










The handle http://hdl.handle.net/1887/32003 holds various files of this Leiden University 
dissertation 
 
Author: Yuanyuan Zhao 
Title: Modelling the dynamics of the innovation process : a data-driven agent-based 
approach  
Issue Date: 2015-02-17 
Modelling the dynamics of the     
innovation process                                       










ter verkrijging van 
de graad van Doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden, 
op gezag van Rector Magnificus Prof. mr. C.J.J.M Stolker, 
volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties 
te verdedigen op dinsdag 17 februari 2015 

















Promotor Prof. Dr. B.R. Katzy 
Co-promotor Dr. R. Ortt (Delft University of Technology) 
 
Overige leden Dr. S.W.Cunningham (Delft University of Technology) 
Prof. Dr. J.N. Kok 
 Prof. Dr. S. Pickl (Universität der Bundeswehr München) 
 Prof. Dr. A. Plaat 


















Printed by: Off Page 






































Table of Contents 
Table of Contents  ........................................................................................................................ 4 
List of Figures............................................................................................................................... 7 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ 8 
1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 9 
1.1 Motivation ...................................................................................................................11 
1.1.1 The importance of innovation ........................................................................11 
1.1.2 Decision making on innovation .....................................................................12 
1.1.3 The difficulty of co llect ing data ....................................................................13 
1.1.4 The challenge of analysing data ....................................................................14 
1.2 Problem statement and research questions ............................................................15 
1.3 Research methodology − in-depth case study .......................................................16 
1.4 Thesis overview..........................................................................................................18 
1.5 References ...................................................................................................................19 
2 A Data-driven Modelling Method for Studying Innovation Processes .............. 21 
2.1 Challenges of modelling innovation processes .....................................................22 
2.2 Overview of research methods for studying innovation processes....................22 
2.3 A new data-driven modelling ...................................................................................24 
2.4 Illustration: Analysing the Nylon innovation ........................................................28 
2.5 Discussion of the data-driven Modelling Method ................................................32 
2.6 Conclusion...................................................................................................................39 
2.7 References ...................................................................................................................40 
3 The Dynamics of Innovation Processes Revisited .................................................... 45 
3.1 Advancing innovation process models ...................................................................46 
3.2 A review of the linear and cyclical model o f innovation ....................................48 
3.2.1 The linear innovation model ..........................................................................48 
3.2.2 The cyclical innovation model.......................................................................49 
3.3 A system view of innovations ..................................................................................50 
3.4 Method of the study ...................................................................................................53 
3.5 Process pattern in the SSRI data ..............................................................................54 
3.5.1 The scientific d iscovery phase (1950s-1960s) ............................................55 
3.5.2 Product development phase (late 1960s -late 1980s) ..................................57 
3.5.3 Prozac’s marketing phase (1990s).................................................................60 
5 
 
3.5.4 Prozac maturity phase (2001--)......................................................................61 
3.6 Discussion ...................................................................................................................63 
3.6.1 Linking linear and cyclical model .................................................................63 
3.6.2 Theoretical implications ..................................................................................65 
3.6.3 Managerial implications..................................................................................67 
3.7 Conclusions .................................................................................................................68 
3.7.1 Answers to RQ2 ...............................................................................................68 
3.7.2 Main contributions ...........................................................................................69 
3.7.3 Future research .................................................................................................69 
3.8 References ...................................................................................................................70 
4 The Emergence of Technological Innovations  .......................................................... 75 
4.1 How to spot emergence? ...........................................................................................76 
4.2 What does “emergence” mean?  ...............................................................................77 
4.3 Can mainstream theories explain emergence? ......................................................79 
4.3.1 Life cycle theory...............................................................................................80 
4.3.2 Evolutionary theory .........................................................................................80 
4.3.3 Punctuated equilibrium theory .......................................................................81 
4.3.4 Social construction theory ..............................................................................82 
4.3.5 Embedded discussion ......................................................................................82 
4.4 A dissipative self-organising model o f emergence ..............................................84 
4.5 Case study: the Teflon innovation...........................................................................86 
4.5.1 Analysis approach ............................................................................................87 
4.5.2 The emergence of Teflon ................................................................................89 
4.6 Discussion ...................................................................................................................96 
4.6.1 Meaning of emergence and the mechanism of emergence .......................97 
4.6.2 Added value of the dissipative self-organising model ...............................99 
4.6.3 Practical implications ....................................................................................102 
4.7 Conclusion.................................................................................................................104 
4.8 References .................................................................................................................105 
5 A minimal-assumption-based agent-based simulation model of the emergence 
of technological innovation ....................................................................................................111 
5.1 Problems when applying agent-based simulation...............................................112 
5.2 Two strategies for simplify ing the simulation model ........................................114 
6 
 
5.2.1 Using hypercycles as a simplifying mechanis ms  .....................................114 
5.2.2 Using pre-defined frameworks to categorise activities............................116 
5.3 The agent-based model............................................................................................117 
5.4 Calibrat ing the model with an empirical innovation case .................................120 
5.4.1 A brief introduction of the Nylon case .......................................................120 
5.4.2 Calibrat ing the simulation model using the Nylon empirics  ..................122 
5.5 Running the model ...................................................................................................123 
5.6 Decision support: scenario design .........................................................................128 
5.6.1 Fluctuations .....................................................................................................129 
5.6.2 Impact of alternative interventions..............................................................130 
5.7 Conclusions and future study .................................................................................132 
5.7.1 Answer to RQ4 ...............................................................................................132 
5.7.2 Five contributions...........................................................................................133 
5.7.3 Future research ...............................................................................................134 
5.8 References .................................................................................................................135 
6 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................139 
6.1 Answers to research questions and problem statement .....................................140 
6.2 Main contributions of the research........................................................................142 
6.2.1 Contribution to data science .........................................................................142 
6.2.2 Contribution to innovation process theory.................................................143 
6.2.3 Contribution to decision making on innovation management ................145 
6.3 Limitations and future research .............................................................................147 
6.3.1 Limitations of the research ...........................................................................147 
6.3.2 Future research ...............................................................................................149 
6.4 A vision on the future ..............................................................................................150 
6.5 References .................................................................................................................152 
Appendix A Supplementary information on Chapter 2  ...........................................155 
Appendix B Supplementary information on Chapter 3  ...........................................181 
Appendix C Supplementary information on Chapter 4  ...........................................211 
Summary.....................................................................................................................................243 
Samenvatting  .............................................................................................................................247 
List of Publications....................................................................................................................251 
Curriculum Vitae  .....................................................................................................................253 
7 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 2.1 Temporal count of events for each system function category .............................30 
Figure 2.2 Technological cycle in Nylon innovation ...............................................................32 
Figure 3.1 Integrated linear and cyclical model ........................................................................52 
Figure 3.2 Four steps of the data-driven method ......................................................................54 
Figure 3.3 The technological cycle in the SSRI innovation ....................................................57 
Figure 3.4 The corporate entrepreneurial cycle in the SSRI innovation ...............................60 
Figure 3.5 The adoption cycle in the SSRI innovation ............................................................61 
Figure 3.6 The entrepreneurial cycle in the SSRI innovation .................................................63 
Figure 3.7 The market-driven cycle in the SSRI innovation ..................................................63 
Figure 3.8 Integrated innovation process of the SSRI  .............................................................64 
Figure 4.1 Positive feedback loops in phase I ...........................................................................90 
Figure 4.2 Positive feedback loops in phase II..........................................................................91 
Figure 4.3 Positive feedback loops in phase III ........................................................................92 
Figure 4.4 Positive feedback loops in phase IV ........................................................................94 
Figure 4.5 Positive feedback loops in phase V..........................................................................96 
Figure 5.1 Hypercycles illustrated by Bratus et al. (2010) ....................................................115 
Figure 5.2 Hypercycles in technological innovations ............................................................116 
Figure 5.3 Flow chart of the simulation....................................................................................119 
Figure 5.4 Interactions between system functions in the Nylon case..................................122 
Figure 5.5 Simulation interface of the Nylon innovation ......................................................124 
Figure 5.6 Evolution of hypercycles in the Nylon case .........................................................127 
Figure 5.7 Simulation result and the Nylon innovation reality .............................................128 





List of Tables 
Table 2.1 Format of chronological event table..........................................................................25 
Table 4.1 Theoretical framework of seven system functions .................................................88 
Table 5.1 Unexpected but meaningful events in the Nylon innovation  ..............................121 
Table 5.2 Behaviour rules of agents in the Nylon innovation  ..............................................122 
Table 5.3 Four chance events and their simulated time  .........................................................123 
Table 5.4 Frequency of system functions in the Nylon innovation .....................................126 












Innovation is a key word for a country’s economic development, a firm’s success, and 
inhabitants’ employment. A main challenge is to deal with the dynamics of innovation 
processes. To understand the dynamics we may attempt to model them. That will be 
the aim of our research.  
This chapter gives our motivation for the current research. We formulate a problem 
statement and four research questions. To answer the research questions we need a 
research methodology. Next to literature research and the analysis of our literature 
findings, we use in-depth case studies. They are briefly introduced in this chapter. 
Their identification is: (1) the Nylon case, (2) the SSRI case, and (3) the Teflon case. 







My motivation for writing this thesis is to model the dynamics of innovation processes. 
Below we describe: the importance of innovation (1.1.1), decision making on 
innovation, in which we deal with the complexity of innovation processes and the 
insufficient information for decision makers (1.1.2), the difficulty of collecting data 
(1.1.3), and the challenge of analysing data (1.1.4). 
1.1.1 The importance of innovation 
Technological innovation is generally believed to be important for a country’s 
economic growth, for a firm’s success and also for a country’s inhabitants. For a 
country, it creates job opportunity, increases economic performance, and improves 
people’s living standard. For firms, it distinguishes their products from those of their 
competitors. The need for innovation is imperative both for nations and firms 
(Eveleens, 2010). For inhabitants, innovation provides challenging opportunities and 
employment satisfaction. As Cooper stated, “It’s war: Innovate or die” (Cooper, 2005, 
p.4). 
Because of the importance of innovation, both national governments and individual 
firms are dedicated in facilitating innovation. For example, China’s expenditures on 
scientific research and technological innovations in 2013 was estimated to reach 
around 1,180 billion yuan ($ 195 billion), almost 2 percent of the GDP (Gross 
Domestic Product) in 2013; and was expected to increase more in 2014 (Zhao, 2014). 
In a similar vein, the budget for EU’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7) for 
Research and Technological Development is as high as 50.5 billion euros, which 
represents a 41% increase compared to FP6 (Vergara, Van Caenegem, & Ibáñez, 2007). 
Efforts at the firm level include, for example, the internet giant Google allowing its 
employees to spend one workday per week exploring projects unrelated to their job 
profiles in order to boost its innovations (Stafford, 2009). IBM calls itself the 
“Innovation Company” and emphasises innovation as an avenue to influence society. 
In 2014, IBM is going to invest more than $1 billion to boost innovation through 
establishing a new business unit for IBM Watson Foundations, which is a new 
developed analytics platform (Firstbiz., 2014). 3M has long emphasised innovation as 
the main driver of its growth. In order to accelerate innovation, 3M invests generously 
in research and development to fuel the innovation pipeline; encourages risk-taking, 
and rewards employees who drive innovation forward. (3M, 2014). 
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1.1.2 Decision making on innovation  
Making decisions about innovation is notoriously difficult.  A multitude of failed 
innovations can provide evidence. Let us take as an example the subsidy policy in the 
German photovoltaic (PV) panel industry. In 2000 the German government issued a 
subsidy policy as market incentives with the purpose of boosting the diffusion of 
photovoltaic innovation. Although this policy has succeeded in attracting more people 
adopting solar panel technology, the cost of solar subsidies paid by the German 
government totalled more than 8 billion euro in 2011, which put the German 
government on the hook for subsidy payments for the excess. So the German 
government began reducing subsidies. However, this decision sent solar companies to 
crisis, and even killed the whole industry.  
A similar failure story of decision making on innovation can be found on the firm level. 
Let us take the failure of Sony’s Reader for e-books as an example. Sony’s Reader for 
e-books was launched in 2006, a year before Amazon brought out the Kindle (SAI, 
2009). Moreover, Sony spent more than twice of what Amazon spent on technology 
development. Compared to Kindle, Sony’s Reader was smaller, slimmer and more 
lightweight. It had a superior screen with “a highly praised ‘electronic ink’ technology 
that was as easy on the eyes as was paper” (Adner, 2012). But Sony’s Reader was 
beaten by Amazon’s Kindle, a weaker product than Reader (Allen, 2012).  
One fundamental reason why decision making on innovation is so difficult is because 
the complexity of innovation processes. Obviously, innovation involves large numbers 
of continuously changing interactions between actors and their activities (Cheng & Van 
de Ven, 1996; Van de Ven, Angle, & Poole, 2000). A consequence of this complex 
interaction is that a small change of one actor’s behaviours or preferences may be 
amplified through the interacted network and produce significant results. This makes it 
hard to predict the relationships between (1) the decisions or actions taken by actors 
and (2) the outcomes they may experience (Cheng & Van de Ven, 1996). Just like the 
German PV panel market, when the government decreased the subsidy, the whole PV 
panel industry was almost destroyed, which is not what had been expected by the 
German policy makers.  
Understanding the complex interactions involved in an innovation system requires big 
amounts of data. Innovation is dynamic and evolves over time, which requires the same 
variable data being collected repeatedly at multiple points of time. Besides, the actors 
Chapter 1 
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that are involved in an innovation scatter at multiple levels (e.g., individuals, firms, 
research institutes, governments, as well as environmental factors), which further 
increases the amount of data. At each point in time data about multiple activities of 
multiple actors as well as the interactions between these actors and activities have to be 
collected, which result in a large database.  
Decision makers very often do not have sufficient information about the complex 
interactions involved in innovation. They miss a comprehensive understanding of the 
entire innovation system. For example, in the German PV panel case, the German 
policy makers did not realise that while they were trying to stimulating the solar panel 
market using a demand-pull innovation policy to stimulate the demand side, the 
Chinese government was carrying out a technology push innovation policy which 
encouraged solar panel manufactures to produce more solar panels. As a result, the 
German solar market stimulated by the demand-pull policy was almost occupied by the 
Chinese manufactured solar panels; and the German solar panel industry was not 
satisfyingly boosted. Similarly, in the Sony Reader for e-books case, Sony failed to 
grapple with the entire innovation system when it brought out its e-Reader. Although 
Sony has better technology in e-Reader, it did not pay attention to the influence of its e-
Reader on the other members of this value chain, e.g., authors and publishers. It did not 
start building a good online store; publishers did not sign on, and neither did readers 
(Allen, 2012).  
1.1.3 The difficulty of collecting data  
The collection of large amounts of data has been a prohibitive difficult undertaking and 
quite labour-intensive (Poole & Van de Ven, 2004). In the innovation research program, 
the Minnesota Innovation Research Program (MIRP) which started in the 1980s and 
aimed at describing how innovation develops over time, the organisers required 
researchers visiting innovation sites not just at one particular time, but at every six 
months, taking detailed records about meetings of each innovation management 
committee (Bitsch, 2005, p.82). It took them decades to collect data and to track what 
happened in the studied innovation processes. Though the cost of collecting and storing 
data has been declining over the past two centuries, until recently it is still relatively 
expensive (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, 2013).  
Currently, it looks like the difficulty of collecting data mentioned above can be solved 
by technological development. As Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier (2013, p.100) stated, 
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“many of the inherent limitations on the collection of data no longer exist”. With the 
development of the Internet and computer techniques, large amounts of data can be 
captured and recorded much more easily and cheaply. For example, starting in 2004 
Google digitises millions of books through scanning every page into a high-resolution 
digital image file which can be easily retrieved by people everywhere through the Web 
(Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, 2013). By searching the key words – “Nylon 
innovation” using the Google search engine, it arrives at about 1,820,000 results in 
about 0.53 seconds. The retrieved results include historical events in Nylon innovation, 
news report, scientif ic descriptions, articles and books, as well as photos and videos 
about Nylon. By searching “Nylon” in the Google Scholar, 1,390,000 results are 
presented within 0.008 seconds. In addition, today many dataset are open to public. For 
example, through the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) database, it 
is easy to gather and track the patent application information for each technological 
innovation under investigation. Ultimately, such easy availability of large amounts of 
data makes it possible to gain a better understanding of the complex interactions 
underlying innovation processes. It enables us to go down to the detailed activities 
underlying innovation processes and to investigate the interaction patterns at the lower-
level, rather than just staying on the surface and averages of innovations.  
1.1.4 The challenge of analysing data 
However, now we are facing the problem of interpreting and analysing the large 
amounts of data. To be most useful, the large amounts of data need to be unlocked and 
analysed to build predictive models. Decision makers need to know what had happened, 
what is happening now, what is likely to happen next and what actions should be taken 
to get the optimal results (LaValle, Lesser, Shockley, Hopkins, & Kruschwitz, 2013, 
p.21).  
The barrier lies in how to extract value from the large amounts of data. The Big Data 
trend transforms our problem-solving approaches (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, 
2013): shifting from a theory-validating to a data-driven approach. We are no longer 
driven by a pre-defined hypothesis about how innovation processes look like, which we 
then attempted to validate by collecting and analysing data; rather, big data allows us to 
work backward, namely starting with data collection, then analys is and finally drawing 
conclusions from whatever patterns may appear (Dutcher, 2013). The large amounts of 
Chapter 1 
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data require new methods. The scientif ic method as we normally use in our research no 
longer works in the Big Data era (Pentland, 2014, p.301).  
Innovation processes as they are executed nowadays contain large amounts of human 
behaviours. These data are textual and qualitative in nature. They are “not readily 
converted into a variable/actor matrix without losing information or doing an injustice 
to the data” (Yang & Gilbert, 2008, p.2). Although social scientists are equipped with 
well-developed statistical techniques to study correlations and regressions among 
numerical data, they have far less well-developed methods to analyse qualitative 
process data (Van de Ven & Poole, 2000). This aggravates the difficulty of decision 
making on innovation. In order to support decision making on innovation, a method 
which is able to theorise from the large amounts of qualitative data is essential. 
1.2 Problem statement and research questions 
With this background, the thesis intends to explore the following problem statement. 
Problem statement:  
To what extent can the new available big amounts of data be used to improve 
decision making on innovations? 
In order to answer the problem statement, four research questions are formulated to be 
further explored. Below each research question is preceded by an explanation. 
 The large amounts of data for innovation together with the inherently 
qualitative nature lead to messy data and require a new analytical method. To 
structure the messy data and to extract valuable insights into the operation of 
actionable decisions, the following research question is investigated in 
Chapter 2. 
RQ1: Is it possible to develop a data-driven modelling method for studying 
innovation processes? 
 Innovation is a dynamic process. Before any efficient decis ions can be made 
on innovation, it is necessary first to have a good understanding of this process. 
In the early days, studying innovation processes was difficult because it 
suffered from constraints of collecting scarce data and analysing it. But now, it 
is possible to gather easily and cheaply data from the internet, which makes it 
possible to see the details of the underlying innovation processes. Taking this 
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opportunity, Chapter 3 reconsiders process theories of innovation and provides 
an overall structure of innovation processes for decision makers to direct this 
process effectively. The study focusses on two stylized models: the linear 
innovation model and the cyclical innovation model. The following research 
question is investigated in Chapter 3. 
RQ2: Is it possible to form an advanced model that is able to combine the 
seemingly contradictory models, namely the linear innovation model and the 
cyclical innovation model?  
 Chapter 4 investigates the emergence of technological innovations. Decision 
makers have to understand the innovation processes if they want to make 
predictions. They have to know which knob to turn in order to stimulate 
innovations. People are used to looking at the statistical averages or the 
aggregates of the system, such as the rate of innovation, the number of 
innovations, and the annual profits brought out by a certain innovation. 
Although averages are useful to obtain a general picture of the developmental 
trend, they provide little hints as regards to how to motivate innovations.  
Innovation systems are made up of millions of interactions. Decision makers 
have to go down to these detailed interactions in order to make effective 
decisions. This is because the outcomes of a certain decision or action are not 
imposed by any central actor, but arise from the lower-level interactions, 
which is frequently referred to as emergence (Snowden & Boone, 2007), 
Emergence is a generic property of complex systems such as innovation 
systems. The following research question is investigated in Chapter 4. 
RQ3: What does emergence mean? And what is the underlying mechanism 
that drives the emergence of technological innovations? 
 The previous chapters are mainly conceptual and are limited in providing 
practical guidance in decision making. In contrast, Chapter 5 goes to 
computational simulation to provide decision support. Simulation provides a 
virtual environment for decision makers to test the effect of their decisions in 
advance. With the fast development of computer power in terms of processing 
capacity and calculation speed, it is now possible to s imulate large amounts of 
data for innovation processes which was not quite possible before. The 
existence of platforms such as NetLogo (CCL, ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo) 
Chapter 1 
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and Repast (Argonne National Laboratory, repast.sourceforge.net), provide 
friendly-use and nice visualisation features, which enable social scientists, 
who are not usually good at computational techniques, to do simulation. 
Therefore, the following research question is investigated in Chapter 5. 
RQ4: Is it possible to simulate the emergent process of innovation so as to 
provide decision support for innovation managers and policy makers? 
1.3  Research methodology − in-depth case study 
To understand the dynamics of innovation processes, the method of in-depth case study 
is adopted in this research. The in-depth case study method is especially recommended 
for complex and poorly understood phenomena such as technological innovation 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). It is able to provide a rich description of the contextual background 
where innovation takes place, and thus a more thorough and comprehensive 
understanding of how and why innovation evolves over time (Berg & Lune, 2004). 
Policy makers as well as innovation managers are more likely to generate practical 
action rules and relevant managerial wisdom from these detailed descriptions than from 
statistic averages (Kodama, 2007; Stevenson & Harmeling, 1990).  
In total, three in-depth technological innovation cases have been investigated. All of 
these three cases are well-documented. The historical data can be obtained from 
internet, relevant books and scientif ic publications. Below we give a brief introduction 
to the three cases. 
Case 1: Nylon innovation (Chapter 2 and 5) 
In Chapter 2, the Nylon innovation case is used to illustrate how the proposed data-
driven modelling method can be applied to analyse a concrete innovation case. In 
Chapter 5, the empirical facts about Nylon innovation are used as input to calibrate the 
simulation model. The Nylon case describes the evolutionary process of Nylon 
technology. Nylon is one type of synthetic plastic  material composed of polyamides of 
high molecular weight, manufactured as a fibre. It was first produced in 1935 by 
DuPont, which created a revolution in the fibre industry.  
The reasons why we choose the Nylon case is because: (1) an interesting feature of the 
Nylon case is that the innovation of a technology gave rise to a new industrial sector; 
(2) the many decades of development of Nylon are disturbed by strong events such as 
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the Second World War and the world-wide oil crisis which mark nonlinear dynamics of 
the Nylon innovation; and (3) the Nylon innovation is one of the classic cases of which 
the data is well-documented and can easily be accessed on the Internet. 
Case 2: Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRI) innovation (Chapter 3)  
In Chapter 3, the Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRI) case is used to 
exemplify the advanced innovation model that is developed in this chapter. This case 
describes how the SSRIs drugs were developed. SSRI is a class of antidepressant drugs 
which are primarily used to treat depression.  
The reason why we choose the SSRI case is because: (1) the development of SSRI is 
acknowledged as a breakthrough in psychotropic medications, because before the 
invention of SSRI all psychotropic medications were based on chance observation; 
SSRIs were the first psychotropic medications that were purposefully designed; (2) the 
complexity of the SSRI innovation is matched by tightly governmental regulations as 
well as unexpected contextual events. Dynamics were primarily driven by multiple 
waves of innovation activities by diverse pharmaceutical companies.  
Case 3: Teflon innovation (Chapter 4) 
In Chapter 4, the Teflon innovation case is used to understand the underlying 
mechanism of the emergence of technological innovations. This case provides a 
general image of what the emergence of technological innovation is. Teflon, 
technically called polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE), is the plastic with slippery, inert, 
non-corrosive and heat-resistant characteristics, and is commonly used for non-stick 
coating for pans and other cookware.  
The reason why we choose the Teflon case is that it provides a good example of the 
emergent process. Teflon was discovered by accident, instead of purposefully planned. 
In 1930 when DuPont and General Motors decided to cooperate in developing new 
refrigerant, nobody would have expected that possibly a by-product material with 
slippery, non-stick and heat-resistant characteristics could be discovered. Even, nobody 
would have said, “Let’s coat our cooking pans with this material and make a non-sticky 
cookware industry”. Yet, this is what Teflon technology exactly grew into: commonly 




1.4 Thesis overview 
Chapter 1 is an introduction to the thesis topic, namely modelling the dynamics of 
innovation processes. First it describes the motivation of this research, and then it 
provides a presentation of the problem statement and the four research questions . And 
finally it describes the methodology and gives an overview of the thesis. 
In Chapter 2 a data-driven modelling method for innovation process study is 
presented. This method takes the advantage of the fast development of Internet and 
digital data sources to develop more advanced process theory. A longitudinal analysis 
of the Nylon innovation case is used to illustrate how the data-driven method can be 
applied. It answers thus RQ1. 
In Chapter 3 the overall structure of innovation processes is investigated. Chapter 3 
applies the data-driven modelling method developed in Chapter 2 to investigate the 
overall structure of innovation processes. It proposes an integrated innovation model 
on the basis of understanding more fine-grained pattern underlying innovation, which 
only gets possible with the necessary data becoming available. This chapter uses the 
example of Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitor (SSRI) as an innovation process in 
the pharmaceutical industry. It answers RQ2. 
In Chapter 4 the emergent property of innovation processes is studied and managerial 
advices on how to enable the emergence of innovation is provided. Instead of focussing 
on the diffusion and adoption processes which assume pre-existing new technologies, 
this chapter addresses the issue of how new technologies come about. A theoretical 
understanding and explanation of the generative process by which innovations develop 
is provided. Guidance about what exactly R&D and innovation managers can do to 
enable emergence is offered. This chapter uses the Teflon innovation case to illustrate 
the underlying mechanism of emergence. It answers thus RQ3. 
In Chapter 5 a simulation model of the emergence of technological innovations is 
presented. The simulation model is calibrated and verified using an empirical 
innovation case, namely the Nylon innovation. It answers thus RQ4. 
Chapter 6 concludes the research by summarising the answers to Research Question 
1 to 4 and providing an answer to the problem statement. It reflects on the 
contributions and limitations of the research. It also presents several recommendations 
for future study.  
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This research is a study of the interface between data science and innovation 
management. The fundamental purpose is to make use of the large amounts of data for 
decision makings on innovation. The details of this research are in the chapters. 
Chapters 2, 3, and 5 have been submitted to corresponding journals and are now under 
peer review. 
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Studying innovation processes remains a challenge for researchers since formalis ing 
from rich but messy process data suffers from the constraints of collecting scarce data 
and processing it – but the constraints are about to be overcome. This chapter aims to 
answer RQ1: is it possible to develop a data-driven modelling method for studying 
innovation processes? Addressing this question, the chapter proposes a data-driven 
method that makes use of the emerging possibilities of big data, i.e., the abundance of 
digital data, to break the traditional trade-off between (a) qualitative methods with rich 
descriptions but without the possibility to develop a general theory, and (b) quantitative 
and simulation methods with high generalisability but with limited in-depth 
understanding of innovation processes. The method consists of five steps: (1) data 
collection, (2) chronological event list, (3) event coding, (4) process pattern 
identification, and (5) simulation. We use a longitudinal case study of Nylon 
innovation to illustrate how the data-driven method can be applied. The chapter arrives 
at criteria to assess the validity of this new method. Finally, the benefits of the new 






2.1 Challenges of modelling innovation processes  
Technological innovation is a dynamic process over time. Therefore, an in-depth 
description of innovation processes over time is the root of (1) any theory building 
(Poole, Van de Ven, Dooley, & Holmes, 2000) and (2) the practical application of the 
theory for decision making (Cantisani, 2006). Yet, analysing innovation processes has 
always been a methodological and practical challenge. Such challenges are present due 
to the need of collecting data over long periods of time and from multiple sources such 
as individuals, companies, governments, and other social actors of which the 
motivations and actions are interrelated and changing. As a result, process studies are 
often felt to be drowning in the messy data of thick qualitative descriptions with little 
formalisation (Langley, 1999). In contrast, quantitative and simulation methods apply 
“clean” data sets as needed for numerical analysis (Modell, 2011) but for innovation 
processes they rather consist of shaky numerical proxy indicators, such as  patent data 
or scientific publications (see, e.g., Heinze, 2004) with limitations in descriptive power. 
This chapter is motivated by recent advances of the increasing availability of massive 
online data, sometimes referred to as big data (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, 2013), 
which offers new ways to overcome this hitherto trade-off. To benefit from the large 
amounts of data, the data analysis methodologies need to be tuned towards a more 
concrete link between empirical data and its formal analysis. 
Therefore, the aim of the chapter is to answer RQ1: is it possible to develop a data-
driven modelling method for studying innovation processes? 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides a literature review on process 
research methods. The data-driven process modelling method is presented in section 
2.3. Its application is illustrated in section 2.4 and its validity and added value are 
discussed in section 2.5. In section 2.6, the chapter concludes with considerations on 
the contributions of the data-driven method to theory development and to decision 
making on innovations. 
2.2 Overview of research methods for studying innovation 
processes 
Process studies are concerned with understanding how innovations evolve over time 
(Mohr, 1982) and why they evolve in the way they do (Langley, 1999, p.692). The core 
challenge, as Langley (1999) identif ied, is to construct a theory from “process data” 
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which are collected around a technological innovation. Three methodological 
approaches are commonly used: (1) quantitative analysis based on time-series data 
(Heinze, 2004; Reinsel, 1994) such as patent data (see, e.g., Fleming & Sorenson, 2001) 
or publication data (see, e.g., Franzoni, 2008; Heinze, 2004; Sakata, Sasaki, Kajikawa, 
Hashimoto, & Morita, 2010; Trajtenberg, 1999), (2) qualitative analysis based 
narrative data such as historical stories, scripts from interviews, or field observations 
(see, e.g., Darnhofer, Fairweather, & Moller, 2010; Klerkx, Aarts, & Leeuwis, 2010), 
and (3) simulation methods (see, e.g., Gilbert, 2005). Below we explain each approach 
respectively.  
The first approach is based on quantitative data that usually uses statistical methods to 
search for patterns or to test theoretical explanations (Langley, 1999, p.697), and 
therefore is referred to as “quantitative studies”. Benner and Tushman (2002), for 
example, apply statistical regression to correlate process management activities  with 
technological innovation using patent data. Similarly, Fleming and Sorenson (2001) 
analyse the relationship between the usefulness of an invention and the knowledge 
components of that invention using patent data. While these process models show high 
generalisability and simplicity (Langley, 1999, p.697-698), they lack descriptions of 
important contextual information, or as Prasad and Rubenstein (1992) put it, “the 
subtle undercurrents remain obscured or get washed out during data aggregation”.  
The second approach is based on qualitative data. In contrast with quantitative analys is, 
it uses narrative descriptions to depict how innovation processes unfold over time (Van 
de Ven & Poole, 2000) and are therefore called “qualitative studies”. Angle and Van de 
Ven (1989) employed narratives to examine the processes of fourteen different 
technical and administrative innovations. Similarly, Kijkuit et al. (2010) give a 
historical description of how networks of employees in the front end of the new 
product development process evolves over time.   Hoeber and Hoeber (2012) adopt a 
similar method to track how community sport organisations undertook a technological 
innovation to classify the determinants that contributed to innovation processes. This 
narrative style offers descriptive richness and a more thorough understanding of 
process dynamics over time in their context. But it does not identify patterns, therefore 
does not contribute to “either simple or general theory” (Langley, 1999, p.697). A 
further critique is the lack of scientif ic credibility because of the inherently non-
transparent and subjective interpretation behind constructed narrations.  
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The third approach of studying innovation processes is the construction of formal 
models and the experimental study of process evolution through computer simulation. 
The data used by simulation models are usually a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative data. For example, Maier (1998) created system dynamics models to 
simulate the influence of diverse factors on the diffusion of innovation. He formulated 
the relationship between the variables in mathematical equations and then calibrated 
the model parameters to specific empirical study contexts through quantifying 
qualitative primary data. Similarly, Kanniainen et al. (2011) established a stochastic 
Bass model to forecast the diffusion of innovation. Cui et al. (2011) applied system 
dynamics models to simulate dynamic feedback mechanisms in the new product launch 
process, and Schuler et al. (1991) used simulation to examine the effects of process 
innovation and product innovations on the quality of logs in the Canadian softwood 
lumber industry. The advantages of simulation models lie in the formal logical 
integration of multiple factors and actors into one single model. Such models are 
computer executable and provide researchers and practitioners with a virtual 
experimentation environment (Simon, 1996). But these are often criticised as “toy 
models” that have too loose relationships with reality to make sense or provide 
practical guidance (Garcia & Jager, 2011; Grimm et al., 2006). 
Each of the three approaches is motivated by their specific strengths, which make the 
three main requirements for any rigorous process study method explicit as: first, the 
ability to identify general patterns of innovation; second, maintaining transparent 
relationships with detailed longitudinal empirical data; and third, establishing explicit 
causal explanation of how factors lead to the observed patterns. With this in mind, we 
provide a data-driven study method in the following section. 
2.3 A new data-driven modelling  
In this section we propose a data-driven modelling method for studying innovation 
processes. It consists of five steps: (A) step 1 - data collection, (B) step 2 - 
chronological event list, (C) step 3 - event coding, (D) step 4 - process pattern 
identification, and (E) step 5 - simulation. 
A Step 1 - Data Collection 
Process data are data about what happened, at what time and by whom. There is no 
standard criterion about the appropriate amount of data to be collected. But the 
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experience of qualitative studies suggests that more data creates a fuller picture of the 
process. Big data opens new opportunities to collect data from multiple independent 
sources, which increases the validity of data through triangulation. Historical archives 
are a useful data source, in combination with real-time interviews and participant 
observations, which however require sufficient resources, observation skills and 
context knowledge by the research team to return valid data (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007, 
p.59). Data collection through databases, Internet search or automatically collected 
sensor data has become a convenient additional opportunity. Like any other research 
methodology, the quality of data defines the possible reach of later conclusions. 
B Step 2 - Chronological Event List 
Representation is an essential requirement for transparent documentation and future 
data access. In step 2, data is represented as a chronological list of events. Events are 
“changes in ideas, strategies, personnel, and context, which are key indicators 
capturing the trajectory of innovation” (Schroeder, 2000). Through iterative 
interpretation events are distilled and constructed from multiple data sources. The 
outcome is a table that represents when, by whom, what happened during innovation 
processes, and where the raw data came from. The format is given in Table 2.1. The 
quality of this step is ensured by (1) documenting the relations between raw data and 
constructed events; and (2) co-coding by multiple researchers. The resulting 
chronological list of events, rather than raw data, is the basis for further identification 
of patterns (Van de Ven & Poole, 2000).  
Table 2.1 Format of chronological event table 
Time By whom Events References 
    
    
C Step 3 - Event Coding 
In step 3 the qualitatively described events of Table 2.1 are further coded using abstract 
categories. This involves two sub-steps: (1) define categories and (2) code events using 
the established categories. 
1) Define Categories: The term “categories” here refers to a generic conceptual 
framework that is used for sorting and grouping big amounts of data (Van de 
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Ven & Poole, 2000). One way of deriving categories is through literature 
review or through the application of existing theoretical frameworks, which 
Maxwell (2008) terms “theoretical categorisation”. 
Let us look at two examples of the “theoretical categorisation”. The first 
example is Rogers’ five adopter categories, namely innovators, early adopters, 
early majority, late majority, and laggards (Rogers, 2010), which are a 
frequently used framework to classify customers during the technological 
diffusion process. The second example is the social system framework 
proposed by Van de Ven and Garud (1987), which is often used to group 
activities involved in the emergence of new industries.  
If there is no suitable framework in existing theories, researchers have to 
create inductively their own categories through summarising categories from 
the empirical data. Abstracting new categories from events can turn this sub-
step (define categories) into an inductive theory building exercise. 
2) Code Events Using the Established Categories: Each event is now related to 
one or more of the established categories. For each category a coding scheme 
needs to be developed that describes the characteristics of events that belong 
to this category. The evolving coding scheme advances theory building and 
allows studies to be reproduced. 
The contribution of step 3 is twofold: (1) the complexity of the data set is reduced (Dey, 
2003, p.94) and (2) abstraction is increased with the transformation of events into a set 
of quantitative time series that can further be analysed using mathematical methods 
(Langley, 1999, p.697). 
D Step 4 - Process Pattern Identification 
The aim of step 4 is to re-construct macro-level patterns of innovation processes from 
micro-level events. Three proven approaches are provided in the literature: (D1) 
temporal bracketing, (D2) trend pattern analysis, and (D3) interaction pattern analysis. 
D1: Temporal Bracketing is the basic sense-making strategy for process studies and is 
in fact a straightforward structuring of a process by successive phases (Langley, 1999). 
Events with shared purposes (e.g., technological development, marketing) are grouped 
into the same phase. This approach is suitable to structure nonlinear organis ing 
processes (Chiles, Meyer, & Hench, 2004) and has been used by Negro (2007), Suurs 
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(Suurs, 2009; Suurs & Hekkert, 2009b), Lichtenstein (Lichtenstein, Carter, Dooley, & 
Gartner, 2007; Lichtenstein, Dooley, & Lumpkin, 2006), and Langley (Langley, 1999; 
Langley & Truax, 1994). 
D2: Trend Pattern analysis aims at obtaining an overview of development trends at a 
macro level. This is usually done through graphic plotting of a number of events 
related to a category over time. The visual representation combines qualitative event 
data with a quantitative analysis. It gives a direct and explic it picture of the major 
development trend of the technological innovation. For example, a cluster of events in 
a certain period may indicate active innovation activities. It has successfully been used 
by Van de Ven and Poole (2000), Abell (1987) and Suurs and Hekkert (2009b). 
D3: Interaction Pattern analysis investigates causal relationships between events to 
explore the underlying micro-foundations of trajectory structures over time (Van de 
Ven & Poole, 2000). Such coding needs to be distinguished from studies of 
relationships between structural components of systems (see, e.g., Islam & Ozcan, 
2013). They describe “lead-to” relationships between events, not the contingency 
relations of variance studies. One event “leads to” another event if it triggers the 
happening of it. For example, the event “R&D investment increases” may lead to a 
“scientific discovery” sometime later, which is a different relation than the structural 
relationship “R&D budget” that may be correlated with “innovativeness of the product 
portfolio”. 
The three process patterns described in this step are complementary and can be applied 
to the same data set to mature process understanding. 
E Step 5 - Simulation 
The previous four steps provide a set of knowledge on how a technological innovation 
evolves over time by identifying macro-level patterns and micro-level mechanisms 
underlying the patterns. This step intends to go one step further from understanding 
historical facts to forecast the future.  
Simulation is based on formal models that can be executed by computers. Agent-based 
modelling is a tool that can integrate qualitative results into a simulation model. By 
describing simple rules of behaviour of individual agents and the interactions between 
these behaviours, the macro-level patterns that emerge from these micro-level 
foundations can be simulated.  
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The data and research results obtained through the previous four steps provide valuable 
empirical foundations for the agent-based simulation. Firstly, the interaction patterns 
identified between events provide qualitative causal models between behaviours of 
actors which can be used as input for agent-based modelling to calibrate the 
interactions between agents. Secondly, the in-depth qualitative analys is, especially the 
identified trend patterns, offer stylised facts about the innovation of interest, which can 
be used to verify the simulation model through comparing simulation outputs with 
these identified stylised facts. Simulation models constructed in this way overcome the 
critiques of “toy problems” through actually bas ing the inputs of the model on micro-
level data, and contrasting the subsequent validation of the outputs against macro-level 
data (Garcia & Jager, 2011).   
After the simulation model has been verified, it can serve as an experimental platform, 
which allows policy and decision makers to test their ideas in advance through 
designing a range of if-then scenarios and thus providing decision support. 
2.4 Illustration: Analysing the Nylon innovation 
Below we analyse the Nylon innovation to illustrate how to apply the data-driven 
method to study innovation processes.  
Nylon was a revolutionary innovation, which opened the era of petrochemical 
manufactured fibres. Before Nylon was invented, fibres were derived from plant 
cellulose. The case of Nylon is selected because: (1) It has an interesting feature, 
namely that the innovation of Nylon gave r ise to a new industrial sector; (2) the Nylon 
innovation is one of the classic cases of which the data is well-documented and can 
easily be accessed on the Internet; and (3) starting from the late 1920s this case spans 
many decades of development and diffusion, which enables a holistic and systematic 
examination of innovation processes. Below the five steps of the data-driven modelling 
method were applied to analyse the Nylon innovation process: (A) data collection, (B) 
chronological event list, (C) event coding, (D) process pattern identif ication, and (E) 
simulation.  
A Step 1 - Nylon Data Collection 
In the Nylon case, the source of data is mainly historical secondary data. This is 
because: (1) the Nylon innovation has a long history, making interview and partic ipant 
observation practically impossible; therefore an ex-post analysis is more appropriate; 
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and (2) the collection of the historical data has become relatively easy with the 
availability of data via the Internet (Yin, 2009). Particularly, for the development 
process of Nylon and for Du Pont strategy we rely on Hounshell and Smith (1988a; 
1988b), and the website (Cook-Hauptman, 2013) copyrighted by Cook-Hauptman 
Associates, Inc. which provides the innovation history of Nylon since 1930s. These 
documents provide rich material to investigate the Nylon development process. All 
these data were obtained from the internet, which also presents the value of the new 
method in terms of its ability to take advantages of the accessibility of data on the 
internet, and furthermore to transfer these scattered and messy process data into 
patterns. 
B Step 2 - Nylon Chronological Event List 
In practice, this step is usually concurrent to and iterative with the data collection step. 
Whenever a new data source is found, the table of events is updated using the new 
source.  
C Step 3 - Nylon Event Coding 
In the Nylon case, we use theoretical coding with the seven system functions by 
Hekkert et al. (2007). The seven system functions represent seven categories of 
activities that are necessary for a technological innovation to succeed. The 
completeness and validity of the seven system functions have been tested and 
confirmed by empirical studies (see, e.g., Edquist, 2004; Hekkert et al., 2007; 
Jacobsson & Johnson, 2000; Negro, Hekkert, & Smits, 2007; Suurs & Hekkert, 2009a). 
The seven system functions are entrepreneurial activities, knowledge development, 
knowledge diffusion, guidance of the search, market formation, resource mobilisation, 
and support from advocacy coalitions, to which we will refer as F1 through F7 in the 
above order. 
Coding the events to the above system functions is done through a coding scheme, 
which can be found in Appendix A.2. The coding results are present in Appendix A.3. 
During the coding process, we find that events do not always contribute positively to 
system function, but sometimes negatively. For example, while the event “increasing 
investment in technology development” positively contributes to the “resource 
mobilisation” function [F6], the event “decreased investment” constitutes a negative 
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resource mobilisation function [-F6]. In this sense, in order to distinguish the negative 
and positive contribution, we mark them as −1 or 1 respectively. 
D Step 4 - Nylon Process Pattern Identification 
Below we use three approaches to identify process patterns of the Nylon innovation: 
(D1) temporal bracketing; (D2) trend pattern analysis, and (D3) interaction pattern 
analysis.  
D1: Temporal Bracketing: Temporal Bracketing of the Nylon innovation 
process shows five discrete phases between 1920 and 1990: (1) Invention 
phase from 1926 until 1934 as resources and activities were dominantly 
allocated to the technological invention of Nylon; (2) Technological 
improvement phase from 1935 until 1937, as attention shifted to Nylon 
performance improvement; (3) Market entry phase from 1936 until 1940 with 
the first market introduction of Nylon; (4) Market maturity phase from 1941 
until the oil crisis of 1970, with the focus on market expansion and products 
diversity, and finally, (5) Decline phase from 1971 until 1990, when Nylon 
was confronted with declining profits. 
D2: Trend Pattern Analysis: For each development period the count of events 
for each system function can be quantitatively obtained as illustrated in Figure 
2.1. The X-axis indicates the time; the Y-axis refers to the number of events; 
and the colour indicates the relation to the system function category.  
 
Figure 2.1 Temporal count of events for each system function category  
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Trend pattern provides a general image of the Nylon innovation process. The 
upward movement of the Nylon innovation embraces the period from 1926 to 
1960s, which is 43 years; its decline begins in the 1970s and lasts until 1980s 
(subject to our study time range), a period of 10 years. From 1926 till 1935, the 
Nylon innovation system mainly involves the entrepreneurial function [F1], 
knowledge development [F2], guidance of the search [F4], and resource 
mobilisation [F6], which implies intense technological development activities. 
The market formation function [F5] first appeared in 1935, which indicates the 
beginning of technological commercialisation. The time period between 1935 
and 1941 witnesses the full involvement of the seven system functions. In 
particular, the most frequent appearance of the market formation function [F5], 
technology development function [F2], and guidance of the search function 
[F4] can be found in the year 1937. After the year 1941 till 1980s, the system 
was dominantly f illed with two functions: guidance of the search function [F4] 
and resource mobilisation function [F6]. And after 1971 event counts are 
overall negative, which explains the decline of the Nylon innovation system.  
D3: Interaction Patterns analysis: The analysis of interaction patterns of 
which events “lead to” further events is a distinct analysis and returns an 
interesting result in the case of Nylon. Cyclical patterns emerge when the 
“lead to” chains of events start from one system function, leading to other 
system functions which eventually feed back to the initial system function, 
thereby forming a close loop. The closed loops are recurring patterns that 
emerge and dissipate again over time. The innovation system’s behaviours are 
consistently “attracted” by event sequences in cycles that dominate the 
system’s evolution (Kiel & Elliott, 1996). We found six such cycles in the 
Nylon innovation process, which can be found in Appendix A.4. Below we 
only describe one technological development cycle as an illustration.  
The Technological development cycle, for example, dominated the initial 
development phase of the Nylon innovation process. Positive outcomes of 
technological experiments [F2] motivated knowledge diffusion [F3], and 
influenced the guidance of the search [F4] which further fed back, via 
increasing investment [F6] to successive knowledge development [F2]. 
Gradually, this contributed to an increasing knowledge base, thereby forming a 




Figure 2.2 Technological cycle in Nylon innovation 
Similarly closed loops were driving the market entry, market mature, and 
decline phase of the Nylon innovation as described in Appendix A.4. 
E Step 5 - Nylon Simulation 
The now achieved process model of the Nylon case provides empirical data as well as 
the necessary structural information for formal modelling. An example is agent-based 
modelling to further explore the dynamic characteristics of the Nylon innovation 
system. Simulation results can then be compared with the empirical description of the 
Nylon innovation process. Controlled manipulation of model parameters can be used 
for if-then scenarios or managerial decision support. How such a simulation model is 
established, validated and adopted for decision making will be described in details in 
Chapter 5.  
2.5 Discussion of the data-driven Modelling Method 
Below we discuss: (A) the validity of the data-driven modelling method; (B) what 
needs to be paid attention to, when using the method; and (C) the added value of the 
method. 
A Validity of the data-driven modelling method 
We start the discussion with a look on the validity of the data-driven modelling method 
in the broad meaning put forward by Maxwell (1992, p.284): “Validity is not an 
inherent property of a particular method, but pertains to the data, accounts, or 
conclusions reached by using that method in a particular context for a particular 
purpose. To speak of the validity of a method is simply a shorthand way of referring to 
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the validity of the data or accounts derived from that method”. Criteria for the validity 
and the rigour of research studies have been established and can be used for checking 
the validity of the developed data-driven modelling method (Adcock & Collier, 2001; 
Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003; Brod, Tesler, & Christensen, 2009; Thomas & Magilvy, 
2011).   
Since the process data around a technological innovation are qualitative, subjective and 
contextual rather than quantitative and rigorous, we find it more proper to apply the 
validity criteria for qualitative research than those for quantitative research to test the 
validity of the developed method. Through literature review, we combine Maxwell 
(1992)’s five categories of validity with Auerbach & Silverstein (2003)’s category of 
transparency as a checklist to test the validity of our research. because the reason is that 
the combination covers almost all those categories of validity in qualitative research 
and provides a thorough framework to evaluate the validity of qualitative research, 
which includes concerns of validity threats in almost every analysis step of the research, 
for example data collection, description, interpretation, analysis and evaluation. The 
five categories of validity from Maxwell (1992) are: descriptive validity, interpretive 
validity, theoretical validity, generalisability, and evaluative validity; together with the 
transparency validity from Auerbach & Silverstein (2003), they make the six categories 
of validity as a checklist to evaluate the validity of our research.  
1) Descriptive Validity refers to the accuracy of data (Maxwell, 1992; Thomson, 
2011). The collected data must accurately represent what happened, and what 
human participants have said or done. The descriptive validity plays a 
fundamental role in other categories of validity test as the data are the basis or 
input for all further actions and therefore it is crucial that they are of a good 
quality. In the case of Nylon, descriptive validity is given as we use long-term 
historical data from multiple data sources and reviewed by different 
researchers. 
2) Interpretive Validity tests how well researchers comprehend the phenomena 
from the perspective of the participants engaged in the studied situation 
instead of from the researcher’s perspective (Headland, Pike, & Harris, 1990; 
Maxwell, 1992). Interpretive validity concerns the event coding step (step 3) 
of the data-driven method. Three different researchers did code the Nylon 
case, a method that is known to reduce the bias of a single researcher ś 
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interpretation. Individual results were triangulated. Differences were used to 
improve the coding schemes. Moreover, the analysis unit of the method is 
events, which refers to what really happened in a technological innovation, 
therefore there is no issue of generalisability or representativeness involved. 
3) Theoretical Validity “goes beyond the concrete description and interpretation 
and explicitly addresses the theoretical constructions that the research adopts 
for, or develops during the study” (Maxwell, 1992, p.291). Theoretical 
validity of the presented Nylon study is achieved by adopting the well-
developed and tested theoretical framework of innovation system functions 
and to base the coding categories for events on it.  
4) Generalisability means “the extent to which one can extend the account of a 
particular situation or population to other persons, times, or settings than 
those directly studied” (Maxwell, 1992, p.293). Qualitative research is always 
criticised for tis lacking generalisability because of the single or small number 
of sampling size. But many researchers have recognized that there are 
different meanings of “generalisability” in (a) qualitative research and (b) 
quantitative and simulation research. Maxwell (2008), Becker (1990), and 
Ragin (1989) expressed that the generalisability of qualitative research should 
not be evaluated based on explicit sampling of some defined population to 
which the results can be extended, but on the development of a theory that can 
be extended to other cases. Yin (2009) refers to this as “‘analytic’, as opposed 
to statistical generalisation” (Maxwell, 2008, p.246). And Guba and Lincoln 
(1989) argued that it may be more appropriate to talk of “transferability” 
rather than “generalisability” in qualitative research. The five steps of the here 
proposed data-driven modelling method are five intermediate steps between 
rich specific data of a concrete situation and general, theoretical explanations. 
These five steps can be transferred to other innovation process studies. 
Moreover, the specific Nylon case provides an in-depth understanding of how 
technological innovation evolves over time. 
5) Evaluative Validity is the credibility of the assessment made by the 
researchers (Maxwell, 1992; Thomson, 2011). The quest is for an evaluative 
framework to assess the credibility of the research results (Maxwell, 1992, 
p.295). This requires a comparison between achieved results with existing 
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literature in the same field. In the Nylon case, the identified cyclical pattern 
resembles the main activities identified in Dosi (1982)’s technological 
trajectory concept, which hypothesises that in the emerging phase of a 
technology initial importance is attributed to knowledge accumulation, which 
is called the technological cycle in this study, followed by an entrepreneurial 
phase characterised by multiplicity of risk-taking actors who contribute to 
technical and commercial trial and error, which is called the entrepreneurial 
cycle in this study, and finally a phase of “oligopolistic maturity” during 
which the market is occupied by a few market and technical leaders, which 
we call the market-driven cycle in this study. The reproduction of known 
findings on the macro-level patterns of innovation processes points to the 
added value of the data-driven method in reconstituting these patterns from 
the rich data on the micro-level events that innovation processes are made of. 
6) Transparency Validity refers to “how well the researcher informs the reader 
how they arrived at their interpretation” (Thomson, 2011, p.80). In order to 
achieve this validity, the research process and the coding procedures must be 
carefully documented and presented clearly to the readers in order to make it 
possible for other researchers to reproduce the research results. 
From a transparency point of view, the five steps of the data-driven method 
constitute a study protocol. Raw data are documented in the data collection 
step (step 1). The chronological list of events is documented with reference to 
the raw data in the chronological event- list step (step 2). The conceptual 
categories and the coding schema are documented in the event-coding step 
(step 3). The identified process patterns are documented in the process-
pattern-identif ication step (step 4). And the simulation process with the source 
codes is documented in the simulation step (step 5), which will be described 
in Chapter 5. This does not only make the research process transparent and 
replicable by other researchers, but also supports the operational research 
process, which of course is not as linear as the five phases may suggest. At 
any point in time, new data can be introduced into the corresponding steps 
which form an evolving version of the research documents. 
In summary, we may remark that the data-driven modelling method developed in this 
chapter has fulfilled the six criteria of validity for qualitative research.  
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B Operationalisation of the data-driven modelling method 
In order to provide practical guidance for researchers and practitioners, we summarise 
below three points that need to be paid attention to when using this new method: (B1) 
defining the unit of analysis, (B2) data collection, and (B3) event coding.  
B1: Defining the Unit of Analysis is a practically challenging task when analysing 
innovation processes. The reason is that a technological innovation usually includes 
multiple actors, networks and institutions that shape the development and diffusion of a 
new technology. Therefore, the process data usually involve multiple levels and units 
of analysis of which the boundaries are ambiguous (Langley, 1999, p.692). For 
example, there are not only components or activities which are exclusively dedicated to 
the technology in focus, but also those which indirectly impose their impact via 
changing the context of the innovation. Therefore, there may be no explicit boundary 
which you can draw in advance; but you can always draw the boundary based on the 
elements and activities that really contribute to the development and deployment of the 
technology in question.  
B2: Data Collection from overwhelming amounts of big data remains a key question in 
innovation process studies. Obviously collected data needs to be free from selection 
bias and other known basic data collection flaws. As processes emerge from events, we 
discuss the issue from the question of how many events are needed to establish a 
process pattern. Piloting scholars who applied event-based methods to innovation 
processes such as Bergek (2007), Hekkert et al. (2007), Suurs and Hekkert (2009b), 
define events as what happened in innovation processes and undertake trend pattern 
analys is based on all events that happened. As a result, some 1,000 – 4,000 events for a 
period of 10-30 years are used to model innovation processes (Suurs, 2009). In contrast, 
Van de Ven et al. (2000) in their Minnesota Innovation Research, define events as 
moments of change in terms of actors, institutions, technology, and external 
environment, not as recurring routine activities, which results in a much smaller 
number of events. The collection of events for the Nylon case followed the latter 
approach and could be based on about 40 relevant events for a period of 50 years. 
Because these events as moments of change have significant impact on Nylon’s 
innovation process, they can be cross-checked with the narrative of published 
storylines of the case.  
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It is helpful to use professional journals to collect events in the field of technological 
innovations. For emerging technologies, it is important to have a fixed set of sources 
for the period that is investigated; otherwise the event trend line is more dependent on 
the number of sources that are included in the analysis rather than on the actual trends 
in the innovation system.  
B3: Event coding is essential to transform the qualitative data into quantitative data. 
During coding, it is possible that one event could be coded into more than one 
conceptual category. For example, in the Nylon case, the event that “DuPont unveiled 
Nylon to women’s club members” may be interpreted as a contribution to three system 
functions (categories): “Knowledge diffusion”, “Market formation”, as well as 
“Support from advocacy coalitions”. In order to avoid this ambiguity, we use the same 
method as Suurs (2009) through dividing the event into detailed actions. For example, 
we coded the “unveiling of Nylon to women’s club” itself as “Knowledge diffusion” 
[F3], the “lobbying it undertakes” to “Support from advocacy coalitions” [F7], and the 
“purpose of this event” to “Market formation” [F5]. 
If the system functions are also used as a conceptual framework to structure events, it 
is important to know that events can contribute positively or negatively to system 
functions (Suurs, 2009). If one event is “positive”, then it counts for “1”; otherwise, it 
counts for “-1”. This also explains why in the trend pattern graph, lines below zero can 
be seen. Moreover, it is also important to stress that the seven system functions are 
useful for classifying and organising chronological events, but there may be other 
functions which are not covered by the seven functions; or the other way around, there 
may be a few events which can be categorised into some of the seven functions. 
Therefore, during coding process, it is important to keep in mind whether extra system 
functions are needed or an extant one is irrelevant.  
The coding of events into different types is an iterative process. In order to ensure the 
internal validity of the method, two points need to be emphasised: (1) new identified 
innovation events are interpreted in terms of the system functions and simultaneous ly 
the system functions are examined against these empirical data; and (2) the 
classifications are re-examined and verified by another researcher; differences are 
discussed until an agreement is achieved. 
Chapter 2 
38  
C Added values of the data-driven modelling method 
Compared to other methods, the new method developed in this chapter has five 
additional benefits.  
First, our method allows for a combination between qualitative, quantitative and 
computational simulation analysis. Particularly, structuring events into a conceptual 
framework / categories in step 3 provides the possibility for quantitative analysis 
through generating frequency counts of the events in each category. Moreover, the 
interactions pattern analysis in step 4 provides potential empirical inputs for an agent-
based simulation model, which is able to simulate the upper-level emergence given the 
lower-level interaction patterns (this will be especially explained in Chapter 5). 
Therefore, the advantages of qualitative analysis in terms of a rich description and 
those of quantitative or simulation analysis in their higher generalisability are 
combined in this method. 
Second, the five steps provide a standard protocol for innovation process studies, 
which makes the modelling process more transparent and tractable. The empirical 
results from the first four steps not only provide valid inputs for computational 
simulations (step 5), but also the validation of the simulation model can be tested 
through comparing simulation outputs with the empirical data. Simulation models 
constructed in this way have a close connection with empirical facts. 
Third, the new modelling method allows paying attention to small, accident and 
context events by going deeply into the micro foundations underlying innovation 
processes. The events are usually treated as noises and elicited from models in 
traditional methods (Thietart & Forgues, 1995). However, the new method takes the 
role of small changes and random events as a part of the analysis through evaluating 
events not only from the direct and immediate effects, but also retrospectively from 
their long-term role in shaping the innovation system’s developmental path. Let us look 
at two examples of the accident events in the Nylon case. As a first example, the 
“accident” event, namely that the Nylon polymer was not suitable for making yarn but 
was found to be useful as a material to make bristles, paved the way for Nylon’s first 
market entry. As a second example, the “accident” event, namely the World War II, 
disrupted Nylon’s diffusion in the civil market, but created a niche market for Nylon in 
the military market. Such accident events stand out from other data, because they 
separate the development path and punctuate the equilibrium points. 
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Fourth, the new method offers a multiple level understanding of innovation dynamics. 
Existing studies on innovations focus either on the micro-level descriptions of 
interactions among actors or on the macro-level overall trends (Poole et al., 2000). 
Since technological innovation is a multi- level phenomenon (Markard & Truffer, 2008), 
these studies may not provide a complete understanding of the phenomena. The new 
method combines both micro-level and macro-level analyses, which are respectively 
reflected in: trend pattern analysis and interaction pattern analysis. Trend pattern 
analys is focusses on the developmental path at an aggregate level, while the interaction 
pattern analysis explores the interaction patterns underlying the path at a micro level. 
The synergy of these two types of analyses provides a systematic view and complete 
understanding of technological innovation. 
Fifth, the new method offers a new way of identifying patterns. Instead of studying the 
interactions between structural components of a system, this new method focusses on 
interaction patterns between events. The term of “event” includes information about 
what happened, who did that and when, which is a combination of actors and activities 
over time. Bergek et al. (2011, p.5) pointed out that it is difficult to evaluate the 
goodness or badness of a system component without referring to its effects on 
innovation processes. Events have a direct and immediate influence on technological 
innovations. Thus, in these events policy makers may directly intervene, not 
necessarily in the establishment of system components. The interactions between 
events mean that some events lead to other events, thereby forming an action and re-
action chain of events. System components are transformed by this ongoing chain of 
events. Through focussing on the interactions between events, the new method allows 
us to distil structure from contents, and offers a minimalist set of assumptions within 
which to examine the emergence of innovation. 
2.6 Conclusion  
The fast development of Internet and digital data sources has important impacts on 
social science research. In this chapter we have addressed RQ1: is it possible to 
develop a data-driven modelling method for studying innovation processes? The 
answer is yes. To answer RQ1, we provide a data-driven modelling method which 
opens new possibilities for theory building. The new method consists of five steps: (A) 
step 1 - data collection, (B) step 2 - chronological event list, (C) step 3 - event coding, 
(D) step 4 - process pattern identif ication, and (E) step 5 - simulation. The core of this 
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method is the identif ication and explanation of interaction patterns between events. The 
main benefit of the new method is that it goes deep into the structure underlying the 
seemingly random innovation processes through focussing on what happened in the 
innovation system, instead of the structural elements of the system. For illustration, the 
Nylon innovation is analysed using this method. It shows how qualitative research 
techniques can be integrated with quantitative and simulation research in a rigorous 
way and what conceptual conclusions can be expected from such an approach. 
New insights into innovation dynamics are obtained as a result of this new method. 
Using the new method, the internal dynamics of innovations in the form of interactions 
between events will be captured. Besides, the empirical results from this new method 
may be further used for agent-based modelling, which will be specified in Chapter 5. 
The combination of qualitative analysis and agent-based modelling may solve the 
problem of loose connections between empirics and computational simulations, thus 
leading to practical guidance for decision makers. 
Decision makers can benefit from this new method in terms of a more thorough 
understanding of innovation processes and how their activities may influence the 
processes. Particularly, by explaining the dynamics of innovation processes in terms of 
the outcome of interactions between various events, the new method can then be used 
as a focussing device for decision makers to identify the intervention points where a 
small effort can lead to signif icant effects. Furthermore, assisted by computational 
simulation, a scenario test is possible which enables decision makers to test the effect 
of their decisions before they are put into act.  
The chapter was deliberately limited to a small and mature case (the Nylon case) and 
the method was manually applied. Future work can develop automated data collection 
and modelling approaches, as well as the development of a computer-based simulation 
and analysis.  
The chapter contributes mainly to the academic discussion on how to advance research 
methods for building innovation theory in the big data era. Concrete steps with tangible 
intermediate results and validation criteria can serve as a practical checklist to design 
and assess future studies. 
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The dynamics of innovation processes are explained in stylised models only: the linear 
model and the cyclical model. The recent availability of large amounts of data via the 
Internet and more powerful computer-based tools allows for more fine-grained analysis 
of the dynamics of innovation processes. Therefore, this chapter revisits the dynamics 
of innovation processes, and addresses RQ2: Is it possible to form an advanced model 
that is able to combine the seemingly contradictory models, namely the linear 
innovation model and the cyclical innovation model? 
In order to answer this question, a system view of innovations is proposed, which 
further formulates two sub-questions. 
RQ 2a: What are the positive feedback loops underlying innovation processes? 
RQ 2b: What are the triggers for the transition from one cycle to another? 
We use the example of Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitor (SSRI) as an innovation 
process in the pharmaceutical industry. It is forced by regulation into a macro-level 
linear pattern but still shows iterative cyclical micro-level patterns. We show that the 
linear and cyclical patterns are intimately related and that the interrelationship can be 
modelled. This approach allows advancing innovation theory through recognising more 
fine-grained patterns in big sets of data describing more precisely dynamic phenomena. 
To innovation practitioners, this study provides a new way to reconcile daily 
management practices with regulatory macro control of innovation processes. 
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3.1 Advancing innovation process models  
There are two seemingly contradictory innovation models. One is the linear innovation 
model which describes innovation as going sequentially through fixed stages, starting 
from basic research and ending with product manufacturing and diffusion (Godin, 
2006). The other is the cyclical model which views innovation as an iterative and 
nonlinear process (Van de Ven, Angle, & Poole, 2000). 
Scholarly discussion for a long time has centred on the question which of the two 
models would reflect the reality of innovation more precisely. There is broad consensus 
that a thorough understanding of innovation processes is essential to answer this 
question. One of the notable studies in this field is the Minnesota Innovation Research 
Program (MIRP) by Van de Ven and his colleagues that started in the 1980s. This 
project aimed at describing how innovation develops over time. The research team had 
to visit innovation sites every six months to administer questionnaires, interview all 
key actors, and record meetings of each innovation management committee (Bitsch, 
2005, p.82). It took them decades to collect data and track what happened in the 
studied innovation processes. The results of this project are fruitful: it substantiates that 
innovation processes do not fit either of the stylised models and that the hitherto 
contested iterative patterns were useful. So, MIRP advanced innovation modelling in 
terms of developing more realistic models of innovation processes (Schroeder, Van de 
Ven, Scudder, & Polley, 1986). 
The MIRP study further showed that an empirical basis for innovation process models 
requires large amounts of data. Innovation processes are longitudinal, which require the 
same variable data being collected repeatedly at multiple points of time. In addition, 
process models combine data on multiple analytical levels, which further increases the 
amount of data. At each point in time, data about multiple activities of multiple actors 
have to be collected. For example, tracking the activities of key actors in R&D 
activities in the beginning of innovation processes requires a focus on aspects that are 
different from the aspects that are needed when tracking the activities of key actors in 
commercialisation activities in later phases (Hassett & Paavilainen-MŠntymŠki, 2013). 
At the time of the MIRP study and until recently the collection of these large amounts 
of multifaceted data was a prohibitive difficult undertaking and labour- intensive (Poole 
& Van de Ven, 2004). 
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But now, “many of the inherent limitations on the collection of data no longer exist” 
(Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, 2013, p.100). With the development of the Internet and 
computer techniques, large amounts of data can be captured and recorded much more 
easily and cheaply. This means we are increasingly able to describe empirically the 
underlying processes of innovation and discover more interaction patterns between 
actors and activities. By doing this, new advanced models may be established which 
combine the seemingly contradictory linear and cyclical innovation models and 
provide a more accurate description of innovation processes. Therefore, our RQ2 reads 
as follows. 
RQ2: Is it possible to form an advanced model that is able to combine the seemingly 
contradictory models, namely the linear innovation model and the cyclical 
innovation model? 
In this chapter we return to the innovation process modelling theme with a new, data-
driven approach. For this purpose, as a case study we use the innovation process of the 
Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitor (SSRI) case in the pharmaceutical industry. 
Innovation processes in the pharmaceutical industry are typically considered to be 
linear, simply because government regulations do require this (Smits & Boon, 2008). 
Well-documented historical data about the SSRI innovation available via the Internet 
(for detailed reference see section 3.4) makes an in-depth process study possible to 
provide a rich description of how innovations evolve over time. 
We show an advanced innovation model that in a f irst step combines the linear and the 
cyclical stylised innovation models as two perspectives of the same process. In doing 
so, we intend to discover more patterns and contribute to a more realistic and holistic 
innovation model. This insight is of practical relevance at all places where innovation 
managers in different corporate functions and certification bodies take decisions that 
influence the same process over different levels. We aim to facilitate the 
communication between scientists who carry out the micro-level activities and policy 
makers who want to control the macro-level progress. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides an overview about 
innovation models. Section 3.3 introduces a systems view of technological innovations. 
Section 3.4 describes the method of the study. Section 3.5 presents the history of the 
Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitor medic ines together with an analys is of the 
underlying driving processes. Section 3.6 discusses the main findings and practical 
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implications and finally section 3.7 concludes by answering RQ2, discussing the 
contributions and recommending future research. 
3.2 A review of the linear and cyclical model of innovation 
Below we give a literature review on the two stylised innovation models : the linear 
innovation model (3.2.1) and the cyclical innovation model (3.2.2).  
3.2.1 The linear innovation model 
The linear model of innovation is one of the first theoretical frameworks for 
understanding and explaining technological change (Godin, 2006). It postulates that 
technological innovation follows a sequential process: starting from basic research, 
going through applied research and development, and finally ending up with 
production and diffusion (Gopalakrishnan & Damanpour, 1994; Kiel & Elliott, 1996; 
Sun, Wong, Zhao, & Yam, 2012). 
The linear model of innovation is a macro-level model. It describes the aggregate trend 
of innovation development and reflects the average behaviour of all involved players: 
the system (Van de Ven et al., 2000). The linear innovation model provides overview 
and a general view of how an innovation develops over time. It is a natural first step 
towards understanding of innovation processes. 
However, the linear innovation model is criticised as being too simple to understand 
the process of innovation (Berkhout, Hartmann, & Trott, 2010; Hung & Tu, 2011; 
Kline, 1985). It ignores the feedback paths within each stage of the development 
processes (Landau & Rosenberg, 1986). Berkhout (2010, p.480) criticised this model 
by four arguments: (1) it is sequential and therefore will lead practitioners to slow 
advancement; (2) it is inefficient and unproductive because decisions are focussed on 
the next stage rather than on the end of the chain; (3) deviating activities can be 
stopped too early, therefore it may lose potential opportunities; and (4) it treats the 
actual underlying processes at each stage as a black box, and is therefore unable to 
describe the dynamics of actual innovation processes. 
Despite such criticism and obvious limitations, the linear innovation model is the 
standard model for innovations not only in the pharmaceutical industry, but also with 
signif icant impact on R&D and innovation management in general (Hara, 2003; Tidd, 
2006). Innovation in the pharmaceutical industry is particularly interesting because it is 
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under tight government regulation. In passing we remark that this innovation is based 
on the linear innovation model. Similarly, many R&D programs such as the EU 
research and innovation programs (EU-FP) or the US National Science Foundation 
(NSF) programs are also based on the linear innovation model. Without successfully 
passing the mile stone of the current phase, the innovation or the innovative R&D 
project cannot make the subsequent step (Hara, 2003). 
3.2.2 The cyclical innovation model 
The cyclical innovation model is a micro-level model. It is not just about averages or 
aggregates (Pentland, 2014). It goes “inside the box” of innovation processes and 
studies the micro-level interactions between individual actors and their activities. It is 
needed for more in-depth insights into technological innovation processes.  Below we 
provide two examples of the cyclical innovation model. 
A first example of the cyclical model is provided by Berkhout (2010) who proposes 
four cycles of change underlying innovation processes: (1) the natural and life sciences 
cycle where technological development is pushed by scientific progress; (2) the 
integrated engineering cycle where technological research is driven by new functional 
demand; (3) the social and behavioural sciences cycle which helps developing new 
insights into emerging changes in demand and corresponding new technical solutions; 
and (4) the differentiated services cycle which links products and markets. These four 
cycles are nonlinear processes that in combination result in innovation. But these 
cycles form a conceptual model only in so far as they lack empirical support. Moreover, 
the model does not provide insights into what happens within each cycle.  
A second example of cyclical innovation processes is provided by Davenport et al. 
(2003) who discover positive feedback loops underlying the technological progression 
of New Zealand firms. An example of such a loop is the “co-evolution with technology 
partner” loop, meaning that a firm´s technological knowledge and capability is 
enhanced by their technology partners, which in turn leads to more partners offering 
technological advantages. In contrast with Berkhout (2010), Davenport et al. (2013) go 
deep into the micro-level processes of technological development. Both Berkhout 
(2010) and Davenport et al. (2013) take a market view by focussing on how innovation 
is adopted rather than explaining how changes in institutional aspects and economic 
structures shape innovation (Hekkert, Suurs, Negro, Kuhlmann, & Smits, 2007, p.415; 
Van de Ven, 1993). 
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3.3 A system view of innovations 
Although both the linear and cyclical models provide insights into innovation processes, 
each of them focusses on one part of the system only. The linear innovation model 
focusses on the macro-level pattern while the cyclical innovation model focusses on 
the micro-level pattern. 
For the remainder of the chapter we adopt a system view on innovations. This entails 
that both micro-level and macro-level patterns are behavioural patterns of the same 
innovation system. Understanding the innovation system should therefore allow 
explaining the system-internal causes of any behaviour. Only the increasing availability 
of data makes a system view possible. It enables us to look at the underlying details of 
innovation processes on the micro level, which allows a further step in understanding 
these processes. 
A system view provides an overview of the various actors and their roles in bringing 
innovation processes through the various stages of an emerging technology. It focusses 
on interactions between actors and activities. The overall pattern is made up of millions 
of interactions between individuals on the micro level. Therefore, a system view is able 
to link the micro-level analysis with the macro-level analysis. 
Innovation processes are inherently dynamic as they describe changes over time and 
thus require dynamic theories for their explanation. But most studies on innovation 
systems are static and focus on the structural elements of systems (Crossan, Vera, & 
Nanjad, 2008). While the analysis of the structure provides insights into what kinds of 
system features are required for successful technological innovation at a given point in 
time, in principle it is unable to explain how an innovation emerges and evolves over 
time (Suurs & Hekkert, 2009b). 
We therefore depart from activities (not structures) of systems, which is a genuinely 
dynamic approach. A further dimension of dynamics is that innovation systems co-
evolve with technological innovations (Fuenfschilling & Truffer, 2014). Therefore, it is 
hard to give a fixed and clear definition of their structural elements and boundaries. 
Instead, the elements and structure of innovation systems are evolving over time as 
well, during which new actors enter and current ones quit. Focussing on activities 




A signif icant element in understanding innovation systems is identifying patterns in the 
sequences of their activities, particularly the so-called feedback loops. Feedback loops 
introduce a further dimension of dynamics, which points to nonlinear behaviour. 
Negative feedback loops reduce changes and drive systems toward predictable stable 
states while positive feedback loops amplify changes by reinforcing a small initial 
change over repeated cycles (Davenport et al., 2003; Gallagher & West, 2009; Levy, 
1994). These positive feedback loops push a system towards a status between stability 
and instability (Stacey, 1995), where a small change may be amplified and then 
produce a signif icant effect (Kauffman, 1993; Prigogine & Stengers, 1984). Since 
innovation is about order creation, and not order maintenance (Chiles, Vultee, Gupta, 
Greening, & Tuggle, 2010) positive feedback loops are more related to innovation 
studies. 
Repeated feedback loops build up momentum and attract characteristic behaviours of a 
system towards the idiosyncratic trajectories (Capra, 1996; Osborn, Hunt, & Jauch, 
2002; Uhl-Bien, Marion, & McKelvey, 2007). Feedback loops are strong forces on the 
behaviour of an innovation system and constrain activities in cycle regimes. When the 
system reaches a threshold of dissatisfaction (Tidd, 2006), which means the old way of 
doing things does not work well (Hazy & Goldstein, 2010), irregular or accident events 
are needed to force the system out of the current cycle regime into a new cycle regime, 
providing a better way of organising and improved performance. For example, at the 
beginning of an innovation, activities are typically organised around technology 
development. Later when the emerging technology is developed to a certain degree and 
its market opportunity is more and more obvious, the focus will shift to marketing and 
commercialisation activities, which form a new market-oriented cycle regime of 
activities. 
In conclusion, such a system view allows combining the linear macro-level innovation 
model with the cyclical micro-level innovation model as feedback loops that are forced 




Figure 3.1 Integrated linear and cyclical model 
The bottom of the well in Figure 3.1 represents the momentum of the cycle produced 
by repeated positive feedback loops, which attracts characteristic behaviours of the 
system. The well indicates the sphere of the cycle in analogy to gravity that forces the 
balls into the bottom of the well. Within the sphere, the system is assumed to return to 
the bottom of the well until trigger events provide sufficiently strong forces on the 
system to push it out of the old cycle regime into a new cycle regime. The succession 
of cycle regimes on the macro level represents the linear model. The positive feedback 
loops within one cycle present a cyclical model. Both are connected by triggers.  
In order to apply the system approach to innovation process models, the activities need 
to be specified. For this study we adopt the seven system functions identif ied by 
Hekkert and his colleagues (e.g., Edquist, 1997; Hekkert et al., 2007; Negro, 2007; 
Suurs, 2009). The seven system functions provide a theoretical framework to 
categorise the activities that are involved in innovation processes. These seven system 
functions are as follows. 
 System Function 1 – Entrepreneurial activities: activities with 
entrepreneurial orientation characterised as risk-taking, innovative and 




 System Function 2 – Knowledge development: the development and 
accumulation of technical knowledge with no direct commercial orientation, 
e.g., technical trial, experiment, technical invention.  
 System Function 3 – Knowledge diffusion: information exchange through 
formal and informal networks, e.g., meetings, personal relationships, joint 
forces with other organisations.  
 System Function 4 – Guidance of the search: activities like setting strategic 
goals, creating visions, or government policies which specify developmental 
directions.  
 System Function 5 – Market formation: creation of (niche) markets to realise 
the commercialisation of technical inventions. For example, the creation of 
niche markets can be stimulated by tax exemption or marketing investment.  
 System Function 6 – Resource mobilisation: activities which could change 
the availability of resources, including financial, material and human resources.  
 System Function 7 – Support from advocacy coalitions: lobby to convince 
potential partners of the viability of the new technology.  
These seven system functions have been found useful in empirical studies (e.g.,  Negro, 
2007; Suurs & Hekkert, 2009a, b). 
In the following sections, we discuss the dynamics of the Selective Serotonin Reuptake 
Inhibitor (SSRI) innovation process in the pharmaceutical industry and investigate the 
following two questions. 
RQ 2a: What are the positive feedback loops underlying innovation processes? 
RQ 2b: What are the triggers for the transition from one cycle to another? 
3.4 Method of the study 
Since the purpose of this chapter is to analyse the dynamics of innovation processes 
from the historical facts rather than exploring the future, the first four steps of the data-
driven method in Chapter 2 are adopted to investigate the innovation process of SSRI, 
as illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2 Four steps of the data-driven method  
Step 1 - Collect data: data refers to narrative descriptions related to technological 
innovation. The data of the case comes from various sources, such as journal papers, 
scientific books, interviews with relevant professionals, and rich information from the 
Internet. The earlier development phase of SSRI (1950s-1960s) is mainly based on 
Shorter (1998) and Stanford et al. (1999), the later phases are derived from Healy 
(2004) and the influence of institutional changes are from Lawlor (2012). 
Step 2 - Represent data as a chronological event list: historical events are organised 
chronologically to show when, by whom, and what happened during the SSRI’s 
innovation process. 
Step 3 - Code events according to given categories: in order to derive patterns from the 
mass of event data, we categorise the events using the seven system functions proposed 
by Hekkert et al. (2007). Classification turns the seemingly-messy event data into a 
sequence of coded events. 
Step 4 - Identify innovation patterns: finding positive feedback loops on the micro level 
and emergent patterns on the macro level. The micro-level analysis focusses on causal 
relationships between activities. If the occurrence of one event or the implementation 
of one activity leads to the occurrence of another, these two events or activities are 
viewed as interrelated. The macro-level patterns are identified using Langley’s (1999) 
“temporal bracketing strategy”, which means innovation processes are decomposed 
into different development phases based on content study. 
3.5 Process pattern in the SSRI data 
For ease of use, we present the data of the SSRI innovation from the early 1950s to the 
early 2000s.It is a story made up of events in chronological order. SSRIs are the first 














personality disorders (eMedExpert, 2011). Using Langley‘s “temporal bracketing 
strategy” we partition the whole innovation process into four periods: (1) the scientific 
discovery phase, from the early 1950s till the late 1960s (subsection 3.5.1); (2) the 
product development phase, from the late 1960s until the late 1980s (subsection 3.5.2); 
(3) the Prozac’s marketing phase, in the1990s (subsection 3.5.3); and (4) the Prozac 
maturity phase starting in 2001 (subsection 3.5.4).  
In all four subsections, we give a description of each phase by two aspects: (A) a 
description of the historical events, and (B) a description of the identified process 
pattern. 
3.5.1 The scientific discovery phase (1950s  - 1960s) 
A Description of historical events 
The time period from the early 1950s until the late 1960s witnesses the emergence of 
the SSRIs research, stimulated by two important factors: (1) scientific discovery of the 
role of serotonin in brains and mental processes, and (2) unmet market demands for 
antidepressants with minor side effects. Below we give a description for both factors.  
(1) Scientific discovery of the role of serotonin in brains and mental processes 
Until the mid-1950s, the dominant idea in science was that mood, behaviours and 
personalities were mainly influenced by environmental factors, such as childhood 
experiences (Cozzi, 2013). The potential role of serotonin in brain functioning and 
consciousness was discovered simultaneous ly and independently by a team in the 
United States (Betty M. Twarog and Irvine H. Page) and another team in Edinburgh, 
Scotland, led by Sir John H. Gaddum (Cozzi, 2013). In 1953 through experimenting on 
himself, Gaddum discovered the existence of serotonin and proposed its potential 
effect on mental performances (Amin, Crawford, & Gaddum, 1954; Cozzi, 2013). This 
discovery became a “ ‘signpost in the sky’ of a whole generation of young psycho- 
pharmacologists” (Shorter, 1998, p.321). In 1957, the working mechanism of the role 
of serotonin was further proposed by researchers from the National Institutes of Health 
in Bethesda who discovered that amines in an antipsychotic drug may lead to 
behavioural changes through unlocking the body’s re-uptake of serotonin (Shorter, 
1998). This discovery opened up the serotonin research in the psychiatric field. At the 
same time, researchers in British Camelot started research in brain chemistry based on 
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Gaddum’s discovery. In 1963, “Alec Coppen discovered that serotonin-equivalents 
were able to relieve depression” (Shorter, 1998). 
At that time, this discovery was not widely accepted by pharmaceutical companies 
(Shorter, 1998). Research was done outside the industry. Researchers started to test 
existing tr icyclic agents to see whether they blocked the re-uptake of serotonin. Before 
the late 1960s, the tricyclic antidepressant drugs were believed only to block the re-
uptake of noradrenaline (Carlsson, 1999). However, in 1968 Carlsson et al. reported 
that the re-uptake of serotonin (or 5-HT) was also inhibited by a tricyclic 
antidepressant named imipramine (Carlsson, 1999; Carlsson, Fuxe, & Ungerstedt, 
1968). This discovery re-confirmed that serotonin was related to mood (Shorter, 1998). 
Also in 1968, Carlsson persuaded Geigy to carry out clinical trials regarding the re-
uptake inhibition of serotonin by tricyclic antidepressants. Simultaneously, Carlsson 
and his colleagues started to develop non-tricyclic agents selectively inhibiting 5-HT 
(serotonin) uptake (Carlsson, 1999). 
(2)  Unmet market demands for antidepressants with minor side effects 
At the end of the 1960s, the prevailing antidepressants, namely MAOIs and tricyclic 
antidepressants (TCA), were effective, yet presented serious side effects. Tricyclic 
antidepressants were reported to cause “dizziness, blurred vision, and constipation” 
(Chemical-Heritage-Foundation, 2012) while MAOIs antidepressants were revealed to 
be highly fatal when taken together with cheese. By the mid-1960s, MAOIs rapidly 
disappeared from clinical practice (Healy, 2004) and alternative antidepressants with 
minor side effects and low toxicity were urgently needed. This need stimulated SSRIs 
antidepressant development. 
B Identified process pattern — the technological cycle 
In the scientific discovery phase (1950s-1960s), scientif ic discoveries paved the way 
for the development of the SSRIs. They provided a knowledge base for SSRI and 
opened up a new direction of antidepressant research. A cycle regime, namely 
“knowledge development  knowledge diffusion  guidance of the search  
resource allocation  knowledge development”, as illustrated in Figure 3.3, can be 
observed. This cycle, referred to as a technological cycle, is characterised by 
continuous scientific discoveries, for example, the discovery of serotonin’s role, the 
discovery that tricyclic antidepressants also block the re-uptake of serotonin (or 5-HT), 
and the discovery of the working mechanism of serotonin reuptake inhibitors to treat 
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depression. The dynamics involve positive experimental outcomes spreading out, 
creating positive expectations, leading to investment in more research projects which 
directly contribute to knowledge development in the SSRI field. 
 
Figure 3.3 The technological cycle in the SSRI innovation 
3.5.2 Product development phase (late 1960s  - late 1980s) 
A Description of historical events 
From the late 1960s onwards, pharmaceutical companies recognised the potential 
market value of the SSRI antidepressants (Healy, 2004) and started to develop agents 
that were able to inhibit the uptake of serotonin (eMedExpert, 2012). This period was 
characterised by different pharmaceutical companies simultaneously developing SSRIs. 
For example, the DuPhar Laboratories in Weesp in the Netherlands developed 
fluvoxamine in 1973 (Healy, 2004). Pharmuka, a Paris based pharmaceutical company, 
discovered Indalpine in 1977. Among them, Zelmid, developed by Astra, was the first 
SSRI; and Prozac, developed by Eli Lilly, later became the most popular SSRI. Below 
we will describe in detail how (1) Zelmid and (2) Prozac came out into the market.  
(1)  The first commercialised SSRI antidepressant: Zelmid (late 1960s-1983) 
In the late 1960s, Carlsson and colleagues started testing non-tricyclic agents for 
selectively serotonin re-uptake inhibitors (Carlsson, 2002). Through cooperation with 
Astra AB, a Swiss pharmaceutical company, they developed the first SSRI called 
zimeldine, with the brand name Zelmid (Healy, 2004). In 1971, Carlsson “applied for a 
patent on Zelmid in Sweden, Belgium and Great Britain as a selective serotonin uptake 
inhibitor” (Healy, 2004). Zelmid then went through three stages of clinical tests. In 
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1980, at a symposium, zimeldine was presented as an effective antidepressant with less 
side effects than existing antidepressants (Carlsson, 1999). 
In 1982, zimeldine was approved as antidepressant agent in Sweden and several other 
countries and was trade marked as Zelmid by Astra in Europe (Carlsson, 1999). Zelmid 
became extensively used. Patients treated with Zelmid showed satisfactory results. 
Astra planned to enter the United States market by submitting its application to the 
FDA in 1982. However, some patients undergoing zimelidine treatment were found to 
suffer a fatal disease. This forced Astra to withdraw all zimelidine drugs from the 
market in 1983 (Carlsson, 1999) including a derivative of Zelmid (Healy, 2004). Later, 
Astra decided to stop R&D-based medicine creation and focussed on over-the-counter 
medicines (Healy, 2004). 
(2) The most popular SSRI antidepressant: Prozac (early 1970s-1988) 
In the early 1970s, SSRI research was intensified in Eli Lilly, an American 
pharmaceutical company (Shorter, 1998). Ray Fuller, a senior pharmacologist in Lilly, 
followed the international serotonin research (Shorter, 1998). Although in the 
beginning Fuller failed to convince Eli Lilly to start developing SSRI antidepressants, 
he did not give up and remained committed to persuading other scientists in Lilly to 
join SSRI research (Chemical-Heritage-Foundation, 2012). With their support Fuller 
finally succeeded in persuading the firm to start SSRI research. Efforts were put on 
synthesising compounds which could function as antidepressants but with less side 
effect than the tricyclic agent (Shorter, 1998). In 1971 fluoxetine was developed (The 
Observer, 2007) followed by lab experiments by David Wong in 1972 (Carlsson, 1999). 
Wong found that fluoxetine was able to inhibit serotonin re-uptake. Thus it might be 
used against depression. 
But still Lilly refused to develop fluoxetine as an antidepressant (Shorter, 1998) 
because at that time depression was rarely diagnosed (The Observer, 2007) and there 
was a backlash against over-prescription of anti-anxiety drugs because the side effects 
and the risk of addiction (Law lor, 2012). In 1980, the American government published 
DSM-III (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder) which set up 
diagnostic criteria, descriptions, and other information to guide the diagnos is of mental 
disorders (BehaveNet, 2013). The arrival of DSM-III defined Major Depressive 
Disorder as a disorder which can be targeted by drugs, whereas in the days before 
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depression was viewed as a consequence of everyday stress. DSM-III eliminated Lilly 
and other pharmaceutical companies’ concerns about SSRI antidepressants.  
In 1987 fluoxetine was approved by the US FDA. Lilly asked Interbrand, the leading 
branding company, to create a more easily-remembered name for the drug. The name 
Prozac was chosen (Healy, 2004). Afterwards, Lilly advertised Prozac to practitioners 
and the public through brochures and posters about the dangers of depression (Frontier-
psychiatrist, 2012). When Prozac was introduced in 1988 patients were already asking 
for it (The Observer, 2007). 
B Identified process pattern — the corporate entrepreneurial cycle 
The product development phase (late 1960s – late 1980s) was characterised by the 
commitment of pharmaceutical companies to the development and commercialisation 
of SSRI. Scientific advancements and market demand attracted pharmaceutical 
companies into SSRI development. 
The development starts as follows. An entrepreneurial cycle regime starts entering the 
SSRI system. Since the entrepreneurial cycle happens mainly within established 
pharmaceutical companies, we call it “corporate entrepreneurial cycle” and see the 
following recurring sequence: entrepreneurial activities  market formation  
guidance of the search  resource mobilisation and back to  knowledge 
development, as illustrated in Figure 3.4. 
The corporate entrepreneurial cycle is a result of the positive outcome of knowledge 
development. Positive research outcomes created high expectations by pharmaceutical 
companies that stimulated them to take entrepreneurial activities and establish new 
business development projects. In order to promot the new drugs both Astra and Lilly 
increased their expenditure on marketing. Positive market feedback affects resource 
mobilisation strategies, which in turn influence the range of business activities  of 




Figure 3.4 The corporate entrepreneurial cycle in the SSRI innovation 
Notably, the very same corporate entrepreneurial cycle applied in Zelmid’s later phase, 
presented a vicious circle. The cycle was triggered by the crisis that some patients with 
zimelidine treatment suffered from fatal diseases. This made Astra decide to withdraw 
all Zelmid drugs from the market and stop entering the American market. The vicious 
circle finally made Astra quit the Zelmid antidepressant market.  
3.5.3 Prozac’s marketing phase (1990s) 
A Description of historical events 
Since the early 1990s, Prozac became the number one drug prescribed by psychiatrists 
(Healy, 2004). Mass media, scientific papers, and books played a critical role in 
facilitating the diffusion of Prozac. Researchers at McLean Hospital published articles 
suggesting Prozac as an effective treatment for many disorders (Shorter, 1998, p.323). 
Peter Kramer (1997) advocates SSRIs as a way of improving the lives of those both 
depressed and normal (Lawlor, 2012, p.176). 
Institutional factors also facilitated the quick diffusion of Prozac: (1) the general 
practitioner became prescriber of antidepressants, increasing Prozac’s use (Lawlor, 
2012); (2) health insurance companies were willing to cover the short-term cost of this 
treatment rather than the long-term cognitive behavioural therapy; (3) FDA approved 
direct marketing of drugs to consumers in 1997 (Lawlor, 2012, p.178); (4) restrictive 
drug approval procedures at the end of the 1970s resulted in a lack of new drugs. 
Prozac fulfilled a need, leading to its fast diffusion; and (5) in the late 1990s the 
threshold to diagnose people as ill was reduced. People previous ly defined as healthy 
but also suffering from pressure and life problems were now defined as being ill. This 
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created a stunning increase of demand for antidepressant drugs (Shorter, 1998). These 
factors made Prozac the most prescribed antidepressant since 1990, and the number 
two best-selling drug in the world (Shorter, 1998, p.324). 
B Identified process pattern — the adoption cycle 
The Prozac’s marketing phase (1990s) is characterised by the establishment of a stable 
market environment for Prozac. The rapid diffusion of SSRI was driven by the Rogers 
(1962) adoption cycle: Prozac became the dominant SSRI drug that was prescribed by 
psychiatrists; the effect of Prozac was further broadcasted, leading to more people 
knowing and starting to use Prozac. We see the cycle as a recurring sequence of market 
formation  knowledge diffusion  guidance of the search and back to market 
formation as shown in Figure 3.5. 
 
Figure 3.5 The adoption cycle in the SSRI innovation 
3.5.4 Prozac maturity phase (2001-) 
A Description of historical events 
The Prozac maturity phase (since 2001) was characterised by the market maturity of 
Prozac. However, since the 2000s, doubts about the real long-term effectiveness of 
Prozac have grown (Lawlor, 2012, p.177). Healy (2004) alleges that Prozac increases 
the risk of suicide among younger patients. 
Patent expiration and new generic drugs contributed to the decline of Prozac. In 1984, 
the Hatch-Waxman Act “allowed generic companies to submit Abbreviated New Drug 
Applications to the FDA and to conduct their development work prior to patent 
expiration” (Cornerstone-Research, 2012). This facilitated the introduction of generic 
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drugs with a lower price. In December 1995, Barr Labs, a generic pharmaceutical 
company, charged that Lilly fluoxetine patents had expired (McLean, 2001) and in 
2000 the court annulled Lilly’s 2001 patent (McLean, 2001). 
In 2001, the first generic fluoxetine was released in America by Barr Laboratories. 
Within two weeks, generic fluoxetine sales exceeded those for Prozac. Lilly lost $35 
million market value in one day, and 90% of Prozac prescriptions in a year (The 
Observer, 2007). Meanwhile, a long-running campaign against Prozac forced Lilly to 
take serious security checks, leading to increased production cost (McLean, 2001). In 
contrast, the price of generic fluoxetine decreased due to the expiration of Barr 
Laboratories’ exclusivity for fluoxetine (Druss, Marcus, Olfson, & Pincus, 2004). 
Pharmaceutical companies producing other antidepressants were not too much 
disturbed by the generic fluoxetine (Druss et al., 2004), instead they were busy with 
grasping the opportunity created by the traumatic events of September 11, 2001, which 
left an increasing number of people suffering from anxiety and depression. They 
increased marketing expenditures for antidepressants (Psychiatric-News, 2002). For 
example, both GlaxoSmithKline and Pfizer in October 2001 significantly increased 
their promotion budgets for antidepressants (Psychiatric-News, 2002). The sales of 
antidepressants drugs soared. 
B Identified process pattern — the two competitive cycles 
In this phase, two competitive cycles executed by two forces drove down the overall 
profitability of Prozac. These two forces are what Porter (2008) called the “threat of 
new entrants” and the “threat of substitutes”. The expiration of Prozac patents led to 
the new entry of generic fluoxetine. The generic drugs had a lower price than Prozac. 
Upon releasing, the prescriptions of generic fluoxetine exceeded those of Prozac. 
While Eli Lilly was negatively influenced by generic companies, pharmaceutical 
companies which produced other antidepressants were busy with grasping the 
opportunity created by the traumatic events of September 11, 2001 through marketing 
campaigns. 
These two forces shape the industry structure through two competitive cycles: (1) an 
entrepreneurial cycle by new entrants and (2) a market-driven cycle by substitutes, as 
illustrated in Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7, respectively. The corporate entrepreneurial 
cycle had been identif ied in the product development phase. The entrepreneurial cycle 
in this phase was different from the corporate entrepreneurial cycle. The new 
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entrepreneurial cycle happened outside big pharmaceutical companies and inside small 
start-ups. Particularly, it was initiated by the new business development of Barr’s 
generic fluoxetine, the market success of which sent a promising signal to other 
companies, which previously were not in the generic fluoxetine market, to enter this 
market. 
 
Figure 3.6 The entrepreneurial cycle in the SSRI 
innovation 
 
Figure 3.7 The market-driven cycle in the SSRI 
innovation 
The market-driven cycle was triggered by the September 11 traumatic events, leading 
to increased demand for antidepressants that were fuelled by increased marketing 
expenditures of firms seeking to enlarge market shares, as shown in Figure 3.7. Both 
the adoption cycle in the Prozac marketing phase and the market-driven cycle in this 
phase take the market formation function as the central force that attracts activities 
around it. But they are different: the adoption cycle represents the word mouth effect 
during the market diffusion process; but the market-driven cycle in Figure 3.7 implies 
pharmaceutical companies’ autonomous resource investment activities leading to 
reinforced market formation. 
3.6 Discussion 
The discussion is split into three parts: linking the linear and cyclical model (subsection 
3.6.1); the theoretical implications (subsection 3.6.2); and the managerial implications 
(subsection 3.6.3). 
3.6.1 Linking linear and cyclical model 




Figure 3.8 Integrated innovation process of the SSRI 
As has been shown in the prior sections the linear and cyclical models co-exist in the 
SSRI innovation process and both contribute to its explanation on macro level and 
micro level respectively. On the macro level, the SSRI innovation process presents a 
linear-like pattern. It was divided into four sequential stages by triggers (The triggers 
will be described in the later part of this section): the scientific discovery phase (1950s 
- 1960s), the product development phase (late 1960s - late 1980s), the Prozac’s 
marketing maturity phase (1990s - 2001) and the Prozac maturity phase (since 2001). 
Unpacking the black box of each stage of SSRI development reveals cyclical pattern of 
activities on the micro level. They form positive feedback loops within which each 
activity leads to a next activity and finally the initial activity will close the loop. On the 
micro level, these feedback loops cause nonlinear behaviours of innovation processes 
because their recurrent occurrence lead to disproportional changes that at first seem to 
be insignificantly small (Van Tonder, 2004). 
The two seemingly contrary models are linked by the concept of triggers that initiate a 
change in the existing system. Positive feedback loops amplify the initial change of the 
trigger through repeated cycles which finally build up the momentum to move the 
system into a new cycle of process. On the macro level the innovation process appears 
as a linear model. 
In response to RQ2a, namely “what are the positive feedback loops underlying 
innovation processes?”, the case of SSRI returns five positive feedback loops: (1) a 
technological cycle which built the knowledge base for the SSRI innovation system, 
followed by (2) a corporate entrepreneurial cycle which created diversity of products, 
then (3) an adoption cycle that stabilised the market environment for Prozac, and 
finally the two competitive cycles, namely (4) an entrepreneurial cycle and (5) a 
market-driven cycle, which drove down the dominant position of Prozac. 
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In response to RQ2b, namely “what are the triggers for the transition from one cycle 
to another?”, the SSRI case indeed returns four triggers. 
 Trigger 1: Initiating the technological cycle. This trigger refers to the 
scientific discovery of the role of serotonin in brains and mental processes and 
the unmet market demands for antidepressants with minor side effects and low 
toxicity. 
 Trigger 2: Shifting the technological cycle to the corporate entrepreneurial 
cycle. This trigger refers to the scientif ic development of serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors for depression treatment which made it clear for pharmaceutical 
companies that there might be a big market worth pursuing. 
 Trigger 3: Shifting the corporate entrepreneurial cycle to the adoption cycle. 
This trigger refers to the fact that fluoxetine (brand-name: Prozac) was 
approved for use by FDA for the United States. 
 Trigger 4: Shifting the adoption cycle to the competitive cycle. This trigger 
refers to the expiration of Prozac patents which led to the new entry of generic 
companies. A related trigger is the September 11 terroristic attack which 
created a bigger market for substitutes companies. 
From the above, we see that the linear and cyclical patterns are two different 
perspectives on the same phenomenon. The linear model of innovation is the aggregate 
appearance caused by the cyclical model of innovation on the micro level.  The micro-
level cyclical model consists of many positive feedback loops and occasional triggers 
which force the system to shift from one cycle to another over time. Altogether, a 
holistic and thorough picture of technological innovations is created, and a more 
accurate model of innovation has been established.  
3.6.2 Theoretical implications 
From the above, we see that the presented approach towards an integrated process 
theory of innovations integrates the linear and cyclical models after a thorough in-depth 
discussion on the macro-level and the micro-level results. Moreover, it connects to the 
four ideal change motors identif ied by Van de Ven and Poole (1995). They provide an 
ideal typology of all process theories in social and biological entities , namely (1) the 
life-cycle motor, (2) the evolutionary motor, (3) the teleological motor, and (4) the 
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dialectical motor. Each of them represents a different generative mechanism that drives 
changes. The life-cycle motor of change explains development as “a function of 
potentials immanent within the entity” (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995, p.521); the 
evolutionary motor of development views changes as driven by repetitive cycles of 
variation, selection, and retention events; the teleological motor views the 
purposiveness of the actor as the final driver of change; and the dialectic motor depicts 
changes as driven by the conflicting events, forces, or contradictory values which 
compete with each other for domination and control (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995, 
p.517). Like any ideal typology, the four change motors provide a useful framework to 
analyse mechanisms that drive innovation processes. Most existing innovation studies 
usually address one of the four motors, e.g., the evolutionary motor (Cooke, Uranga, & 
Etxebarria, 1998); the lifecycle motor (Rogers, 2003); the teleological motor (Lee & 
Myers, 2004); or the dialectic motor (Rukanova Boriana, 2007). 
The integrated model discussed above allows for combinations of the four ideal change 
motors, thereby providing a more comprehensive understanding of changes in any 
given real situation. The life-cycle motor is reflected by the macro-level pattern of the 
SSRI innovation which goes from scientific discovery via product development and 
marketing, to market maturity. 
The evolutionary motor is reflected in micro-level processes as repeated cycles. It is 
related to competition between different entities for scarce resources. For example, the 
corporate entrepreneurial cycle in the product development phase was motivated by 
external competition and market pressure. Similarly, in Prozac’s marketing phase, the 
fitness to external changes such as a reduced threshold of what people defined as 
illness also belongs to the evolutionary motor. 
The dialectic motor appears in the conflict between whether depression is caused by 
the environment or is caused by a brain malfunction. The discovery that serotonin 
plays a role in brains and mental processes brought challenges to the old prevailing 
thesis, which viewed environmental factors, such as how one grew up, or the childhood 
experiences,  as the main explanation of mood, behaviours and personalities. 
The teleological motor is an important trigger of activities that sometimes lead to 
positive feedback loops. The changes are carried out by autonomous behaviours; they 
start from bottom-up and bring changes in phases. For example, in the scientific 
discovery phase the technological cycle is driven by scientists’ curiosity and dedication 
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to exploring the unknown knowledge world. They actively pursued a variety of 
experiments. Positive experimental results further fed into more experimental activities. 
They form positive feedback cycles of setting goals, enacting on the developments, and 
evaluating the results. All in all, it is called the teleological motor. 
From the explanation above, all four motors have been included in our model. They 
also prove the completeness and comprehensiveness of our model in terms of 
explaining technological changes.  
3.6.3 Managerial implications 
Although the linear innovation model still is the dominant representation used in 
presentations, experienced innovation managers and policy makers intuitively build on 
organisational forces as described by the feedback loops in their guidance of innovation 
processes. The models presented here allow for a better explicit formulation of the 
dynamics of the innovation processes and the involved activities.  Below we briefly 
discuss their implications for (1) R&D managers, (2) policy makers, and (3) the system 
level itself. 
(1) For R&D managers the important leverage of positive feedback loops is 
emphasised. Although the overall innovation processes in the pharmaceutical industry 
follows fixed sequential stages through bureaucratic regulated processes, attention 
should be paid to feedback loops within each stage. The success of a technological 
innovation relies more on linking multiple activities into self-reinforcing cycles. 
Successful progression to a next phase in the linear process is the outcome of the 
feedback loops. But it is the feedback loop that better explains the causes of success or 
failure than the stage-gate or milestone reviews. 
(2) For policy makers in companies and governments a focus on the innovation system 
is put forward. The success of new drugs in specific and innovation in general depends 
on the innovation system including its firms, universities and research institutes, and 
other public and private sector actors (Van de Ven, 1993, p.27). Focussing on the 
performance of critical functions and their interrelat ionships frees policy makers from 
debating structural configurations that are assumed to change in the course of 
innovation processes. Therefore, management should move to a system level and 
explore how social, economic, and political changes shape - in this case -
pharmaceutical firms, and how firms can properly respond to the changes and leverage 
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the changes for their own innovation processes (Tushman, Lakhani, & Hilalifshitz-
Assaf, 2012). 
(3) The model reviews the source of uncertainty that is inherent to technological 
innovation processes. A major source of uncertainty in innovation therefore resides at 
the system level (Omta & de Leeuw, 1997; Van de Ven, 1993). The SSRI case 
illustrates both the importance of contextual events and the role of pharmaceutical 
companies for innovation development. Contextual events define the behavioural 
boundaries for companies; and companies can reduce uncertainties by establishing an 
institutional environment supporting the drug, for example by political lobbying and 
advertising. 
3.7 Conclusions 
At the emerging opportunity of available data we revisit the dynamics of innovation 
processes using the data-driven method in Chapter 2. With an analysis of the SSRI case 
we show the empirical usefulness and the rigor of this approach to yield a more fine-
grained understanding of the dynamics of innovation processes. Below the conclusion 
is split into three parts: answers to RQ2 (subsection 3.7.1), main contributions 
(subsection 3.7.2), and future research (subsection 3.7.3). 
3.7.1 Answers to RQ2 
In this chapter we intended to find an answer to RQ2: Is it possible to form an 
advanced model that is able to combine the seemingly contradictory models, namely 
the linear innovation model and the cyclical innovation model?, as well as to RQ2a: 
What are the positive feedback loops underlying innovation processes?, and RQ2b: 
What are the triggers for the transition from one cycle to another?.  
The answer to RQ2 is yes. This exploratory conceptual study revisited the dynamics 
of innovation processes at a moment where the prerequisites for a more thorough and 
better understanding of innovation processes become available. We propose an 
integrated innovation model on the basis of understanding the underlying innovation 
processes, which only gets possible with the necessary data becoming available. By 
doing so, seemingly contradictory models, for example, the linear and cyclical 
innovation models, mutate into different perspectives on the behaviour of the same 
innovation system. By means of modelling activities and their combination into 
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feedback loops with triggers that stimulate the innovation system to adapt new 
behaviours pattern we were able to show consistency of the different perspectives. 
In response to RQ2a, the SSRI case returns five positive feedback loops: 
technological cycle (subsection 3.5.1), corporate entrepreneurial cycle (subsection 
3.5.2), adoption cycle (subsection 3.5.3), entrepreneurial cycle and market-driven cycle 
(subsection 3.5.4). And in response to RQ2b, the SSRI case returns four triggers 
(subsection 3.6.1).  
3.7.2 Main contributions 
We aim to contribute to a more holistic and coherent framework to understand and 
explain innovation processes. Therefore we propose an advanced innovation model 
which integrates not only (1) the macro-level and micro-level analyses, but also (2) the 
four ideal change motors by Van de Ven (1995). We argue that the key to understand 
how innovations evolve is to understand how positive feedback loops emerge and build 
up on each other.  
The system view (section 3.3) provides a way to develop advanced innovation theories. 
During our investigation, we only briefly pointed to the possibility of integrating the 
four ideal change motors by Van de Ven (1995). The meaning of ideal types is that any 
study of a situation will show a combination of the ideal types in the real situation. The 
here presented modelling approach is a means to make this combination explicit.  
The necessary amount of empirical “big data” is increasingly getting available.  The 
here proposed approach is intended to enable investigation of the details and 
underlying interactions in the innovation system to go beyond description of aggregates 
and statistical averages.  
3.7.3 Future research 
For future research, three potential directions are suggested. 
(1) Future research studies will need to ident ify more and new data sources for 
innovation studies. The potential of the variance of data sources ranging from 
messages in social media to sensor data from GPS or mobile phones, are 
currently under-explored for the purpose of innovation studies (Mayer-
Schönberger & Cukier, 2013). The use of new techniques for automated 
collection and analys is of large amounts of data needs to be studied to develop 
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more “in-depth” data about innovation processes and to shift from descriptive 
statistics to explanatory analysis of the fine-grained details of the innovation 
processes. 
(2) More studies based on modelling the activities of innovation system are 
needed in order to advance our understanding of the dynamics of innovation 
networks. When availability of data is increased, we can do new things that 
were not possible before (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, 2013). For example, 
although we have made signif icant progress in our understanding of 
innovation networks, our fundamental understanding of how these networks 
emerge and evolve over time is still in its infancy. In the era of big data, 
interaction data can be gained over time from many new communication 
channels, such as cell phone data, social networking platforms such as 
Facebook or twitter, supplemented by traditional questionnaires and interviews. 
More data sources for innovation studies will facilitate a better and more 
accurate understanding of innovation dynamics and systems. The more we 
learn about how innovation systems work, the more we are able to influence 
them effectively.   
(3) An obvious application of the data-driven approach is for decision support. 
The data-driven approach enables us to learn from historical and real-time data 
and to predict the future. For example, if the market formation function often 
takes place together with entrepreneurial activities, policy makers can facilitate 
market establishment through lowering market barriers and encouraging 
market entry by small start-ups. Decision support can also benefit from 
computational simulations. The large amounts of available data make it 
possible to understand the individuals’ behaviours and to establish more 
empirical-based simulation models. With these simulation platforms, decision 
makers are able to experiment the influences of different interventions in 
advance so as to improve decision making efficiency.  
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The Emergence of Technological Innovations 
 
Abstract 
Although the term “emergence” is often used when people talk about technological 
innovations, it is usually not explicitly defined or explained. Moreover, mainstream 
innovation theories have limitations in explaining the non-equilibrium phenomena of 
emergence. Filling these gaps, the chapter intends to answer RQ3: what does 
emergence mean? And what is the underlying mechanism that drives the emergence 
of technological innovations? 
It explicitly defines the emergence of technological innovations and applies a non-
equilibrium theory to explain the emergence of technological innovations. Particularly, 
we draw on the dissipative self-organising model from complexity theory to analyse 
the case of the emergence of Teflon technology. Our findings suggest a good match 
between the theoretical perspective employed and the empirical processes under study. 
This chapter complements the insights of the mainstream theoretical perspectives into 
technological innovations, providing a more comprehensive understanding of 
innovation dynamics by addressing the downplayed phenomenon of the emergence of 
technological innovations. The self-organising model also provides ins ights into 






4.1 How to spot emergence?  
Technological innovation occurs in a system where networks connect innovators and 
other engaged members. Emergence is a key generic property of complex systems such 
as innovation systems (Rouchy, 2011). Therefore, it is important for R&D and 
innovation managers to understand emergence in order to facilitate innovation. In spite 
of this importance, the emergence of technological innovations has not been subject to 
an extensive investigation, and managers have received insufficient guidance about 
what exactly they can do to enable emergence. This brings us to investigate RQ3: what 
does the emergence of technological innovation mean? And what is the underlying 
mechanism that drives the emergence of technological innovations? 
Mainstream theories in social science have limitations in explaining emergence 
(Aldrich, 1999; Arthur, 1994; Basalla, 1988; Chiles, Meyer, & Hench, 2004; Van de 
Ven, 1993). Technological innovations are usually assumed to be pre-existing (Padgett 
& Powell, 2012; Romanelli, 1991) or their appearance is seen as a stochastic event 
(Frenken, 2006). The fundamental issue of emergence, namely how such innovations 
come about, is hardly addressed. This gap in innovation research leads to a limited 
understanding of the generative processes of technological innovations, and the co-
produced organizational and institutional changes (Ruttan & Hayami, 1984; Van de 
Ven, 1993). It therefore does not surprise that policy-makers and managers have 
difficulties in making effective decisions to facilitate and manage innovations (Davila, 
Epstein, & Shelton, 2012; Teece, 1987).  
A fundamental reason why mainstream theories fail to explain the emergence lies in 
their common assumptions, namely, that innovation processes are destined towards 
equilibrium driven by convergent forces (Stacey, 1995), thereby downplaying non-
equilibrium phenomena such as the emergence of technological innovations (Chiles, 
Vultee, Gupta, Greening, & Tuggle, 2010). The emergence of technological 
innovations is about order creation rather than order maintenance. It generates 
something qualitatively new which is more than the summation of micro-level 
components. It does not have an equilibrium status, but is a continuous changing 
process of the qualitatively new form (Chiles et al., 2004; Van de Ven, 1993). 
Therefore, the explanation of the emergence of technological innovations necessitates a 
theory based on a non-equilibrium perspective. Complexity theory is such a theory and 
it takes emergence as its “anchor point phenomenon” (Chiles et al., 2004, p.502). 
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Therefore, it follows logically that complexity theory may provide ins ights into the 
emergence of technological innovation. Complexity theory requires large amounts of 
data to understand innovation processes. Recently, with the development of computing 
power and storage, the large amounts of data are more easily available, which make it 
possible to make sense of the innovation process using the complexity theory (Manyika 
et al., 2011; Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, 2013). In this chapter we intend to apply a 
self-organising model from complexity theory to understand the emergence of 
technological innovations. 
Particularly, we apply the self-organis ing model to analyse a concrete case of 
technological innovation, the Teflon innovation, to gain deeper insights into the 
phenomenon of emergence. The Teflon case is selected because: (1) Teflon was 
discovered by accident, instead of as a result of a purposefully planned activity, which 
provides a good representation of the emergence process; (2) The Teflon innovation 
was initiated by a big company, DuPont, but it also involved multiple waves of actions 
by small entrepreneurial firms, and underwent external shocks such as the Second 
World War, which made it a good example to understand innovation dynamics; and 3) 
it is a well-documented case with historical data that can be obtained from internet. By 
doing this, we find a good match between the complexity theory and the emergence of 
the Teflon innovation. Theoretically, this chapter provides an alternative explanation of 
the emergence of technological innovations; practically, it offers guidance for 
innovation managers on how to enable this process.  
This chapter is structured as follows: section 4.2 reviews different perspectives of 
emergence, based on which properties of emergence are proposed. Section 4.3 reviews 
how mainstream theories explain the emergence of technological innovations. Section 
4.4 introduces a self-organising model from complexity theory as an alternative 
solution to understand emergence. Section 4.5 uses Teflon innovation case to illustrate 
the self-organising model. Section 4.6 discusses theoretical and managerial 
implications. Section 4.7 provides the answer to RQ3 and draws a conclusion. 
4.2 What does “emergence” mean?  
Although the study on the emergence of technologies is nowadays rather popular, the 
meaning of the term “emergence” differs widely. So, a unified definition of emergence 
is missing (Corning, 2002). However, based on the literature review we found that 
there are mainly two perspectives of emergence.  
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In the first perspective, “emergence” is seen as the first appearance of something new 
and thus as a singular event in time without history (Woolley, 2010). Statements falling 
in this group are, for example, “the emergence and disappearance of technological 
frames.” (Bijker, Hughes, Pinch, & Douglas, 1987, p173); “emergence, survival and 
growth of small biotechnology firms” (Walsh, Niosi, & Mustar, 1995); “identify the 
emergence of an increasing schizophrenic divide …” (Philpott, Dooley, O'Reilly, & 
Lupton, 2011, p.161). This perspective views emergence as the appearance of 
something fundamentally new, which cannot be predicted or deduced from micro-level 
components (Goldstein, 1999, p.50). Although it provides insights into the unique 
features of emergence, the process of emergence itself remains a black box (Goldstein, 
1999, p.54). 
In a second perspective, “emergence” is seen as a process evolving over time 
(Lichtenstein, 2000a). The following three statements express a process perspective: 
“the process of emergence entailed a continual accretion of inputs that progressively 
shaped the emerging paths” (Garud & Karnøe, 2003, p.294-295), “technical behaviour 
emerged over a long period and then consolidated before it began to spread” (Carbonell, 
Mosquera, & Rodríguez, 2007, p.232), “emergence as a process of self-organising” 
(Lichtenstein, 2000a). This perspective emphasises emergence as a continuously 
changing and self-organising process which periodically leads to spontaneous 
outcomes at the system level. 
Although both perspectives provide insights into the meaning of emergence, they miss 
a systematic view of emergence. They focus on different levels of a system: the first 
perspective focusses on the macro-level appearance; and the second emphasises micro-
level processes that lead to the macro-level appearance. Both are needed to understand 
emergence and they are reconcilable from a systematic view (Corning, 2002). It is not 
easy to give a concise definition of emergence, but some common properties can be 
identified from the above perspectives. Therefore, we define emergence as a 
phenomenon with five distinguished properties. Emergence is (1) system behaviour, (2) 
the genesis of some fundamentally new features, (3) a continuous changing process, (4) 
nonlinear with complex interactions, and (5) more than technological diffusion.  Below 
we briefly explain the five elements. 
 Emergence is system behaviour. The emergence of technological innovation 
is an across-system phenomenon: on the macro level, emergence is observed 
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as the appearance of something radically novel; on the micro level, emergence 
is an evolving process composed of interactions of system components. The 
system is not fixed or static or pre-given, instead it co-evolves with 
technological innovations (Ruttan & Hayami, 1984; Van de Ven, 1993).  
 Emergence is the genesis of some fundamentally new features, which are not 
previously observed and which are more than the summation of the lower-
level components. These new features will be continuously constructed and 
transformed over time by the lower-level interactions.  
 Emergence is a continuous changing process. Emergence comprises not only 
the first time appearance of a radically new technology, but also the 
continuous evolution and transformation over time of new forms of 
technologies, organisations and institutions (Chiles et al., 2004; Van de Ven, 
1993). The emergence process is continuously pushed forward by micro-level 
behaviours of interrelated components. The micro-level processes are the 
fundamental reason of emergence.  
 Emergence is nonlinear with complex interactions. Emergence is brought 
about by complex and nonlinear interactions of micro-level components 
(Stacey, 1995, p.287). It is not pre-designed, but a dynamic construct arising 
over time (Goldstein, 1999, p.50).  
 Emergence of technological innovations is more than technological 
diffusion. Technological diffusion assumes the pre-existing of a new 
technology and focusses on how this technology is bought and applied over 
time. In contrast, the emergence of technological innovations is the process of 
innovation which results in the creation and continuous re-creation of new 
technologies. Therefore, the process of emergence happens before the new 
technology exists; and it does not stop when the new technologies come out 
into view, but continues changing over time (Chiles et al., 2004).In this sense, 
the emergence of technological innovation is more than the diffusion process.  
4.3 Can mainstream theories explain emergence? 
Using the f ive elements of emergence mentioned in our definition, we now review four 
mainstream theories in the innovation study field to see whether they are capable of 
providing a theoretical understanding of the phenomenon of emergence. These four 
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mainstream theories are selected based on previous literature review papers (e.g., Nieto, 
2003; Sammut-Bonnici & Wensley, 2002; Steyaert, 2007). The theories  are:  the life 
cycle theory (subsection 4.3.1), the evolutionary theory (subsection 4.3.2), the 
punctuated equilibrium theory (subsection 4.3.3), and  the social construction theory 
(subsection 4.3.4). Next to these four mainstream theories, in the embedded discussion 
subsection 4.3.5, we also consider two heterodox theories to examine to what extent 
that they can explain the emergence of technological innovations.  
4.3.1  Life cycle theory 
Life cycle theory assumes that the development of systems undergoes predefined 
stages such as birth, growth, maturity, and decline. For example, Foster (1986) divided 
the process of technological change into three major stages: introduction, growth, and 
maturity. Abernathy and Utterback (1978) proposed a three-stage life cycle model of 
technological innovation, going from the fluid phase characterised by high uncertainty, 
to the transitional phase where some standardisation emerges, and then the specific 
phase distinguished by a dominant design. These life cycle models have common 
characteristics: they see innovation as a linear and determined process (Van de Ven & 
Poole, 1995) in which an innovation cannot enter the next stage before the previous 
stage is finished.  
However, since emergence is a nonlinear process, the predefined and determined 
nature of the life cycle model is not suitable to explain emergence. Most life cycle 
models focus on the factors affecting the creation and acceptance of new products and 
on the conditions in which technological innovation succeed (Utterback, 1974) instead 
of describing how a new technology emerges. Therefore, the genesis of the technology 
is not investigated and the underlying behaviours within each stage remain black box 
phenomena (Ruttan, 1997). 
4.3.2 Evolutionary theory 
Evolutionary theory explains the process of change as a continuous cycle of variation, 
selection, and retention (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). Variations create new forms of 
organisation, ideas, or technologies. Selection occurs through competition between 
these different forms in obtaining resources, and the environment selects the forms 
with the best fit (Freeman, 1977; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). Retention perpetuates 
and maintains the selected new forms. It has become a mainstream paradigm to explain 
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technological change since the late 1970s (Ruttan, 1997). The strength of the 
evolutionary theory is that it uncovers the underlying mechanism of the innovation 
(Ruttan, 1997) and allows researchers to model the interactions between the population 
and its environment (Ruttan, 1997, p.1522). 
However, evolutionary theory assumes the pre-existing of a new technology, and 
focusses on the diffusion process of the new technology. The underlying causal 
processes which generate new technologies have not been explained  (Van de Ven, 
1993). New technologies are assumed to be pre-existing in the population or are treated 
as results of random chance events (Campbell, 1974; McKelvey, 1982; Van de Ven & 
Poole, 1995), individual technological genius (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985), or 
“whatever reason … They just happen” (Aldrich, 1979, p.28). Since emergence is more 
than technological diffusion and it also includes the generation process of new 
technologies, it is not sufficient to use evolutionary theory to understand emergence. 
4.3.3 Punctuated equilibrium theory 
Punctuated equilibrium theory describes the process of change as long periods of 
incremental change interrupted by relatively short periods of radical change (Eldredge 
& Gould, 1972). A strength of the punctuated equilibrium is that it helps understanding 
the discontinuity and unpredictability of technological innovation (Sammut-Bonnici & 
Wensley, 2002, p.293).  
However, the central argument of the punctuated equilibrium model, namely periodical 
change interrupting long periods of stability (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997), is 
inconsistent with the “continuously changing” nature of emergence. The emergence of 
technological innovations is through continuous generation, evolution and 
transformation of new forms of technologies, rather than through an abrupt, punctuated 
change. And it is intimately related to the broader organisational and institutional 
change instead of just a technical change. But the effects of non-technological 
discontinuities, such as stimulus from legal, political or social environments, are 
ignored by the punctuated equilibrium model, which only focusses on technological 
breakthrough as the source of discontinuities (Romanelli & Tushman, 1994). Therefore, 
consistent with others (e.g., Chiles et al., 2004; Kauffman, 1993; Lichtenstein, 1995; 
Sammut-Bonnici & Wensley, 2002), we may conclude that the punctuated equilibrium 
model is insufficient to guide research on emergence. 
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4.3.4 Social construction theory 
Social construction theory (SCOT) views technological innovation as a process shaped 
by social processes, and claims that the process can be traced by the evolving meanings 
of the technology by different social groups (Pinch & Bijker, 2000). It describes 
innovation as undergoing two stages: (1) the early diversity of interpretations of an 
artefact by relevant social groups, and (2) the stabilisation of innovation where 
(implicit) agreement on a common interpretation is arrived. The theory argues that the 
process of technological innovation is constituted by social processes, rather than by 
purely technical ones (Bijker, 1993, p.121). The strength of the SCOT perspective is 
that (1) it discards economists’ ‘black box’ treatments and (2) linear models of 
innovation, and provides a rich description of how social processes interact with 
technological innovation processes, thereby (3) linking what happens on the micro 
level to broader social structures (Russell, 1986). 
However, the social construction theory emphasises how an existing artefact is shaped 
by social culture, instead of how a new one comes out. This is inconsistent with the 
fundamental change nature of emergence. The emergence of different interpretations of 
a technological innovation is not investigated. It is seen as “some spontaneously 
generated [process] or a process of conception which implicitly needs no social 
analys is” (Russell, 1986, p.333). Although the social construction theory provides a 
rich description of how social processes interact with technological innovation 
processes, a drawback of this theory is that it lacks theoretical generalisations (Bijker et 
al., 1987, p.116). So, we may conclude that this theory is not sufficient to explain the 
underlying mechanisms of emergence. 
4.3.5 Embedded discussion 
Mainstream theories have provided invaluable knowledge in understanding a technical 
change, yet their contributions in terms of understanding the emergence of 
technological innovation is limited (Frenken, 2006, p.2). In mainstream theories, the 
process of emergence is treated as a black box, whereby they can discern both the 
micro-level inputs (e.g., variations, punctuations, diversity) and macro-level outputs 
(e.g., the life cycle pattern, the evolutionary patter, the punctuation pattern,). But how 
these variations or punctuations are transformed into the higher level patterns during 
the emergent process has been less explained. One exception is the social construction 
theory (Pinch & Bijker, 2000), which describes how micro-level social processes shape 
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technological innovations. However, a more general and theoretical explanation about 
why emergence occurs is lost.  
The fundamental reason why mainstream theories fail to explain emergence 
phenomena lies in their assumptions, namely, that technological innovation has a 
tendency towards equilibrium (Stacey, 1995). The variances or punctuations, which 
initiate divergent processes, are absorbed by negative feedback processes toward 
predictable states of adaptation to the environment (Stacey, 1995, p.477). These 
equilibrium-based theories have ignored or downplayed the emergent phenomena 
characterised by uncertain and non-equilibrium innovation processes. 
Besides the mainstream theories, there are two heterodox theories that are relevant to 
emergence: (1) the Austrian economics perspective and (2) the increasing returns 
theory. Below we examine whether these two heterodox theories are sufficient to 
explain emergence. 
The Austrian economists (Vaughn, 1998) consider emergence as an unintended 
consequence of human action and interaction. They realise the insufficiency of 
mainstream microeconomics in explaining the origin and emergence of social order 
(Garrouste, 1994), because the equilibrium assumption does not fit into the complex 
and dynamic nature of economic change (Kirzner, 1997). However, a limitation of this 
perspective is that it focusses on theoretical understanding and lacks empirical 
evidence to support their theories (Chiles et al., 2004). All in all, it has not given an 
explicit definition of emergence or explanation of its internal mechanisms.  
In contrast, the increasing returns theory does give an explanation of the internal 
mechanisms of the emergence of a market: small changes might be amplified by 
positive feedback processes so as to lock in the innovation process and lead to market 
formation (Arthur, 1989). However, the focus on the emergence of a market implies an 
emphasis on the diffusion and adoption phase of a new technology rather than the pre-
commercialisation and emergent process of this new technology. Particularly, it 
explains how increasing returns might drive the adoption process towards a market 
structure (Arthur, 1989), but the genesis of technological innovation has not been paid 
much attention to. Therefore, the increasing returns theory is not sufficient in 
explaining the emergence of technological innovations. 
Hence, both the four mainstream theories and the two heterodox theories in the field of 
technological change have theoretical or empirical limitations regarding technological 
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emergence. We need an alternative theory to facilitate our understanding of the 
mechanism of emergence. In section 4.4, we are going to provide such an alternative 
theory.  
4.4 A dissipative self-organising model of emergence 
From the above, we may conclude that the explanation of emergence requires a non-
equilibrium based theory. Complexity theory is such a theory. Different from the 
equilibrium-based theories such as the mainstream theories, complexity theory assumes 
that a complex system like the innovation system (Katz, 2006; Rose-Anderssen, Allen, 
Tsinopoulos, & McCarthy, 2005) must remain at a status between order and disorder in 
order to transform itself (Burnes, 2005, p.79). This means that there is no predictable 
equilibrium status for such complex systems; instead they keep evolving and are 
continuously (re-)constructed by interactions between lower-level components.  
The non-equilibrium assumption of complexity theory f its well to the nature of 
technological innovations which usually happen in an uncertain and continuously 
dynamic environment. In such a dynamic environment, firms need to innovate 
continuously themselves, rather than just carrying out rare, episodic changes (Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1997). Since the primary purpose of innovation is to generate new products 
or services, these truly new products or services do not exist in the past or the present, 
and therefore are not predictable. 
Complexity theory focusses on the fundamental characteristics of the behaviour of 
nonlinear and network feedback systems (Borzillo & Kaminska-Labbe, 2011; Stacey, 
1995; Verweij, 2013). Particularly, complexity theory is interested in the emergence 
phenomenon of such systems, which means it focusses on explaining how the system-
level pattern spontaneously emerges from the nonlinear behaviours of lower-level 
system components (Chiles et al., 2004; Chiva, Grandio, & Alegre, 2010). An 
innovation system is a system that is nonlinear and network linked (Bergek, Jacobsson, 
Carlsson, Lindmark, & Rickne, 2008). From this, it follows logically that complexity 
theory should also apply to the emergence of technological innovations.  
In fact, many strategy and organisation researchers have applied complexity theory to 
explain the emergence of organisations (e.g., Chiles et al., 2004; Lichtenstein, 2000a), 
and in these studies complexity theory has provided valuable contributions to the 
explanation of the underlying mechanisms of emergence. However, technological 
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innovation scholars have barely begun to do this, which leads to insufficient 
understanding of the basic causal processes underlying the emergence of technological 
innovations (Chiles et al., 2004; McKelvey, 2001). Therefore, we intend to extend the 
application of complexity theory to the emergence of the technological innovation f ield, 
and to shed light on how technological innovations emerge. 
Complexity scientists have identified a dissipative self-organising model as the 
constant mechanism underlying the continuous change (Gemmill & Smith, 1985; 
Prigogine, Nicolis, & Babloyantz, 1972). The basic logic of this dissipative self-
organising mechanism is: the system is an open system and it is continuously 
exchanging energy with its environment; because energy is continuously injected into 
or dissipated from the system, the system is maintained in a status between order and 
disorder, where the injected energy is increased enough so that the system may 
transform itself from the existing regime of order to a totally new regime of order 
(Leifer, 1989). Therefore, the self-organising model explains the underlying 
mechanism that drives the transformation from one regime of order to another. It 
includes three critical elements : (1) irregularity, (2) positive feedback loops, and (3) 
behavioural regime (Lichtenstein, 2000b). Below we briefly explain each element.  
 Irregularity. Continuous injection of energy could bring irregularity and 
disturbances to a system, which drives the system more and more away from 
the equilibrium state. In the technological innovation field, these disturbances 
can be referred to as irregular, random, unexpected, and non-routine events, 
e.g., hiring a new innovation manager, increasing innovation budgets, 
changing new product development direction. These events bring the 
innovation system under the influence of a new set of behaviours, and create 
the opportunity for movement into a new regime of order.  
 Positive feedback loops. Positive feedback loops refer to either vicious or 
virtuous circles that amplify initial small changes. Once the irregularity is 
brought into the system, positive feedback loops can enormously amplify the 
disturbances so that these disturbances can overcome the damping forces of 
the existing regime of order and finally move the system into a new regime of 
order. Examples of positive feedback loops have already been found in 
technological innovations. For example, Davenport et al. (2003) discovered a 
number of positive feedback loops underlying the technological progression of 
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New Zealand firms. One of them is a reciprocal circle of “co-evolution with 
technology partners”, which means that the technological capability of firms 
can be enhanced by their technology partners, which in turn leads to a larger 
scope of partners offering mutual technological advantage.  
 Behaviour regime. In the same behaviour regime, system behaviours follow a 
certain pattern, which means although system behaviours are random and 
unpredictable they are constrained within boundaries (Eoyang, 2009; Morgan, 
2006). For example, the behaviours of innovation systems may be constrained 
by intangible properties of the organisation, such as its culture, values, 
innovation managers’ vision, management style. If the behaviour regime 
changes, new patterns of behaviours may appear. For example, at the 
beginning of an innovation, activities may be oriented around technological 
development; later after the technology is sufficiently mature to be launched 
into the market, activities are oriented to marketing and product 
commercialisation; thereby the innovation system enters a new behaviour 
regime, which may have a different rate and direction of a technological 
change. When a new behaviour regime appears, emergence is observed at the 
system level (Cariola & Rolfo, 2004). 
Since the dissipative self-organis ing model is a consistent mechanism underlying the 
constant changes and emergence is a continuous changing process, it logically follows 
that the dissipative self-organising model may be also applied to explain the emergence 
of technological innovations. Therefore, in the section 4.5 we intend to check 
empirically whether the dissipative self-organis ing model matches the reality of the 
emergence of technological innovations, using the Teflon innovation case.  
4.5 Case study: the Teflon innovation 
The Teflon case serves as a good example for examining technological emergence. 
This is because Teflon was discovered by accident, stumbled upon by researchers of 
DuPont looking for refrigerants, instead of purposefully planned results (Funderburg, 
2000). Its developmental process did not rely on the imposition of an overall plan by a 
central authority, but emerges from interactions between many actors, e.g. , DuPont, 
small individual entrepreneurs, and governments. The long history of Teflon enables a 
systematic examination of how innovation evolves over time. 
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This section is split into two parts: (1) the approach that we adopt to analyse the Teflon 
case (subsection 4.5.1), and (2) the analysis results of the emergence of Teflon 
(subsection 4.5.2). 
4.5.1 Analysis approach 
The analysis approach combines inductively exploring data and deductively verifying 
theory. We start from an explorative approach in purpose of inducing theoretical 
insights from the original data. With iterative interpretation of the raw data, we have a 
feeling that the empirical case fits the complexity theory literature far better than any 
other. At that point, we shifted from exploring data to verifying how the Teflon case 
matches the dissipative self-organisation model from complexity theory.  
Since we focus on understanding the emergence of Teflon innovation from historical 
data instead of exploring different scenarios, the first four steps of the data-driven 
method in Chapter 2 are adopted. They are: (1) data collection, (2) chronological event 
list, (3) event coding, and (4) process pattern identification. Below we give a brief 
description of these four steps applied to the Teflon case. 
(1) Data collection 
History events around the Teflon innovation are collected as many as possible through 
searching the internet. Consistent with Van de Ven and Poole (1990), here we define 
events  as changes in terms of actors, institutions, technology, and external 
environment. . Retrieved data include scientific publications and historical documents. 
Especially, for the early invention of Teflon we rely on the innovation archive of 
Teflon provided by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT, 2000); and for the 
diffusion part of Teflon we make use of Funderburg (2000). 
(2) Chronological event list 
All these events are tabulated in the form of when, by whom, what happens, and the 
original source of the data in a chronological order. 
(3)  Event coding 
In order to reduce complexity and identify patterns, events are classified according to a 
theoretical framework provided by Hekkert et al. (Hekkert, Suurs, Negro, Kuhlmann, 
& Smits, 2007), which divide activities involved in a technological innovation into 
seven groups, namely seven system functions, shown in Table 4.1. The validity of 
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these seven system functions have been proved through empirical studies by many 
scholars (e.g., Negro, 2007; Negro, Hekkert, & Smits, 2007; Suurs, 2009; Suurs & 
Hekkert, 2009a; Suurs & Hekkert, 2009b). We rely on these seven system functions as 
a theoretical framework to classify the events by assigning each event to one of the 
seven system functions. 
Table 4.1 Theoretical framework of seven system functions 
System functions Explanation 
F1: Entrepreneurial activities Risk-taking, innovative and proactive activities 
(Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; Miller, 1983) 
F2: Knowledge development Development and accumulation of technical 
knowledge 
F3: Knowledge diffusion Information communication through formal and 
informal networks 
F4: Guidance of the search Activities which provide guidance and direction 
for the innovation 
F5: Market formation Creation of (niche) market for emerging 
technologies 
F6: Resource mobilisation Changes of resource availability of a technology 
F7: Support from advocacy 
coalitions 
Lobbying in order to create legitimacy for a new 
technology (Negro & Hekkert, 2008) 
(4) Process pattern identification 
The Teflon innovation process is structured as a chronological narrative in the form of 
a history of events. This narrative approach is especially useful for organising data 
“when time plays an important role and where a single case provides rich and varied 
incidents” (Chiles et al., 2004, p.505). The contributions of events to system functions 
are indicated by [F1, F2… F7], which serves as a preliminary step towards identifying 
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patterns. Due to space limitation, this coding process will not be detailed here, but can 
be found in Appendix C. 
4.5.2 The emergence of Teflon 
In this subsection, we come to see how closely the Teflon innovation fits the 
dissipative self-organising model derived from complexity theory. We do this by 
interpreting the Teflon innovation process according to the three elements of the model 
(please see section 4.4): irregularity, positive feedback loops, and behaviour regime. 
We found that the Teflon innovation underwent five core irregularities, each of which 
initiated a series of events that transformed the system, and finally ushering the system 
in a new regime of order. Partitioned by these irregularities, the Teflon innovation went 
through five phases: (1) invention, (2) military applications, (3) industrial applications, 
(4) household applications, and (5) market maturity. Below for each phase, we will 
first describe the irregularity that initiated the phase, second discuss the feedback loops 
that underlined this phase, and third what kinds of behaviour regime was established in 
this phase.  
(1) Phase I: Invention (1930 - 1938) 
Irregularity: A serendipitous finding initiated Teflon’s innovation process. In 1930, 
General Motors and DuPont together developed new refrigerants from a range of 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)
1
, among which the compound “refrigerant 114” was found 
to be the most effective (Funderburg, 2000). The innovation manager in DuPont agreed 
to reserve the entire output of that refrigerant for GM’s Frigidaire division. As a direct 
consequence it also meant that DuPont had to develop new refrigerants to supply other 
manufacturers. In 1936, innovation managers in DuPont assigned Plunkett as a 
researcher to synthesise new forms of the refrigerant Freon (MIT, 2000). In 1938, 
Plunkett and his assistant accidently discovered a white powder with lubricant 
properties, chemical inertness and an extremely high melting point (MIT, 2000). This 
white powder, polymerised tetrafluoroethylene (PTFE), with the brand name Teflon, 
was the result of high pressure and temperature (Funderburg, 2000). Plunkett 
succeeded in re-creating the substance (Funderburg, 2000), applied for a patent in 1939 
that was granted in 1941. 
                                                                 
1
 Chlorofluorocarbon, shorted as CFC, is an organic compound which is widely used as refrigerants.  
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After the invention, innovation managers moved the development work from fluorine 
chemistry to polymer chemistry and process development. The former focussed on 
ways to produce enough raw materials for PTFE, to serve industrial applications. The 
latter was busy with possible polymerisation processes  when they received new 
materials from the polymer chemistry group (Funderburg, 2000). 
Positive feedback loops: In this period, innovation managers unconsciously created a 
positive feedback loop of technological development: continuous research activities 
with positive research results provided high expectancies, leading to an increased 
research budget, which in turn advanced further research activities (see Figure 4.1). 
This positive feedback loop amplified the accidental discovery of Teflon.  
 
Figure 4.1 Positive feedback loops in phase I 
Behaviour regime: In this period, the activities focussed on scientific research and 
development of the newly discovered material. We therefore view behaviours in this 
period as bounded within a “technological regime”.  
(2) Phase II: Military applications (1939 - 1944) 
Irregularity: World War II boosted the PTFE development. Up to 1940, the innovation 
manager has encountered two obstacles for PTFE innovation: the huge production 
costs of PTFE and its unclear applications. During World War II, the Manhattan 
Project needed equipment able to withstand highly corrosive conditions (Funderburg, 
2000). The chemical inertness of PTFE fulfilled this requirement (Funderburg, 2000). 
Taking this opportunity, in 1940 innovation managers in DuPont were able to persuade 
the director of the Manhattan Project to choose DuPont to design the equipment 
(Funderburg, 2000). Subsequently, PTFE was successfully used in Manhattan Project 
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(Clegg, 2012). The innovation managers then decided to extend PTFE to other military 
applications, such as airplane engines and explosives manufacturing (Funderburg, 2000; 
Willett, 2012). It was such a success that despite the price of PTFE (around $100 a 
pound) the entire PTFE production was purchased by the U.S. government 
(Funderburg, 2000). 
Positive feedback loops: In this period, a positive feedback loop emerged without 
being intended: innovation managers took the opportunity of WWII and created the 
first niche market for PTFE as anticorrosive material in Manhattan project; 
government-funded projects were established; financial resources were continuously 
injected into PTFE research; all of these in turn lead to even better market performance 
and quick market expansion. This self-reinforcing cycle drove the Teflon innovation 
system towards increasing diversity, and shifted it from technological research to 
market exploration (see Figure 4.2). 
 
Figure 4.2 Positive feedback loops in phase II 
Behaviour regime: Since this period was initiated by innovation managers identifying 
a niche market opportunity and mainly focussed on market development activities, we 
call it a “market-driven regime”. 
(3) Phase III: Industrial applications (1944 - 1953) 
Irregularity: The third phase started when, after the successful military applications, 
the innovation managers in DuPont decided to enter the industrial markets with PTFE. 
In 1944, DuPont registered the trademark Teflon (Funderburg, 2000). But before 
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DuPont could produce Teflon on a large scale, the innovation managers needed to 
solve several production problems. We mention: the temperature and pressure required 
for equipment, synthesis problems, as well as the obstacles encountered during 
fabricating Teflon into useful articles (Funderburg, 2000). Finally, in 1948 DuPont was 
ready for full-scale Teflon production (Funderburg, 2000). In 1950, the first 
commercial Teflon plant was established (Funderburg, 2000). 
Simultaneously, the innovation managers enhanced the marketing. They assigned 
scientists to assist customers to “integrate Teflon into their production processes” 
(Funderburg, 2000). And they maintain regular meeting with researches, 
manufacturing and sales staff to exchange experiences (Funderburg, 2000). 
Consequently, many market applications emerged, ranging from tape and sheets for 
insulation, via gaskets to sealer plates. 
Positive feedback loops: In this period innovation managers unconsciously created two 
types of positive feedback loops: (1) a reciprocal cycle between entrepreneurial 
activities market formation and guidance of the search; and (2) a reciprocal cycle 
between entrepreneurial activities, technological development and guidance of the 
search (see Figure 4.3). The success in the military market motivated the innovation 
managers to decide to enter the industrial market, which was followed by two parallel 
activities: on the one hand innovation managers intensified technological development 
to cater industrial market, and on the other hand they enhanced marketing. All of these 
provided positive feedback to the managers’ decision and encouraged them 
continuously to explore new market applications. 
 
Figure 4.3 Positive feedback loops in phase III 
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Behaviour regime: We refer to this period as dominated by “entrepreneurial regime” 
because of the prevalent entrepreneurial initiatives in this period. 
(4) Phase IV: Household applications (1954 - 1968) 
Irregularity: The fourth period started with the first Teflon-coated pan company 
established by Marc Gregoire in France. While innovation managers in DuPont were 
hesitant to enter the home cooking market because of safety concerns, Gregoire entered 
this market. Gregoire knew Teflon from one of his colleagues who found a way to affix 
Teflon to aluminium for industrial applications (Funderburg, 2000). This inspired 
Gregoire to affix Teflon on his fishing gear to avoid tangles. His wife suggested 
coating their cooking pans with Teflon to avoid stick. A patent was granted in 1954. In 
1955, the Gregoires started to sell Teflon-coated pans in their neighbourhood. It was a 
big success. In 1956, they established a company, named Tefal (Funderburg, 2000). 
Later, “France’s Conseil Superieur de I’Hygiene Publique” officially cleared Teflon for 
use on frying pans” (Funderburg, 2000). “The Laboratoire Municipale de Paris and the 
Ecole Superieur de Physique et Chimie also declared that Teflon-coated cookware 
presented no health hazard” (Funderburg, 2000). “In 1958 the French ministry of 
agriculture approved the use of Teflon in food processing” (Funderburg, 2000). As a 
result, Gregoires’ company sold one million items in 1958, and three million in 1960  
(Funderburg, 2000).  
The innovation mangers in DuPont were inspired by Teflon’s success in the cooking 
market in France (Funderburg, 2000). They decided to start applying for approval by 
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) using Teflon in cooking and food 
processing. After years of testing, in 1960 DuPont submitted the application to the 
FDA (Funderburg, 2000).  
But before DuPont entered the pan market, Hardie, an American entrepreneur, had 
already started importing Gregoire’s Teflon-coated pan. In 1958, Hardie met Gregoire 
at a party in France. Attracted by Gregoire’s Teflon pan business Hardie wanted to start 
this business in America. He persuaded Gregoire to cooperate, and got the rights to 
manufacture non-stick cookware using Tefal’s process in America. He tried to 
persuade American cookware manufactures but this product was so new that they 
rejected it. Later, Hardie met an executive of DuPont whom he convinced of Teflon-
coated pan’s great market value. The executive connected Hardie to Macy’s, a chain of 
department stores, in New York, which became Hardie’s first customer. In December 
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1960, Hardie’s non-stick skillets sold out quickly at Macy’s. Hardie called Horchow, a 
buyer for the Dallas department store Neiman Marcus, and persuaded him to accept a 
sample skillet. Horchow introduced this product to Helen Corbitt, a cookbook editor 
who ran a popular cooking school in Dallas. Corbitt loved this product so much that 
she ordered several pans from Neiman Marcus and wrote a half-page newspaper 
advertisement. Hardie’s business took off. Buyers were crazy about this product and 
Hardie received so many orders that he ran out of pans and was unable to supply 
although his French supplier had expanded its facilities. Hardie decided to build up his 
own manufacture facilities in America. The success attracted many American 
cookware companies and Teflon enjoyed fast growth. 
Positive feedback loops: In this period individual entrepreneurs rather than innovation 
managers in DuPont facilitated creating two positive feedback loops : one is the re-
enforcing relationship between the entrepreneurial activities , market formation and 
guidance of the search; and the other one is the reciprocal cycle between 
entrepreneurial activities, support from advocacy coalitions and resource allocation. 
These two cycles played an important role in the emergence of Teflon’s cookware 
market. The pivot is individual entrepreneurs looking for cooperation and obtaining 
resources through continuous lobbying. With sufficient resources, entrepreneurs were 
able to market the Teflon pan, creating positive expectations and attracting new entries. 
These self-reinforcing cycles (see Figure 4.4) lead to a quick expansion of Teflon in the 
cooking pan market. 
 
Figure 4.4 Positive feedback loops in phase IV 
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Behaviour regime: Given the centrality of the entrepreneurial activities in the above 
feedback loops, we call the regime in this period “entrepreneurial regime”. Individual 
entrepreneurs became dominant instead of innovation managers in DuPont. 
(5) Phase V: Market maturity (1969 - 1980s) 
Irregularity: Teflon reputation crisis initiated this period. Because of the lack of 
experience of American manufactures, the Teflon-coated pans turned out to have such 
a low quality that demand decreased. “Just as quickly as the US demand for non-stick 
pans had soared, it plummeted, and warehouses were filled with unsold stock”. Haride 
closed his factory. Yet, innovation managers in DuPont believed in the potential of the 
Teflon pan, and committed to recovering its fame. They surveyed the market to reveal 
the causes of market failure and found that the bad quality kept customers back from 
purchasing the Teflon-coated pan. In order to recover Teflon-coated pan’s reputation, 
the innovation managers in DuPont decided to build up a set of coating standards. 
Simultaneously, they initiated a certification program: companies that intended to 
produce Teflon pans were supposed to obtain an official seal of approval for Teflon 
kitchenware. By the mid-1960s the Teflon pan had regained its reputation. 
In order to maintain market share, innovation managers in DuPont continuously 
facilitated developing new generations of Teflon from 1968 to 1985, such as Teflon II 
in 1968 (Funderburg, 2000), “Tefzel® ethylene tetrafluoroethylene (ETFE) and 
Teflon® perfluoroalkoxy (PFA) in 1972 (DuPont). In 1974, “Tefal diversifies with a 
gas lighter and a waffle/sandwich toaster” (Anonymous, , accessed in 2013). In 1976, 
DuPont discovered Silverstone which could “provide even greater non-stick 
performance and scratch resistance” (DuPont). In 1984, “another improvement in non-
stick coatings was made”. In 1986, Silverstone Supra was introduced (DuPont).  
However, during this technology improvement period, innovation managers in DuPont 
encountered an unexpected challenge: rumour arose that users of Teflon pans “suffer 
the flu or seizures after breathing Teflon fumes” (Funderburg, 2000). One medical 
journal warned readers of Teflon’s danger. Many magazines discussed the safety issues 
of Teflon pans. In response, innovation managers in DuPont carried out a series of 
crisis management activities, including directly acknowledging minor problems, public 
retraction, as well as publishing summarised research results. 
Positive feedback loops: Innovation managers in DuPont played an important role in 
creating a positive feedback loop which recovered Teflon reputation. In this positive 
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feedback loop, positive market response led to high expectations, which directly fed 
back on continuous financial support for developing new generations of Teflon, which 
in turn improved market performance. This self-reinforcing cycle (see Figure 4.5) 
enables the emergence of an established institutional structure.  
Notably, positive feedback loops do not always lead to positive results. When Teflon 
was plagued by a safety rumour, it sent a negative signal which led to decreasing 
market demand. The set of activities carried out by innovation managers in DuPont, e.g. 
public retraction, publishing research results, aimed at re-gaining a positive guidance 
function, which would reverse the effect of the loop (see Figure 4.5) 
 
Figure 4.5 Positive feedback loops in phase V 
Behaviour regime: Given the significant role of market formation in this self-
reinforcing loop, we call the dominant regime a market-driven regime. 
4.6 Discussion 
Below we discuss our findings in three parts: (1) in subsection 4.6.1, we answer RQ3: 
what does emergence mean? And what is the underlying mechanism that drives the 
emergence of technological innovations; (2) in subsection 4.6.2, we discuss the added 
value of the dissipative self-organising model; and (3) in subsection 4.6.3, the practical 






4.6.1  Meaning of emergence and the mechanism of emergence  
(1) What does emergence mean? 
In section 4.2, we define emergence as a phenomenon that consists of five critical 
properties. Emergence is (1) system behaviour, (2) the genesis of some fundamentally 
new features, (3) a continuous changing process, (4) nonlinear with complex 
interactions, and (5) more than technological diffusion. Below we briefly explain the 
five elements. 
The case of Teflon verifies these five elements. The emergence of Teflon is (1) system 
behaviour: The innovation of Teflon involves multiple waves of actions by multiple 
actors, such as DuPont, small entrepreneurial firms, governments, and so on. They 
were interacted and co-influenced and all contributed to shaping the developmental 
path of Teflon. Therefore, they constituted the Teflon innovation system; (2) genesis of 
some fundamentally new features: Teflon is radical new material with fundamentally 
new properties, such as slippery, inert, non-corrosive and heat-resistant; (3) a 
continuous changing and (4) nonlinear process: the emergence of Teflon did not stop 
after the invention of Teflon, but Teflon is continuously disrupted by irregularities and 
transformed by positive feedback loops; and (5) more than technological diffusion: 
before the invention of Teflon in 1938, the activities which contributed to its invention 
had already started (viz. since 1930) when General Motors and DuPont cooperated to 
develop new refrigerants. After Teflon was commercialised in the military and 
industrial market, the innovation path of Teflon was continuously changed by 
individual entrepreneurs who started the household cookware market. 
It is interesting to mention that the definition of emergence is not given in a traditional 
static way, which usually defines a phenomenon in terms of its antecedents, and 
consequences. Instead, the five elements of emergence emphasise a more dynamic and 
system view of emergence. All in all, it is not able to predefine the inputs and outputs 
of emergence. 
(2) What is the underlying mechanism that drives the emergence of technological 
innovations? 
The case study of Teflon in section 4.5 verifies that the dissipative self-organis ing 
model can be used to explain the underlying mechanism that drives the emergence of 
technological innovations. Using the dissipative self-organis ing model, the emergence 
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of the Teflon innovation is represented as a transition between different behaviour 
regimes driven by underlying pos itive feedback processes. Irregular events, including 
external forces (e.g., the World War II) and internal forces (e.g., top-town decisions by 
innovation managers) divided the whole innovation process into five phases or f ive 
behaviour regimes : technological regime, market-driven regime, entrepreneurial 
regime (innovation manager as the main actors), entrepreneurial regime (individual 
entrepreneurs as the main actors), and market-driven regime. Depending on which 
regime dominates, the technological innovation process was continuously shifting from 
one core set of behavioural possibilities to another (Tidd, 2006) 
This self-organising model of emergence perfectly fits the properties of emergence, 
which are (1) system behaviour, (2) genesis of something fundamentally new, (3) 
continuous process, (4) nonlinear process, and (5) more than technological diffusion. 
Below we explain how the dissipative self-organising model explains these five 
elements of emergence.  
 (1) System behaviour. The self-organising model explains emergence as a 
transition between different behaviour regimes on the macro level driven by 
micro-level positive feedback loops. The macro-level and micro-level 
perspectives imply the existing of a system.  
 (2) Genesis of some fundamentally new features. In the self-organising model, 
when the system enters a new behaviour regime, it represents a newly 
emerging configuration and new possibilities of behaviours. The whole system 
reorganises itself around the new configuration (Gemmill & Smith, 1985).  
 (3) Continuous and (4) nonlinear. In the self-organising model, the whole 
process of the emergence of the technological innovation is composed of 
positive feedback loops. There is no ending of this process. Any small changes 
may be amplif ied by these positive feedback loops and the configuration of the 
system may be fundamentally changed.  
 (5) More than technological diffusion. The self-organising model captures a 
rather complete process of the Teflon emergence, which started before the 
invention of Teflon and continued after the big success in its first niche market.  
All in all, we see that there is a balanced match between the reality observed in the 
Teflon innovation case and the self-organising model drawn from the complexity 
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theory. The match closes a gap in the literature by providing a theoretical explanation 
of the emergence of technological innovations. 
4.6.2 Added value of the dissipative self-organising model  
In this subsection, we discuss the five contributions of the self-organising model to the 
theories of technological change. 
(1) Providing a theoretical explanation of emergence  
The dissipative self-organising model gives a theoretical explanation of the emergence 
of technological innovation. The emergence of Teflon innovation is represented as 
successive transformations of behaviour regimes: going from a technical regime, to 
market-driven regime, an entrepreneurial regime (DuPont as main actor), another 
entrepreneurial regime (small firms as main actors) and finally a market-driven regime. 
This pattern converges with the technology trajectory proposed by Dosi (1982) stating 
that the path of a technology innovation starts with knowledge accumulation (the 
technological regime), and is followed by a Schumpeterian phase characterised by 
multiple risk-taking actors who contributed to technical and commercial trial and error 
(the entrepreneurial regime). The final phase is a phase of “oligopolistic maturity” 
during which the market is occupied by a few market and technical leaders (the market-
driven regime) (Dosi, 1982). The dissipative self-organising model (1) reproduces the 
macro-level pattern of Dosi (1982)’s conceptual model, and (2) provides explanations 
for the underlying reasons that lead to the macro-level pattern.  
(2) Emphasising continuous changes rather than incremental or radical 
changes 
Instead of viewing technological change as either incremental or radical, the dissipative 
self-organisation model proposes that complex systems must respond continuously to 
changes in order to survive (Burnes, 2005; Ottosson & Björk, 2004). Organisations are 
complex systems that need to respond continuously to changes through a process of 
spontaneous self-organising if they are to survive (Basalla, 1988; Rycroft & Kash, 
2004). This echoes Brown and Eisenhardt (1997) who demonstrated that organisations 
in the computer industry are neither in an incremental change nor in a discontinuous 
change as proposed by punctuated equilibrium theory; instead, they continuously 
change by their own self-organising process. 
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(3) Serving as “a point of synthesis” for a number of theories of technological 
change 
The dissipative self-organising model serves as “a point of synthesis” for three theories 
of technological change (Gemmill & Smith, 1985, p.760): (a) increasing returns theory, 
(b) punctuated equilibrium theory, and (c) path dependency theory. We discuss them 
below. 
 (a) Arthur’s (1996) increasing returns theory parallels the ‘positive feedback loops’ 
element in the dissipative self-organising model. He states that if a product or a 
technology gets ahead by chance, increasing returns can magnify this advantage, 
and thereby create a lock-in (Arthur, 1996, p.100). This simplif ies an essential 
feature of self-reinforcing cycles: the ability to create a new configuration of the 
economic system. 
 (b) Tushman and Romanelli’s (1985) punctuated equilibrium model proposes that 
discontinuous changes facilitate any existing organisation to overcome inertia and 
set course for the next convergent period (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985, p.175). 
The dissipative self-organisation model explains : how shifts occur between inertia 
and change (Gersick, 1994, p.9): if the turbulence is sufficiently big the system is 
forced to change; otherwise the system remains in the existing regime. 
 (c) The dissipative self-organisation model explains the path dependency theory, 
which refers to the dynamic and non-reversible property of innovation processes 
(Garud & Karnoe, 2001). The dissipative self-organisation model is able to 
capture chance events and integrate them into analysis. These events are random 
and unplanned; therefore they characterise a specific innovation process. This 
implies that innovation trajectories are essentially non-reversible (Colombelli & 
Tunzelmann, 2011). For example, due to the decision by Kinetic Chemicals to 
reserve its entire output of refrigerant 114 for GM’s Frigidaire division, DuPont 
had to develop alternative effective refrigerants to sell to other industrial 
customers, during which Teflon was discovered as a by-product.  
(4) Advancing innovation theories by challenging existing ones  
The dissipative self-organisation model has aspects that contradict with three existing 
theories: (a) evolutionary theory, (b) life cycle theory and (c) social construction theory. 
We discuss the three theories below. 
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 (a) Evolutionary theory assumes that individuals do not have an impact on the 
population level (Chiles et al., 2004, p.515). From the case of Teflon, we found 
the opposite. Below we give three arguments to support our finding. (1) The 
expertise and curiosity of Plunkett is a determinant factor to the emergence of the 
Teflon innovation. (2) The entrepreneurial activities by individuals influence the 
conditions and the result of innovation processes. For example, Marc Gregoire 
established the first Teflon-coated pan company and initiated the new cookware 
market. The dissipative self-organisation model helps to understand that small 
events by individuals may also generate a big effect through amplifying feedback 
loops. (3) DuPont played a pivotal role in the sustainable development of Teflon-
coated pans. When the Teflon pan had a bad reputation, DuPont built up a set of 
coating standards and initiated a certification program that helped to regain a good 
reputation. Evolutionary theory claims that the market provides the main selection 
mechanism. The Teflon case shows how activities of key individuals and 
companies influenced Teflon’s developmental direction. The dissipative model 
helps to understand how small actions at critical times have a significant influence 
on the macro-level patterns (Chiles et al., 2004). 
 (b) The S-curve life cycle theory assumes that there is only a single S-shaped 
diffusion curve during the life of a technological innovation. In contrast, the 
model of successive behaviour regimes in the Teflon case revealed that the 
technological innovation process followed a continuous transition from one 
attractor regime to another. For each behaviour regime, there could be an S curve. 
Sood and Tellis (2005) also found more than one S curve in four different 
industries. 
 (c) The social construction theory assumes that the technological path is the result 
of the actors’ intentional activities and interactions; the artefacts, tools, practices, 
rules and knowledge which are created by actors will, in turn, shape the 
technology over time (Bijker, 1987; Garud & Karnøe, 2003; Giddens, 1979). This 
implies that actors are “guided in their actions by foresight – an insight into the 
connections between cause and effect” (Hayek, 1978, p.6). The Teflon case 
illustrates that actors not always have a clear understanding of the causal 
connections. The dissipative self-organis ing model from complexity theory 
explains that the success of Teflon depends, not only on components’ conscious 
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insight into causal connections (Hayek, 1978, p.7), but also on their ability to act 
to changes and thereby form action and re-action chains or self-reinforcing cycles. 
4.6.3 Practical implications  
The dissipative self-organising model of emergence provides insights into the 
emergence of technological innovations for innovation managers. As described in 
section 4.4, there are three elements in the dissipative self-organising model, which are 
(1) irregularity, (2) positive feedback loops, and (3) behaviour regime.  The first two 
elements are the reasons that lead to the transformation of the third element (Eoyang, 
2009). Irregular events bring disturbances to existing behaviour regime; and positive 
feedback loops amplify the initial disturbances to enable the system overcome the 
damping forces of an existing behaviour regime. Therefore, these two elements, 
namely (1) the irregularity and (2) positive feedback loops,  are what innovation 
managers need to pay attention to when they want to enable emergence. In order words, 
innovation managers should find intervention points to initiate and support positive 
feedback loops. We refer to the activities which can initiate a new cycle as a trigger 
point, and we refer to the activities that contribute to overcoming developmental 
barriers and connecting other activities into a cycle as a key linking point. In the 
following part, we illustrate what are the intervention points in positive feedback loops  
in the three behaviour regimes of Teflon innovation: (1)technological regime, (2) 
entrepreneurial regime, and (3) market-driven regime. In each of the three regimes, we 
explain how innovation managers can make use of these intervention points.  
(1) Technological regime 
Trigger point: Knowledge development through research can initiate a positive 
feedback loop in the technological regime. For example, without the scientif ic curiosity 
of scientists, such as Plunkett, the unexpected discovery of Teflon, which was 
irrelevant to the main research on refrigerants, would have been ignored.  
Key linking point: Uncertainties represent a major barrier in the formation of a positive 
feedback loop in the technological regime. In order to keep the emerging technology 
alive, it is important to provide positive outcomes (Guidance of the search) to make 
people believe that this technology is promising. Therefore, the system function 
“Guidance of the search” plays an important role in connecting “Knowledge 
development” and “Resource allocation”, which forms a closed loop.  
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Lobbying for government support is helpful in demonstrating the promise of the 
emerging technology. For example, the two obstacles, namely huge production cost 
and unclear applications, faced by DuPont after Teflon was discovered, were solved by 
government support. 
(2) Entrepreneurial regime 
Trigger point: Entrepreneurial activities of individual entrepreneurs and innovation 
managers build connections between the emerging technology and the market.  
Key linking point for innovation managers: A major barrier in building 
entrepreneurial regimes is the lack of a market (Suurs, 2009, p.236). The “Market 
formation” function is the key linking point, coordinating other activities and closing 
the loop. Living labs and business plan competitions around the emerging technology 
can introduce the emerging technology in the market and provide opportunities to test 
the viability of the new technology.  
Key linking point for individual entrepreneurs: Market formation and arranging 
support resources (Resource mobilisation) are important activities to establish networks 
to gain resources and legitimacy. For example, in the Teflon case, entrepreneurs made 
use of their personal networks to get resources and find cooperation opportunities.  
(3) Market-driven regime 
Trigger point: Both an unsatisfied market demand (market gap) and a satisfied market 
demand (existing market achievement) may initiate a positive feedback loop in the 
market-driven regime. For example, the application of Teflon in the military market 
fulfilled a market gap to develop anti-corrosion equipment for the Manhattan Project, 
which initiated a market-driven regime; only twenty years later the satisfying market 
performance in the late 1960s stimulated another market-driven regime.  
Key linking point: Entrepreneurs are a key linking point to form a positive feedback 
loop in the market-driven regime initiated by a market gap. They explore the market 
and are willing to take risks (entrepreneurial activities). Policies should stimulate 
market exploration through tax reduction or project funding to attract entrepreneurial 
activities  
For the market-driven regime initiated by satisfied market demand, the key linking 
point is to improve product or service performance continuously and to provide new 
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generations (knowledge development). Policies may focus on establishing institutional 
structures to stimulate existing market demand. 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter highlighted how technologies come into being and how they keep on 
changing over time. By defining and explaining the emergence of technological 
innovation, this chapter fills theoretical and empirical gaps in mainstream innovation 
theories. Particularly, the chapter answers RQ3: what does emergence mean? And 
what is the underlying mechanism that drives the emergence of technological 
innovations? Through literature review, we arrive at a definition of emergence as a 
phenomenon that consists of five critical elements. Emergence is (1) system behaviour, 
(2) the genesis of some fundamentally new features, (3) a continuous changing process, 
(4) nonlinear with complex interactions, and (5) more than technological diffusion. 
Through an in-depth case study of the Teflon innovation, we found that the underlying 
mechanism of emergence can be explained by using the dissipative self-organis ing 
model from the complexity theory. This model includes three critical elements : (1) 
irregularity br inging disturbances to the existing regime of order; (2)  positive feedback 
loops amplifying the initial fluctuations; and (3) a new behavioural regime as a result 
from these self-reinforcing loops. This self-organising model highlights the significant 
role played by contextual, accidental, and random events in terms of occasionally 
bringing disturbances to existing domains of behaviour regimes, gaining monument 
through positive feedback loops, and finally knocking the system from a dominant 
behaviour regime into a new one, which presents a behaviour regime shifting pattern. 
The contributions of this chapter are threefold. First, it contributes in theory and in 
practice by explicitly defining the emergence of technological innovations. Although 
the term emergence is used frequently, clear definitions were lacking, so far. Second, it 
theoretically explains the internal mechanisms of the emergence. Mainstream theories 
are unable to explain emergence because of their fundamental equilibrium-based 
assumptions. This chapter shows how a dissipative self-organising model from the 
non-equilibrium theory (the complexity theory) can be used to examine and explain 
technological emergence. Thirdly, this chapter provides innovation managers with a 
good understanding of technological change and insights into how to enable emergence 
to facilitate innovations. 
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This chapter has some limitations in terms of statistical generalisability, but is valuable 
in terms of analytic generalisability (Yin, 1984) . The latter means that the theoretical 
framework in this chapter can be applied and tested in other cases. It may be fruitful to 
study more technology innovations in order to contribute to a richer insight into the 
emergence of technological innovations. This research may be considered as a first 
tentative step towards the application of the complexity theory to technological 
innovations. Another issue is the historical data themselves, which have been 
questioned regarding their objectivity. While we argue that historical data provide a 
holistic and systematic examination of the factors influencing technological innovation 
path, the real-time participant observation, and the data collection may be necessary to 
overcome the retrospective or hindsight bias.  
For future studies, computational simulation models may be established based on the 
categories and relationships derived from the empirical cases. Agent-based modelling 
(ABM) method is a good choice to simulate emergence (Antonelli & Ferraris, 2011; 
Garcia, 2005). By representing the emergence of technological innovation in a virtual 
environment, researchers and practitioners are offered an experimental platform to 
examine, in advance, the effects of different interventions on technological innovations, 
thereby moving the study one step further from explaining historical phenomena to 
exploring the possible future. 
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A minimal-assumption-based agent-based 




Although agent-based simulation has been increasingly used to study technological 
innovations, so far most applications have focussed on the diffusion and adoption 
process of innovations. The emergence of technological innovations, namely how new 
technologies come into being, has been less studied. The emphasis on simulation 
models faces their own obstacles, since the simulation models tend to have so many 
parameters that they are difficult for practitioners to understand, and hard for 
researchers to calibrate and verify empirically. This chapter intends to combine 
research on simulation models with the emergence of technological innovations by 
investigating RQ4: Is it possible to simulate the emergent process of innovation so as 
to provide decision support for innovation managers and policy makers? 
By breaking down the innovation system into activities instead of structural elements, 
we provide an alternative, minimal-assumption-based simulation model of the 
emergence of technological innovations. The emergence of technological innovations 
is simulated as a collective order arising from action-reaction chains of heterogeneous 
activities. The simulation model is calibrated and verif ied using an empirical 
innovation case, namely the Nylon innovation. The results contribute to a thorough 
understanding of the mechanisms concerning the emergence of technological 
innovations. Moreover, they provide a theoretical model with minimal assumptions for 
the simulation of the emergence of technological innovations.  
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5.1 Problems when applying agent-based simulation   
Agent-based modelling provides an excellent way of understanding how complex 
social phenomena emerge from interactions between individuals (Gilbert & Troitzsch, 
2005; Negahban & Yilmaz, 2014). Technological innovation is such a complex social 
phenomenon where dynamics emerge from the interactions between multiple different 
participants, e.g., individual entrepreneurs, companies, government, universities, 
financial institutions, and consumers (Garcia & Jager, 2011). Therefore, agent-based 
modelling can be seen as a methodology that is well suited for simulating technological 
innovations (Schramm, Trainor, Shanker, & Hu, 2010). However, the existing 
applications of still have three problems: (1) insufficient attention to emergence, (2) the 
integration problem, and (3) an abundance of parameters. Below we describe each of 
the three problems.  
(1) Insufficient attention to emergence 
Although agent-based simulation has been widely used in technological 
innovation studies (Ahrweiler, 2010; Dawid, 2006; Gilbert, Jager, Deffuant, & 
Adjali, 2007), most applications have focussed on the adoption and diffusion 
process of technologies (see, e.g., Dunn & Gallego, 2010; Garcia, 2005; 
Rebaudo, Crespo-Pérez, Silvain, & Dangles, 2011), whereas the emergence of 
technological innovations has been less studied (Frenken, 2006). In particular, 
most studies have focussed on how interactions between adopters and actors 
on the micro level influence the diffusion of innovations given a pre-existing 
technology or deal “with innovation as a simple stochastic process” (Frenken, 
2006, p.137). The processes of how new technologies come into being, or the 
emergence of technological innovations, has not been explained or taken into 
account in the simulation models.  
(2) The integration problem 
The integration problem refers to the fact that qualitative data of innovations is 
hard to be integrated into simulation models. A reason why the phenomenon 
of emergence of technological innovations is not frequently investigated us ing 
agent-based simulation is due to the difficulty of coding process data. Such 
data is generally textual in nature: what happened at what time and where; and 
such data is “not readily converted into a variable/actor matrix without losing 
information or doing an injustice to the data” (Yang & Gilbert, 2008, p.2). 
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While most agent-based models are constructed using numerical and 
statistically averaged data, the qualitative nature of process data of innovations 
hinders their application to the design and validation of agent-based models. 
However, process data is the key to understand the mechanism of emergence, 
i.e., the sequences of events that causally link initial conditions and the f inal 
results of innovations. Especially with the big data trend, which refers to the 
easy availability of large amounts of data, it is possible to collect more fine-
grained and detailed qualitative data about activities to specify agents’ 
behavioural rules. Therefore, building an agent-based simulation model 
integrating those big qualitative process data is necessary for advancing 
innovation theory development. Currently, the integration is a big problem. 
(3) An abundance of parameters 
Moreover, existing simulation models tend to have so many parameters that 
they are not only difficult for practitioners to understand and to act upon 
(Waldherr & Wijermans, 2013), but also hard for researchers to calibrate and 
verify with innovation cases empirically (Helbing, 2012). Therefore, agent-
based models which draw on minimal assumptions but capture a substantial 
part of the reality are highly valued (Midgley, Marks, & Kunchamwar, 2007).  
As a response to the above problems, this chapter attempts:  
(1) To establish an agent-based simulation model, which highlights how a new 
technology comes into being rather than how an existing one diffuses over 
time, thereby contributing to a good   understanding of the mechanisms that 
drive the emergence of technological innovations; 
(2) To use qualitative process data instead of numerical data as input to calibrate 
the simulation model; 
(3) To provide a theoretical model with minimal assumptions to simulate the 
dynamics of technological innovations. This echoes “Einstein’s principle that a 
model should be as simple as possible, but not simpler” (Helbing, 2012, p.37). 
The Nylon innovation case is used to calibrate and test the simulation model. 
Particularly, the qualitative empirical data of the Nylon case are used as input to 
calibrate agent behaviours on the micro level. Moreover, the simulation outcomes are 
compared with the aggregate patterns of the Nylon innovation on the macro level.  
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This chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 provides two strategies for 
simplifying the simulation model. Section 5.3 describes the simulation model. Section 
5.4 empirically calibrates the model us ing the Nylon innovation case. Section 5.5 
presents the simulation results. Section 5.6 provides “what-if” scenarios for decision 
support. Section 5.7 answers RQ4, and concludes with a list of five contributions as 
well as five potential future research projects. 
5.2 Two strategies for simplifying the simulation model  
The emergence of technological innovation is a complex and dynamic process, which 
involves interactions between multiple actors and activities. Reducing its complexity 
by abstract models is the first step for proper simulations. To simplify the complex 
phenomenon, two efforts are carried out: (1) we borrow the hypercycle model from 
chemistry, which explains the origin of life as a result of self-sustaining reaction 
networks; this is done to simplify the underlying laws and mechanisms driving the 
emergence of technological innovations (subsection 5.2.1); and (2) we break down the 
innovation system into activities instead of structural elements; and we use a well-
accepted theoretical framework to categorise these activities (subsection 5.2.2). 
5.2.1 Using hypercycles as a simplifying mechanisms  
There is not much own theory on the phenomena of emergence in economics and 
organisational science (Padgett, Lee, & Collier, 2003). Many scholars in the social 
science domain have tried to borrow theories from other disciplines such as physics, 
mathematics, and chemistry, in order to better understand the phenomenon of 
emergence. One of the few theories which explain emergence is the hypercycle model, 
which originates from theoretical chemistry. It proposes that life emerges from “a 
particular class of self-replicating reaction networks” (Eigen & Schuster, 1978, p.7). In 
this chemical reaction networks, each step reinforces the next step’s reproduction and 
growth, which forms catalytic links. These linkages form a closed loop called 
hypercycle. Bratus et al. (2010) provided a visualised illustration of the hypercycle, 
shown in Figure 5.1, and explained as follows: “Each macromolecule (Mi) helps to 
replicate another one, Mi+1, Mn macromolecule promotes the replication of M1 closing 
the loop” (p.1898). The emergence of hypercycles implies that the system is able to 
reach a self-sustaining state without planned interventions. In other words, hypercycles 
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are a necessary prerequisite for sustainability and for promoting further evolution 
(Eigen & Schuster, 1978).  
 
Figure 5.1 Hypercycles illustrated by Bratus et al. (2010) 
This concept of “hypercycles” is very much like the positive feedback loops that have 
been found in empirical technological innovation studies. For example, Berkhout et al. 
(2010), Davenport et al. (2003), and Suurs & Hekkert (2009) have identified positive 
feedback cycles among activities underlying technological innovations. Each activity in 
the positive feedback cycle reproduces itself over time, and meanwhile “leads to” the 
happening of other activities.  
These “lead to” chains of activities may form hypercycles in technological innovation. 
For example, “increased R&D investment” may lead to “more technological 
development activities”; and the latter may further lead to “much more positive 
experimental outcomes”. The activity “much more positive experimental outcomes” 
may lead to “higher expectations of this technology”, which may finally lead to 
“increased R&D investment”. All of these “lead to” chains form a hypercycle, 
illustrated in Figure 5.2. Like hypercycles in the chemical origin of life, hypercycles in 





Figure 5.2 Hypercycles in technological innovations 
It is important to emphasise that the hypercycle representation of technological 
innovations studies interactions between activities, not between actors. The focus of 
attention to explain the emergence of technological innovations is on the patterns 
caused by the activities. The activities are linked in a chain. In the following section we 
will focus on what kinds of activities are involved in technological innovations, and 
how they can be classified. 
5.2.2 Using pre-defined frameworks to categorise activities  
There are many activities involved in a technological innovation process, such as 
technological development, financing, and marketing. We need a framework to classify 
these activities in order to identify further patterns. For this purpose, we draw on the 
seven system functions by Hekkert et al. (2007). They categorise the activities involved 
in innovation into seven groups. These seven system functions are: Entrepreneurial 
activities (F1), Knowledge development (F2), Knowledge diffusion (F3), Guidance of 
the search (F4), Market formation (F5), Resource mobilisation (F6) and Support form 
advocacy coalitions (F7). Chapter 4 contains a  brief introduction to the seven system 
functions (see Table 4.1). A detailed illustration of the seven system functions can be 
found in Hekkert et al. (2007). Using the seven system functions as a framework, we 
focus on the patterns of how the system functions are linked with each other and 
whether they can form a hypercycle. 
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5.3 The agent-based model 
Agent-based model (ABM) is a useful computational simulation method to simulate 
the phenomenon of emergence. It is able (1) to capture the multiple, complex and 
dynamic interactions on the micro level, and (2) to reveal the outcomes on the macro 
level that result from these interrelated behaviours (Dilaver, Bleda, & Uyarra, 2014; 
Elliott & Kiel, 2004). A second valuable property of ABM is that it is not expressed in 
terms of quantitative variables or numerical equations, but in terms of autonomous 
agents interacting with each other and with the environment based on a set of rules 
(Boulanger & Bréchet, 2005; Garcia, 2005; Kies ling, Gunther, Stummer, & 
Wakolbinger, 2012). It allows qualitative data to be explicitly incorporated in the 
model” (Kelly et al., 2013, p.161). The study of technological innovation involves (1) 
quantitative and qualitative data, and (2) micro-level analys is and macro-level analysis 
(Gupta, Tesluk, & Taylor, 2007; Murmann & Frenken, 2006). Such complexity of the 
technological innovation phenomena necessitates an agent-based simulation approach 
(Courdier, Guerrin, Andriamasinoro, & Paillat, 2002).  
In the following part, we briefly describe our agent-based simulation model by five 
aspects: the agents, the behaviour rules of agents, the environment, the overall 
programming logic, and the output. 
The agents 
In our simulation model, agents perform the seven system functions. Each agent 
distinguishes itself by performing different system functions. This implementation is 
consistent with Suurs and Hekkert (2009) and Bergek et al (2008) who propose that the 
breakdown of a technological innovation system cannot only be conceptualised in 
terms of structural elements, but also in terms of key activities or system functions 
(Suurs & Hekkert, 2009, p.1004). The underlying assumption is that the influence of 
one agent on others is implemented via activities. 
The behaviour rules of agents  
Each agent has a set of rules, which specifies (1) what kind of activities this agent is 
able to do, and (2) the resulting activities other agents may take as a result of (1). The 
rule is signified as [Input, Output]. For example, if one agent’s rule is : [F1, F4], it 
means that the agent is able to perform system function F1, the happening of which 
will lead to the performance of F4 by one of its neighbouring agents. Each agent can 
Chapter 5 
118  
have more than one type of skills, or many instances of the same skill. For example, 
one agent can have rules: F1F3, F4F5, F2F6, or copies of the same rule: F1F3, 
F1F3, F1F3. 
The environment 
The environment where the innovation takes place contains instances of each system 
function. The number of instances of each system function in the environment is not 
fixed but changes over time (Padgett et al., 2003). In each simulation run, one type of 
system function will be drawn from the environment, triggering the performance of a 
chain of system functions. The final performed system function will be placed back in 
the original environment. This is consistent with the dynamic nature of the innovation 
environment. 
The programming logic 
At the beginning of each simulation, agents are randomly distributed in a regular two-
dimensional gr id lattice. Because many social networks including the innovation 
networks have the small world phenomenon (Sandberg, 2006), the communication 
between agents follows the “small-world” model (Watts, 1999), in which direct 
interactions between agents only happen with their eight direct neighbours. Skills are 
randomly distributed to agents. 
At each simulation run, a random rule is selected. The agent who has that rule selects 
an instance of a certain system function from the environment as the input of the 
selected rule. If the input fits into the requirement of that rule, then the agent will 
perform that system function, which will further trigger another sys tem function 
according to that rule. For example, if the selected rule is [F1 F2], and the agent that 
has this rule chooses a “F1” function from the environment, then the agent would 
perform F1. Otherwise, if the agent chooses any system function other than F1, the 
input requirement of “[F1 F2]” could not be fulfilled and the rule cannot be activated. 
The unmatched input would be deposited back in the environment. 
A successfully performed system function would trigger the performance of a system 
function by one of its neighbours. For example, if the selected rule is [F1 F2] and F1 
has been successfully performed, F2 will be triggered. One of the agent’s eight 
neighbours is randomly selected. If the selected neighbour has rules with F2 as input, 
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the selected neighbour would perform F2 and the next trigger system function will be 
decided by this neighbour’s rule.  
If the output of one agent’s rule cannot be performed by any of its neighbours, the 
system function would be deposited into the environment. And a new simulation run 
would be initiated. 
The whole programming logic is visualised in Figure 5.3. 
 
Figure 5.3 Flow chart of the simulation 
Output: hypercycles 
The action-reaction chain of system functions continues to be extended until one 
agent’s resulting activities cannot be performed by any of its neighbours. If the chain 
Chapter 5 
120  
goes back to an already passed agent, a closed cycle is formed, which is a hypercycle. 
The simulation records the number of hypercycles in each run. The characterisation of 
the hypercycle and its number of occurrence signif ies the sustainability of a 
technological innovation system. 
5.4 Calibrating the model with an empirical innovation case 
We use a concrete innovation case to calibrate empirically the simulation model. The 
Nylon innovation case is selected because it is well documented and large amounts of 
empirical events can be easily accessed on the internet. Before the calibration, we first 
give a brief introduction to signif icant characteristics of the Nylon innovation as well 
as the stylized facts that are going to be used in the simulation model.  
5.4.1 A brief introduction of the Nylon case 
Nylon is a silky material known generally as polyamides. It brought a revolution in the 
fibre industry in terms of initiating the era of synthesizing fibres from petrochemicals 
rather than from plant cellulose. Its innovation process can be divided into four periods.  
(1) Period of technological invention and development (between 1926 and 1937): the 
majority of resources and activities were allocated to the technological invention and 
technological improvement of Nylon. 
(2) Period of market entry improvement (between 1936 and 1940): the first market 
introduction and the initial market development of Nylon. 
(3) Period of market maturity (between 1941 and 1970):  the full-scale 
commercialisation of Nylon.  
(4) Period of decline (between 1971 and 1990): financial crisis caused by world-wide 
oil shortages in 1973 and 1979 which signif icantly reduced the input materials needed 
for Nylon production.  
Through in-depth study, four types of positive feedback loops that drive the Nylon 
innovation process can be identified. We discuss them briefly below. 
(1) Technological cycles: continuous knowledge pursuit activities by scientists and 
technology developers [F2] bring out positive research outcomes which spread out 
[F3] and provide expectations and new research directions [F4], leading to 
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increased resources to be invested to the emerging technology [F6], which in turn 
boost the knowledge development [F2]: F2F3F4F6F2. 
(2) Entrepreneurial cycles: the first market introduction of NylonNylon [F1] had a 
good market performance [F5], providing the incentives for DuPont [F4] to 
continue investing in the Nylon development [F6] in terms of new products and 
new pilot plants [F1]: F1F5F4F6F1. Simultaneously, entrepreneurs 
committed themselves [F1] to lobbying the top management of DuPont to support 
fundamental research [F7], thereby influencing the direction of the innovation [F4]: 
F1F7F4. 
(3) Market-driven cycles: good market performance [F5] provides high expectancy 
[F4] and continuous resource allocations [F6] to knowledge development [F2], 
which, in turn, contributes to better product performance and larger market sales 
[F5]: F5F4F6F2F5. Simultaneously, the high expectancy [F4] also 
stimulates DuPont to explore new businesses and new markets for Nylon [F1], 
which, in turn, feeds back on a better market performance [F5]: F5F4F1F5.  
(4) Resource cycles: in the later phase of the Nylon innovation, in face of the financial 
crisis DuPont carried out a series of resource re-combination [F6], e.g., acquired 
upper supply chain companies, decreased Nylon plant investments, and decreased 
investment in Nylon development, evaluated the effects [F4], and then took further 
resource adjustment [F6]: F6F4F6. 
From the above, the seemingly staged process of the Nylon innovation at the aggregate 
level actually emerges from the interactions between activities in the form of positive 
feedback loops on the micro level. In the simulation model, we are going to reproduce 
this emergent process. Moreover, three environmental events are found to have played 
a significant role in shaping the Nylon innovation (see Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1 Unexpected but meaningful events in the Nylon innovation 
Time Unexpected events Influence on the Nylon innovation process 
1940-1944  The World War II Providing a military market for Nylon. 
1973 The first world oil crisis Significantly decreasing the resource supply for 
Nylon production. 
1979 The second world oil crisis 
Chapter 5 
122  
5.4.2 Calibrating the simulation model using the Nylon empirics 
The agents involved in the Nylon innovation include (1) R&D, marketing, and 
financial departments inside DuPont, (2) US government and (3) consumers outside 
DuPont. Their activities can be categorised into the seven system functions.  
The behavioural rules of these agents are calibrated based on the identif ied four types 
of positive feedback loops in the Nylon innovation process. The cycles, as mentioned 
in subsection 5.4.1, imply the potential “lead to” relationship between the system 
functions, which is summarised in Figure 5.4. The arrows mean that the system 
function in the starting point of the arrow leads to the system function in the ending 
point of the arrow. These “lead to” relationships between system functions form the 
[Input, Output] rule of the agents in the simulation model. For example, in Figure 5.4 
there is an arrow from F1 to F5, which can be coded into the simulation by designing a 
rule as [F1 F5]. 
 
Figure 5.4 Interactions between system functions in the Nylon case 
According to Figure 5.4, the following behavioural rules are coded in the model. 






 F3F4  F4F1 
 F4F6 







The three important environmental events mentioned in Table 5.1 are incorporated in 
the simulation model by changing the amount of corresponding activities in the 
simulation environment at the corresponding time. For example, the WWII provided a 
niche market for Nylon, which signif icantly increased the instances of market 
formation activities [F5]; and the two times world oil crisis significantly reduced the 
resource base of Nylon production. The latter was simulated in the model through 
changing the amount of resource allocation activities [F6] in the environment.  
The investigated time period of the Nylon innovation is between 1926 and 1989 and 
each simulation run has 5000 simulation iterat ions. Therefore 7 time steps in the 
simulation roughly represents 1 month of the real world time. Based on this, the 
simulation time is translated into the unit of year, named simulated year. The three 
environmental events and their corresponding time in the simulation model are 
illustrated in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 Four chance events and their simulated time 
Unexpected events Year (Real world) Tick time (Simulation) 
WWII 1941 3612 
First oil crisis 1973 3948 
Second oil crisis 1979 4452 
5.5 Running the model 
The simulation is programmed using the open source software NetLogo (Wilensky, 
1999). The simulation code
1
 is based on a modification of Watts and Binder (2012)’s 
codes by adding innovation empirical events and adjusting the model to innovation 
processes. The number of agents is 100. As explained in section 4.2, during the 
simulation, seven time steps represents 1 month; and each simulation runs for 5,000 
time steps. The interface of the simulation model is shown in Figure 5.5. 
                                                                 
1





Figure 5.5 Simulation interface of the Nylon innovation 
As shown in Figure 5.5, the input panel is on the left, surrounded by the red lines, 
where we set the parameter value and initiate the model; the visual interface is in the 
middle, surrounded by the yellow lines, where the agents perform different activities 
and interact with each other in a 10 × 10 gridded surface; the output graphs are on the 
right side, surrounded by the green lines, where the change of the number of 
hypercycles and the number of agents, as well as the evolution of activities and 
environment over time,  are presented simultaneously.  
In the following, we are going to analyse the simulation results by comparing them 
with the real activities in the Nylon innovation. This is, in fact, a history friendly 
approach (Malerba, Nelson, Orsenigo, & Winter, 1999) to carry out the empirical 
validation of the simulation model. The purpose is to test how much the simulation 
reproduces the typical history of phenomena under study (Garavaglia, Malerba, 
Orsenigo, & Pezzoni, 2013). Particularly, validation of this model is carried out 
through comparing simulation outputs with the empirical facts of the Nylon innovation. 
Figure 5.6 shows the simulation results of 5,000 simulation iterations of one particular 
example run. The X-axis presents the year in the simulation model. The Y-axis shows 
the number of hypercycle starting from each of the seven system function. Lines with 
different colours in this graph correspond to hypercycles initiated by different system 
functions. From this figure, we find that hypercycles did emerge. This means that the 
Nylon innovation system is self-sustainable.  
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The following descriptions explore whether the “stylized facts” of Nylon technological 
innovations have been reproduced in the simulation outputs. We do this by linking 
what is implied by each line in Figure 5.6 to what actually happened in real Nylon 
innovation. A careful look at Figure 5.6 finds the following six similarities. 
(1) The four types of cycles in the Nylon innovation have been reproduced in the 
simulation. As described in section 4.1, we have identif ied four types of positive 
feedback cycles which play the most signif icant role in pushing the Nylon 
innovation forward: technology cycles, entrepreneurial cycles, market-driven 
cycles, and resource allocation cycles. In the simulation results, shown in Figure 
5.6, these four types of cycles are reproduced: cycles from F2 (technological 
cycles); cycles from F1 (entrepreneurial cycles); cycles from F5 (market-driven 
cycles); and cycles from F6 (resource cycles).  
(2) Cycles from F3 (diffusion) and cycles from F7 (support of coalition) do not 
emerge in the simulation model, which is consistent with the historic reality of 
Nylon innovation: (a) DuPont kept the development of Nylon a secret for 
competitors, thereby producing a low level of knowledge diffusion activities [F3]; 
and (b) resources needed for the Nylon innovation were directly allocated from 
top-down, thereby resulting in a low level of lobbying activities for resources [F7].  
(3) The top two lines, “Cycles from F4” and “Cycles from F6”, represent hypercycles 
starting from guidance of the search and resource mobilisation. They surpass other 
cycles and dominate the innovation process. This is consistent with the important 
role that has been played by top-down guidance (F4) and resource allocation (F6) 
in the Nylon innovation: Nylon was developed by a single company, DuPont, and 
was initiated by a top-down, predefined, and planned strategic re-orientation. 
Therefore, the direction of the whole innovation process was guided and 
constrained by top management through the manipulation of resource allocation. 
Table 5.4 illustrates the actual count of key events of each system function in the 
Nylon innovation. This table also confirms that F4 and F6 are the functions which 







Table 5.4 Frequency of system functions in the Nylon innovation 
System function F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 
Count of key events 12 18 8 37 7 24 4 
(4) The line “Cycles from F6” has two peaks in the simulated year 1973 and 1979, 
which reproduce the response of DuPont in face of the two world-oil crises in 1973 
and 1979. As we mentioned in section 4.1, in order to cope with the crisis DuPont 
carried out a series of resource-reallocation activities. For example, DuPont 
reduced resources allocated to Nylon research and increased the budget for 
developing new materials that can substitute Nylon. And after the second oil 
shortage, in 1981 DuPont acquired Conoco (as Continental Oil) for $7.6 billion in 
order to insure a source of petroleum-based feedstock for Nylon (CHA). All these 
operations are through resource re-allocations, consistent with the two maxima of 
cycles from F6 in Figure 5.6 . 
(5) “Cycles from F2” represents technological development activities. It appears at the 
beginning of the simulation and arrives at a peak in the simulated year 1935. It 
means technological activities were the main drivers of the Nylon innovation in its 
early stage. This is consistent with the reality of the Nylon innovation that since 
1936 the attention of Nylon innovation was put on market developing in terms of 
toothbrushes, stockings as well as military uses (see for example: Hounshell & 
Smith, 1988a; Hounshell & Smith, 1988b). 
(6) “Cycles from F1” and “Cycles from F5” represent entrepreneurial activities and 
market formation activities, respectively. These two lines overlap with each other 
since the simulated year 1942 and disappear at the simulated year 1947. This is 
also roughly consistent with the influence of the Second World War on the Nylon 
innovation, during which the entrepreneurial activities simultaneously contributed 
to Nylon’s market formation (system function F5). Shortly after the technological 
improvement phase of the Nylon innovation, the Second World War broke out 
which created a niche market for the Nylon technology. Around this period, the 
main motor of the Nylon innovation is the military market created by the war. The 
market formation activities during this period were mainly realised through 
entrepreneurial activities in terms of exploring military market. After the w ar, 
market expansion continued with exploring a new industrial market, such as 
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textiles, carpets, and industrial. The overlap between market formation and 
entrepreneurial activities stopped when a mature market structure was established 
in the early 1950s. Figure 5.6 reproduces these facts in the form of overlapped 
“Cycles from F1” and “Cycles from F5” from the simulated years 1942 to 1948. 
 
Figure 5.6 Evolution of hypercycles in the Nylon case 
All of the above descriptions demonstrate that the stylized facts of the Nylon 
technological innovation have been roughly reproduced by the simulation. The 
corresponding points between the simulation outputs and the Nylon innovation reality 
can be visualised in Figure 5.7, where the key events in Nylon innovation are matched 
with the simulated results. Four developmental phases can be roughly identified from 
the simulation results as shown in Figure 5.7: (1) a technological development phase 
characterised by active F2 (Knowledge development), (2) a market entry phase 
characterised by overlap between F1 (entrepreneurial activities) and F5 (market 
formation), (3) a market maturity phase characterised by routine operation F4 
(guidance of the search) and (4) a decline phase characterised by two oil crises. This 
temporal sequence of the phases is consistent with what we have observed in the Nylon 
innovation, namely a life-cycle pattern of the Nylon innovation going through 
technological invention and development phase between 1926 and 1937, market entry 
phase between 1936 and 1940, market maturity phase between 1941 and 1960s, and 
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finally the decline phase between 1970s and 1980s. Therefore, the fluctuation patterns 
of these graphs quite well reproduce the Nylon innovation realities.  
What needs to be pointed out is that there are some discrepancies between the 
simulated time and the real happening time of the activities in Nylon case, but the 
fluctuation patterns of these graphs rather well reproduce the Nylon innovation realities. 
As Barlas (1989, p.59) stated: the validation of simulation models should focus on 
checking whether the behavioural patterns generated by the simulation model are 
sufficiently close to the major patterns in the real system, instead of the individual data 
points. So, the emphasis is on pattern prediction rather than point prediction (Pala, 
Vennix, & Kleijnen, 1999). All in all, we may conclude that the simulation is able to 
reproduce historic facts of the Nylon innovation. 
 
Figure 5.7 Simulation result and the Nylon innovation reality  
5.6 Decision support: scenario design 
A challenging scenario design aims at going beyond purely reproducing historic facts 
to explore possible development paths. It is widely recognized that technological 
innovation is unpredictable and that technological innovation systems do not behave 
deterministically (Helbing, 2012; Tidd, 2006; Van de Ven, 1993). There are always 
fluctuations or disturbances from diverse sources, such as top-down interventions, and 
unexpected environmental changes. In this section, we intend to illustrate the potential 
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role of the simulation model to assist in exploring the consequences of anticipated 
fluctuations through what-if scenarios. 
Subsection 5.6.1 introduces the what-if scenarios which are initiated by seven 
fluctuations or “shocks”; subsection 5.6.2 analyses the impact of the different shocks 
by comparing how the system status differs from the status prior to the shocks. Each 
scenario is named according to which system function has been changed, and the real 
evolution of the Nylon innovation is the scenario called “No-shock”. 
5.6.1 Fluctuations 
We design seven what-if scenarios by introducing seven fluctuations to the innovation 
system. A fluctuation is the scientific correct indication for a rapid change of the status 
quo. It is also called a shock. Henceforth, we will use the notion “shock” since it better 
expresses the abrupt start of a new development. Shocks are important for the 
emergence of technological innovations, because they stimulate the technological 
innovation system to react. Capra (1996) suggested that disequilibrium caused by 
shocks is a signal of life and equilibrium is a condition of death. Although there are 
varied sources of shocks, they all influence the system via the seven system functions. 
Therefore, shocks are simulated through changing the number of instances of the 
corresponding system function in the environment.   
 Shocks on F1: represent changes in the amount of activities characterised as risk-
taking, innovative, and proactive (Miller, 1983), which can be, for example, a new 
company entry, start-ups, a new technology application, or a business expansion. 
 Shocks on F2: represent changes in the amount of knowledge development 
activities, which can be, for example, primary scientists or researchers leaving or 
participating in a technological innovation.  
 Shocks on F3: represent changes in the amount of knowledge diffusion activities, 
for example, establishing new channels for information communication.  
 Shocks on F4: represent changes of innovation direction, which are usually 
exemplified as changes in political regulations or company’s strategies.  
 Shocks on F5: interventions via changing market demand through, for example, 
providing subsidies, decreasing taxes, or a public project. 
 Shocks on F6: changes in resources availability. 
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 Shocks on F7: the lobbying activities of entrepreneurs in order to persuade others 
to accept the particular technologies. 
5.6.2 Impact of alternative interventions  
This subsection focusses on exploring the different influences of the seven shocks on 
the system. Figure 5.8 presents a particular example run of how the Nylon innovation 
system responds to external shocks. The Y-axis refers to the total number of 
hypercycles in each simulation. The pink line is a basic line which represents the real 
situation of the Nylon innovation when there is no pre-defined shock. The other seven 
lines represent designed shocks to corresponding activities. The shocking time was set 
at simulation time 1500, roughly corresponding to the simulated year 1943. Before the 
shocking time, all of the lines overlap each other. After being shocked, the system was 
influenced differently by different shocks. In Figure 5.8, the seven lines diverge from 
the basic line after the simulated year 1943, which means each shock has a noticeable 
effect on the Nylon innovation system, reflected in the increasing number of 
hypercycles at the end of the simulation. Particularly, the shocks on F7 and F3, namely 
intervention through enhancing support coalitions and knowledge diffusion, bring the 
most signif icant change, as shown by the top overlapped blue and green lines at the end 
of the simulation in Figure 5.8. But after all these shocks the system is still alive with 
surviving hypercycles, which means the Nylon innovation system is still able to 
maintain a self-sustaining status after shocks.  
We further examine whether the seven scenarios are statistically different from each 
other and from the basic line. Particularly, we use one-way ANOVA to check whether 
the mean differences of the average number of hypercycles in each shock scenario and 
in the non-shock scenario are statistically signif icant. Table 5.5 shows the results. In 
this table, the two numbers in each cell represent the mean difference of the average 
outputs between the row scenario and the column scenario, as well as its p-value in the 
parenthesis. In the second row (“no-shock” row), the no-shock situation is compared 
with eac h shocked scenario; and the p-values confirms that each scenario has 
statistically s ignif icant influence on the Nylon innovation. The mean differences 
indicate that the shock on F7 has the most significant influence, followed by the shock 
on F3. From the significance of the p-values, we can also see that most scenarios have 
statistically different influence on the system. But shocks through changing F3 and F7, 




Figure 5.8 Effects of different interventions 
of hypercycles. These statistic results are consistent with our simulation results, thereby 
further validating our simulation model. 
To summarise, the above analyses find that although each intervention has brought 
signif icant influence on the emergence of hypercycles, the Nylon innovation system is 
sufficiently robust to go through these interventions and end up with self-organising 
cycles. The interventions by increasing or decreasing the lobbying [F7], e.g., asking for 
coalition activities, and the knowledge diffusion activities [F3] have the most 
signif icant influence on changing Nylon’s innovation path. Moreover, their effects are 
almost the same. The high sensitivity of Nylon innovation to variations on the F3 and 
F7 behaviours is due to the history-friendly setting of the model. It replicates the 
characteristics of the Nylon innovation by setting the knowledge diffusion activities 
[F3] and lobbying activities [F7] at such a low level that even a small change in the 
























































































      -1.906* 
(0.000) 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
5.7 Conclusions and future study 
This section is split into three parts: (1) answer to RQ4 (subsection 5.7.1), (2) five 
contributions (subsection 5.7.2), and (3) future study (subsection 5.7.3). 
5.7.1 Answer to RQ4 
This chapter answers RQ4: Is it possible to simulate the emergent process of 




The answer is yes. In this chapter we show an agent-based simulation model of the 
emergence of technological innovations (section 5.3). It is calibrated to a real 
innovation case, the Nylon innovation. We show that the agent-based simulation is able 
to reproduce the stylized facts of the Nylon innovation process. Afterwards, we adopt 
the simulation model for decision support through scenario designs (section 5.6).  
5.7.2 Five contributions  
Compared to other simulation models of technological innovation, our research 
provides five contributions. 
Firstly, we establish an agent-based simulation model of the emergence of 
technological innovations, focussing on how new technologies come into being, rather 
than how existing technologies diffuse over time. The emergence of technological 
innovations is simulated as a collective order emerging from self-sustaining 
hypercycles of different activities on the micro level. A concrete innovation case, 
namely the Nylon innovation, has been used to calibrate and validate the simulation 
model empirically. By doing this, it helps ground simulation models on empirical cases . 
Moreover, it transforms qualitative analysis to computer simulation analysis.  
Secondly, we provide two strategies to simplify the complex process of innovation 
emergence, namely the hypercycle representation of technological innovations and the 
act of breaking down innovation systems into activities. These strategies result in a 
simulation model with minimal assumptions to simulate the emergence of 
technological innovations. The assumptions that are critical for simulating the 
emergence of technological innovations become nothing more than the interacting 
patterns of how necessary activities are linked. Actors involved in the innovation 
process are simplif ied as agents performing activities that are needed for innovation 
success. The interactions between activities, namely the action-reaction response 
networks which may form hypercycles, become the focus of attention to explain 
emergence. Although much simpler than any real innovation process, the hypercycle 
representation of the emergence of technological innovations succeeds in simulating 
the emergence of the Nylon innovation with chains of action-reaction sequences that 
fold back on each other to keep themselves alive. Therefore, it provides a fundamental 
understanding of the mechanisms of the emergence of technological innovations.  
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Thirdly, the way how the simulation model is developed illustrates how social 
scientists can take advantage of large amounts of qualitative data,  e.g., those now 
getting available in the internet, or other so-called “big data”. With the development of 
computing power and storage, we can now collect data that we could not before 
(Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, 2013). For example, instead of sampling studies or 
questionnaires, the historical data about the Nylon innovation is obtained through 
internet searching. In this sense, potential cooperation between data science and social 
science, such as innovation studies, may lead to better insights, more advanced theory 
development, as well as more practical decision support.  
Fourthly, we build the agent-based simulation model using qualitative data instead of 
numerical and quantitative data. Most agent-based models are established using 
quantitative data based on well-developed statistical techniques (Yang & Gilbert, 2008). 
With the availability of big data about technological innovations, we are able to obtain 
fine-grained and detailed activities to specify behavioural rules of individual agents 
instead of using statistical averages. With these thick descriptions, it is possible to 
figure out the fundamental mechanisms underlying innovation processes, i.e., by what 
intermediate steps, the final innovation outcomes follows from a set of initial 
conditions (Mayntz, 2003). Through constructing an agent-based simulation model, it 
aims to represent the processes or mechanisms that have been discovered from the 
qualitative case studies, and then to formalize and verify the set of mechanisms that 
lead to the emergence of technological innovations.  
Fifthly, practically the simulation model in this chapter also shows potentials in 
assisting decision making by identifying the impact of different interventions on the 
emergent process through exploring different if-then scenarios. After empirical 
verification of the simulation model, experimental tests can be designed to examine the 
impact of different interventions on the innovation systems. The simulation results 
revealed that the Nylon innovation system is still alive after shocks, with several 
hypercycles surviving the entire simulation process. Specifically, interventions through 
changing the knowledge diffusion and lobbying activities have the most significant 
influence on the innovation system. 
5.7.3 Future research 
This research is a starting point to simulate the emergence of technological innovations, 
and to integrate agent-based simulation and empirical qualitative studies. We hope that 
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this research will serve to provoke interest in the fertile and unexplored area of 
innovation research. Additional rules or attributes of agents can be added piecemeal in 
the future to increase the complexity of the system. Particularly, future study can 
improve the simulation model from the following five points. 
(1) Integrate the timing of interventions into the model since the intervention time to 
technological innovation has been acknowledged as an important factor (Zollo, 
Cennamo, & Neumann, 2013).  
(2) Connect the abstract model with more empirical cases of technological innovations. 
Additional rules or properties that determine the entire innovation system or 
individual agents’ behaviours can be added piecemeal by future empirical studies, 
thereby gradually increasing the complexity of the system (Garcia, 2005).  
(3)  Distinguish different system components and relate each component with 
corresponding activities. In the current version of the simulation, the innovation 
system is broken down into different activities, instead of system components. 
Future research may do both, namely distinguish both agents and their activities. 
For example, design a class of agents named “firms”, and define their activities as 
knowledge development and knowledge diffusion. By doing this, agent-based 
modelling can be used to target a particular decision-making level.  
(4) Consider the temporal sequence of different cycles. In the present version, all 
system functions can be triggered in the beginning of the simulation, which is not 
the same in the real situation. Future study may consider letting system functions 
enter the system at different times or setting specific conditions for each entry.  
(5) Transform the simulation model established in this chapter to other process studies 
of social systems by adjusting the main activities in the model to those of the 
systems under investigation. 
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In this research we have explored how the new available big amounts of data can be 
used to improve decision making on innovation. In this chapter we conclude our 
research by providing answers to the RQs, listing our results and formulating the 
conclusion. For adequate reading we summarise what we have done. In Chapter 2, a 
new method for modelling innovation processes that is able to integrate qualitative, 
quantitative and simulation analysis is presented. Chapter 3 re-considers innovation 
process theories in order to provide decision makers with an advanced process model 
that explicitly takes into account the intricacies of the innovation reality. Chapter 4 
discusses the emergence of technological innovations to help decis ion makers 
understand detailed activities underlying innovation processes. While chapter 2, 
chapter 3 and chapter 4 mainly focus on the conceptual perspective of innovation 
processes which may be limited in providing concrete practical advice for decision 
makers, Chapter 5 deals with simulation models to support decision making with 
respect to innovations. 
This concluding chapter is split into four parts: answers to research questions and 
problem statement (section 6.1), main contributions of the research (section 6.2), 




6.1 Answers to research questions and problem statement 
Below we repeat and answer the four RQs and the problem statement. 
Research Question 1: Is it possible to develop a data-driven modelling method for 
studying innovation processes? 
This question is investigated in Chapter 2. We provide a data-driven modelling method 
which aims at  taking advantage of the fast development  of Internet and dig ital data sources 
to develop a more advanced process theory. Part icularly, the trade-off between rich 
descriptions of individual cases on the one side and the generalised but shallow models on 
the other side is overcome by a well-thought-out and deeply analysed combination of 
qualitative, quantitative and simulation analysis. The new data-driven modelling method 
includes five steps: (1) data collect ion, (2) data chronological event list, (3) event coding, (4) 
process pattern identification, and (5) simulation (details are given in Chapter 2).  
Research Question 2: Is it possible to form an advanced model that is able to combine 
the seemingly contradictory models, namely the linear innovation model and the 
cyclical innovation model? 
This research question is investigated in Chapter 3. It applies the data-driven modelling 
method developed in chapter 2 and investigates the overall structure of innovation 
processes. It proposes an integrated innovation model. The basis is to understand the 
more fine-grained patterns which underlie innovations. This is nowadays possible since 
the necessary data are becoming available by the new big data techniques. We model 
activities into feedback loops with triggers that stimulate the innovation system to 
adapt as a whole to a new behaviour pattern. By doing so, the seemingly contradictory 
models, namely the linear and cyclical innovation models, mutate into two different 
perspectives on the behaviour of the same innovation system. In this way, the chapter 
is able to show consistency of the different perspectives. Practically, it provides a more 
holistic and coherent framework for decision makers to understand and explain 
innovation processes. 
Research Question 3: What does emergence mean? And what is the underlying 
mechanism that drives the emergence of technological innovations? 
This research question is investigated in Chapter 4. The emergence of technological 
innovation is defined as a phenomenon which consists of five critical properties. 
Emergence is (1) system behaviour, (2) the genesis of some fundamentally new 
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features, (3) a continuously changing process, (4) a nonlinear process with complex 
interactions, and (5) more than technological diffusion. 
The underlying mechanism that drives the emergence of technological innovations can 
be explained by the dissipative self-organising model from the complexity theory. It 
describes emergence as driven by: (1) irregularity that brings disturbances to the 
existing regime of order; (2) positive feedback loops that amplify the initial 
fluctuations; and (3) a new behavioural regime that is a result from these self-
reinforcing loops (details of this model are given in Chapter 4).  
Research Question 4: Is it possible to simulate the emergent process of innovation so 
as to provide decision support for innovation managers and policy makers? 
This research question is investigated in Chapter 5. We simulate the emergence of 
technological innovations as a collective order arising from action-reaction chains of 
heterogeneous activities. The way of simulation can be adapted to a range of scenario 
designs which are tailored to innovation managers and/or policy makers. So, the 
answer is yes, although many improvements are still possible.  
Based on the answers to the four RQs we are able to answer the Problem Statement. 
Problem statement: To what extent can the new available big amounts of data be used 
to improve decision making on innovations? 
To a large extent we can make use of the large amounts of data to improve decision 
making on innovations. From RQ1, we know a new data-driven modelling method that 
can be used to analyse the messy data. From RQ2, we know a more advanced 
innovation process model which provides decision makers with a good understanding 
of the overall structure of innovation processes. From RQ3, we know the underlying 
mechanism of emergence which provides decision makers with valuable ins ights into 
the interaction patterns on the micro level of innovation processes. From RQ4, we 
know a simulation model which provides a virtual environment for decision makers to 
test the effects of their decisions.  
6.2 Main contributions of the research 
Below we discuss the three main contributions of this research: (1) contribution to data 
science (subsection 6.2.1), (2) contribution to innovation process theory (subsection 
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6.2.2), and (3) contribution to decision making on innovation management (subsection 
6.2.3). 
6.2.1 Contribution to data science   
Qualitative data plays an important role in making sense of the complex world. It 
constitutes a large part of the now available data of innovation. However, existing data 
analys is tends to place a huge value on quantitative data, and devalue the importance of 
qualitative data (Want, 2013). One reason is that there are well-developed methods 
(e.g., statistical methods) to analyse quantitative data. However, we see that techniques 
that make sense of qualitative data are less well investigated.  
In this respect, it is even more important to integrate qualitative data into the overall 
analys is. This is really necessary for adequate innovation decision support. In general, 
the decision makers are interested in small samples and in-depth studies that are rich in 
contextual and descriptive data (Malan & Kriger, 1998). This data is able to provide a 
good understanding of how thing evolves over time. Such a trend line can further 
generate practical action rules and relevant managerial wisdom (Landau & Drori, 2008). 
The research (Chapter 2) presents a new method which shows how to extract value 
from large amounts of qualitative process data in general and innovat ion process data 
in particular. The method combines qualitative, quantitative and simulation analys is. 
By coding the messy and qualitative process data into pre-defined categories (step 3), 
this method reduces the complexity of data and allows a transition from qualitative to 
quantitative analysis through generating frequency counts of the events in each 
category, which can then be analysed statistically. Simultaneously, it does not only 
qualitatively analyse the interactions between different categories of events (step 4), 
but also employs computational simulation (step 5) to provide decision support. In this 
way, the new method breaks the traditional trade-off between (1) qualitative methods 
with rich descriptions but without the possibility to develop general theory, and (2) 
quantitative methods with high generalisability but with limited in-depth understanding 
of the process. 
Moreover, the five steps make the modelling process more transparent and tractable. 
Researchers following these five steps give clear information on how they arrive at 
their research results, and how others can reproduce the research. Although this method 
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is introduced to analyse innovation processes, it can also be extended to other research 
fields which fulfil the following three conditions. 
a) The research purpose is to examine how a phenomenon evolves over 
time, i.e., the line of research is a process study. 
b) The research uses events (what happened, at what time and by whom) as 
process data instead of purely quantitative or numerical data.  
c) The research focusses on interactions between events or activities instead 
of system components. 
6.2.2 Contribution to innovation process theory 
This research contributes to theory building of innovation research. Particularly, the 
theoretical contributions inc lude two aspects: (A) advancing innovation process theory, 
and (B) investigating the emergence of technological innovations. Below we discuss 
both aspects. 
A Advancing innovation process theory (Chapter 3) 
There is a gap between process theory that has been developed and process theory that 
is useful for practitioners to guide their decision making (Stevenson & Harmeling, 
1990). Even nowadays, existing innovation models miss a systematic view on 
innovation processes. There have been developed views either on the micro level or on 
the macro level of innovations (Siau, Long, & Ling, 2010; Van de Ven, Angle, & 
Poole, 2000), which form two types of models of innovation respectively, namely the 
macro-level model and the micro-level model. Below we give a brief description of 
both types of models. 
(1) The macro-level model of innovation focusses on the aggregative trend and 
trajectory of innovation development, but ignores or simplif ies the local 
actions. To emphasise our point, we start with an example from the past. Over 
twenty years ago, Utterback (1994)’s three stages in the life cycle model of 
technological innovations did provide a formal sequence of phases which 
innovation has to pass. However, he did not depict the detailed processes 
which create the phased developmental pattern.  
(2) The micro-level model of innovation focusses on the behaviours and 
properties of system components on the micro level. But it does not consider 
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the aggregate level emergence and the trend led to by these local behaviours. 
An example of this micro-level model of innovations is Alder and Chen 
(2011)’s teleological motor model  which described accounts of interactive 
dynamics between enterprises. However, it missed the general trend which 
was generated by these micro-level interactions.  
Decisions made on the micro level may influence macro-level environment; and 
contextual factors on the macro level such as governmental regularity or policies may 
influence micro-level behaviours. Focussing on only one level may result in an 
incomplete view of the overall phenomenon. And how the reality of one level 
influences and is influenced by behaviours or events on other levels is also missed 
(Fuller & Moran, 2001).  
Our research (Chapter 3) deals with advanced innovation process theory by integrating 
both the macro-level and micro-level analys is. Moreover, we are able to show 
consistency of the two stylized and seemingly controversy models of innovation, 
namely the linear innovation model and the cyclical innovation model. These two 
stylized models co-exist in innovation processes and contribute respectively to the 
micro-level and macro-level explanation of the dynamics of innovation processes. 
They are two aspects of the same phenomenon. We emphasise the difference as follows: 
the macro-level pattern is an expression of the micro-level processes; micro-level 
processes are the fundamental reasons leading to the macro-level appearance. 
This advanced model is presented in chapter 3. It provides (1) an overall structure of 
innovation processes that is more close to innovation reality that can guide decision 
makers channelling the innovation processes than the traditional models (Van de Ven 
et al., 2000); and (2) a systematic perspective of innovations which help improve a 
comprehensive understanding of innovation processes (Andersson & Johansson, 2010). 
Such a better understanding of the overall innovation processes paves the way for 
efficient decision making which aims at influencing this process. 
B Investigating emergence (Chapter 4) 
Emergence is a generic property of innovation systems. It explains the relationship 
between micro-level interactions and macro-level outcomes. In spite of this importance, 
so far the emergence of technological innovation has not been subject to an extensive 
investigation. There is not an agreed-upon definition for the term “emergence”. The 
mainstream theories in social science are found to have limitations in explaining 
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emergence (Chassagnon, 2014; Chiles, Meyer, & Hench, 2004). Chapter 4 explicitly 
defines the emergence of technological innovations; and theoretically explains the 
internal mechanisms of the emergence. Therefore, it closes a gap in the literature of 
innovation research. 
6.2.3 Contribution to decision making on innovation management 
Making decisions about innovation is notoriously difficulty. This research contributes 
to decision making on innovation management from two aspects: (A) providing new 
insights into innovation management; and (B) using computational simulation to 
provide decision support. Below we discuss these two aspects. 
A Providing new insights into innovation management (Chapter 4) 
Effective decision making on innovation requires a good understanding of emergence, 
because emergence explains how a decision leads to a certain result, usually an 
unexpected one. The definition and mechanism of emergence (see Chapter 4) helps 
decision makers understand the underlying patterns of detailed activities in innovations. 
Our research provides three new insights into how to manage innovations: (1) the 
strategy should be adapted from strategic planning to probe-and-learn; (2) general 
guidelines should be provided, not specific actions; and (3) emphasis should be on 
enabling emergence. Below we explain these three insights one by one.  
(1) Strategy should be adapted from strategic planning to probe-and-learn 
During technological innovations, small changes may multiply over time through the 
positive feedback loops, which makes the innovation direction sensitive to initial 
conditions. Moreover, the empirical case of Teflon (Chapter 4) illustrates that many 
unexpected, accident and chance events may happen in innovation. All these events 
make innovation processes unpredictable and dynamic. Therefore, long-term prediction 
is quite difficult (Hingley & Nicolas, 2006; Levy, 1994).  
Hence, firms and policy-makers should not spend large amounts of resources and time 
on forecasting and making plans; instead they should carry out a more experimental 
model of management, which means decision makers first probe, then observe, and 
thereafter respond (Snowden & Boone, 2007). In this way, decision makers do not 
impose an order onto innovation processes, but allow the path forward to reveal itself 
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(Snowden & Boone, 2007). This idea is consistent with the emergence property of 
innovation (Chapter 4). 
(2) Providing general guidelines, not specific actions  
Interventions can be conducted through setting general guidelines that influence 
individuals’ decisions and behaviours instead of performing too many specific actions. 
The set of guidelines contributes to configure the context where self-organisation 
occurs, and put a boundary to behaviours. Within these behavioural boundaries, 
individuals should have a certain freedom to self-organise. Too many constraints 
would inhibit innovation and creativity; and in contrast, too much self-organisation 
could lead to disorder and undermine managerial predictability. 
(3)  Enabling emergence  
Decision makers should pay attention to whether the current behaviour regime is 
satisfying or not. If the firm is in a satisfying situation, the current behavioural regime 
is supposed to sustain a desirable state. To maintain the stability, the challenge for 
decision makers is to protect the system from disturbing influences, and to keep a 
relatively stable space within which the organisation can self-organise. The key 
principle is to create and improve feedback mechanisms through increasing 
communication and connection between individuals. 
If the current behavioural regime maintains an unsatisfying situation, the strategic 
challenge lies in creating conditions to support the emergence of a new behavioural 
regime. The two key principles include (1) bringing a stimulus to the system through 
open to unexpected, accidental, and random events; and (2) creating instability through 
top-down revolution or through the establishment of new challenging vis ions. 
Specifically, the following is suggested: (a) build connections through a shared vision, 
conception, or understanding; (b) encourage informal work relationships; (c) appreciate 
informal, flexible, and experimental ways of working (Hung & Tu, 2011); (d)) view 
the unexpected events as opportunities for reflection and modification; (e) continuously 
observe what emerges and make adjustments to goals and supporting infrastructure 
(Choi, Dooley, & Rungtusanatham, 2001). 
B Using computational simulation to provide decision support (Chapter 5) 
Decision making on innovation is difficult for decision makers, because they lack tools 
to predict the behaviours of firms (Levy, 1994). Traditional research methods, such as 
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statistic regression based on patents data, publications data or innovation numbers, are 
unable to capture the dynamics of innovation. The reason is that they ignore the 
ordering and interactions between independent variables and have an emphasis on 
immediate causation only (Poole, Van de Ven, Dooley, & Holmes, 2000). Therefore 
the traditional methods are not able to provide useful prediction models for decision 
making on innovations As an alternative, agent-based simulation is able to complement 
econometric approaches by incorporating the nonlinear and dynamic interactions  on the 
micro level and revealing emergent patterns at the aggregate level (Barton, 2014; 
Bayona, Garcıá-Marco, & Huerta, 2001). 
Chapter 5 provides a decision support tool for decision makers by establishing such an 
agent-based simulation model of technological innovations. Through building a 
simulation environment and designing what-if scenarios, it allows decision makers to 
know in advance which possible impact of a new enacted decision would bring to a 
certain technology and industry and help optimize their entire innovation system.  
It must be emphasised that there is hardly any simulation model that can precisely 
represent and predict reality. The objective of the agent-based simulation is not so 
much to present an accurate description of reality or to provide a precisely prediction 
tool, but to help understand established findings from the qualitative research and to 
assist in identifying the potential causal relationships that have not been previous ly 
observed in history (Garcia, 2005). 
6.3 Limitations and future research 
Below we reflect the limitations of the research (subsection 6.3.1) and present potential 
directions for future research (subsection 6.3.2). 
6.3.1 Limitations of the research 
This research is subject to the following three limitations. 
(1) The first limitation is related to the data source. The empirical data of this research 
is limited largely to historical secondary data sources, including searching on the 
internet, scientific papers and books. Historical data are often questioned regarding 
their objectivity. A solution to this is to complement the secondary data set with 
primary datasets such as interviews or participant observations if applicable. By 
triangulating data collected from different sources, our research may have 
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contributed more to the validity of the study. But it is important to note that 
historical analys is is necessary for innovation process studies because historical 
data provide a holistic and systematic examination of the factors that influence an 
innovation path, while the real-time data collection method will involve short-
range viewing. Therefore, we have chosen to use mainly historical data. 
(2) The second limitation is referred to the number of cases. In total, this research 
involved three cases – the Nylon case, the SSRI medicine case, and the Teflon case. 
This sample size of three case studies may be too small to be capable of 
generalising conclusions. In this sense, generalisation cannot be realised from 
statistic perspective (Suurs, 2009). But our research does fulfil what Yin (1994) 
called “analytic generalisation”, which means the qualitative research based on one 
single in-depth case study provides a theoretical framework which can be used and 
extended to other cases (Abell, 1987; Suurs, 2009). This research realises such an 
analytic generalisation by providing a data-driven method in studying innovation 
processes (Chapter 2), an advanced innovation process model (Chapter 3), an 
explicit definition of emergence as well as a generative process model of the 
emergence of technological innovations (Chapter 4), and a way to build an agent-
based simulation of emergence based on minimal assumptions (Chapter 5), all of 
which can be transferred into other social phenomena process studies.   
(3) The third limitation lies in the potential bias brought by the selected cases. The 
three technological innovation cases selected in this research are from two 
different branches of industries. These cases form a heterogeneous sample. 
However, the question remains whether the selection may influence the research 
results. The Nylon and Teflon belong to the chemical materials industry, in which 
business and government are the primary customers instead of the final consumers. 
Both were developed by a single company, DuPont, which makes the 
developmental process much more manageable. The SSRI drugs are from the 
pharmaceutical industry, which is atypical since it has a long R&D phase, suffers 
from tight governmental regulation and has a short adaptation phase. Because of 
the specific characteristics of each industry, the research results from these three 




6.3.2 Future research 
Below we present five recommendations for future research. 
(1) The methodology presented in Chapter 2 may be extended from innovation 
process studies to other process studies, which focus on how a social 
phenomenon evolves over time. Particularly, in step 3 (Event coding) of this 
method, the framework selected to categorise events or activities may not be 
limited to Hekkert et al. (2007)‘s system function framework, but can be any 
other relative theoretical framework. In case there is no other suitable 
framework in the literature, it is also possible to create inductively the 
researchers’ own categories through summarising categories from the 
empirical data. Therefore, in future studies, a different theoretical or empirical 
framework may be tried to classifying events and activities.  
(2) It may be fruitful to study more technology innovations in order to contribute 
to a richer insight into the types of positive feedback loops and how they 
would influence innovation processes. If more case studies are carried out, 
different cases can be compared and more general insights into what types of 
positive feedback loops emerge can be obtained.  
(3) This research has identif ied different types of feedback loops underlying 
innovation processes. Future studies may go one step further by examining the 
temporal sequence of different feedback loops along innovation processes, to 
see (a) whether there is a general succession model of positive feedback loops 
in technological innovations, which may theoretically explain how innovation 
evolves along time and why it does in that way; and (b) whether the succession 
models are different in different industries or they follow the same trajectory.   
(4) This research has applied several metaphors from complexity theory to help 
understand the dynamics of technological innovations, such as positive 
feedback loops (Chapter 3 and 4), self-organising (Chapter 4), and hypercycles 
(Chapter 5). It is a first attempt to connect empirical cases with complexity 
theory. Other metaphors from complexity theory may also contribute to the 
understanding of innovation dynamics. But they are quite often loosely 
connected to the empirical world and are too abstract to guide practical work. 
That is because complexity theory originates from natural sciences and 
concepts have to be modified and adjusted with empirical examples before it 
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can be applied to social sciences. Future work should take effort to (1) 
understand the differences between the two fields’ applications and (2) 
develop particular theoretical and analytical systems for innovation and other 
social science studies. One particular way is to find empirical examples of 
complexity theory concepts. In this way, a social-science-based complexity 
vocabulary could be developed. 
(5) The agent-based modelling in Chapter 5 may be further developed based on 
more empirical case studies. The definition of individual agents’ behavioural 
rules may be added piece by piece, which gradually increase the complexity of 
the simulation and make it more close to the real world. Especially, in the end 
of Chapter 5, the investigations provide several potential directions for future 
research that may improve the simulation model. Moreover, the simulation 
model in Chapter 5 can be extended to other application fields, such as crisis 
management field. The action and reaction relationships between events can 
be understood as crisis response networks between heterogeneous actors. 
Simulations of crisis management allows for effective interventions. 
6.4 A vision on the future 
This study is an interface between data science and innovation management, because it 
attempts to provide decision support on innovation using large amounts of data. In this 
research process, both modelling techniques and business interpretation are important. 
Modelling techniques make it possible to extract value and structure from the messy 
data; and business understanding interpret the analysis results into insightful and 
actionable suggestions for decision makers. Therefore, there should be more 
cooperation between data science in computer schools and innovation management in 
business schools 
On the one hand, only focussing on the modelling side may lead to abstract numbers 
with no practical meaning. Data analysing for decision support is about human 
understanding (Edge, 2012). Although data experts are good at data analysis techniques, 
such as statistics, computer programming, machine-learning algorithms, they may lack 
understanding of a specific context. They are used to fitting the data to a model, getting 
a good number and then publishing it; and the reviewers do not understand it either 
(Edge, 2012). Data experts may need people with a business mind to interpret the 
numerical results, to come up with creative ideas about how to tap data to extract new 
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values, and to translate a practical issue into a concrete data- analysis project, to 
translate the statistical results into actionable insights, and to communicate the results 
in a practical language that all stakeholders understand (Davenport & Patil, 2012).  
On the other hand, by only focussing on the business side one may get lost in the 
messy details, unable to extract their hidden values. Bus iness people or researchers 
usually do not have the right skills to extract value from big messy data (Mayer-
Schönberger & Cukier, 2013), for example, the most basic and universal skill of data 
experts – writing codes (Davenport & Patil, 2012). Although most of the tools 
available to analyse big data (1) have been improved greatly, (2) are not expensive and 
(3) are open source, e.g., Hadoop, the technologies involved do require a skill set that 
is unfamiliar to most business persons and researchers, even to some IT experts 
(McAfee, Brynjolfsson, Davenport, Patil, & Barton, 2012). Therefore, business people 
and researchers need data experts to reveal the hidden value of the messy and large 
amounts of data.  
Hence, cooperation between data science and social science such as innovation studies 
may lead to better insights, more advanced theory development, as well as more 
practical decision support. This is also how the current research and its results are able 
to come out. The suggested cooperation is therefore essential to Big Data analysis. The 
data scientist and the social scientist occupy two important positions (data specialist 
and big-data mind-set) in the “big-data value chain: data holder, data specialist, and 
big-data mind-set” (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, 2013). They have complementary 
functions and downplaying the importance of either of them may make the big-data 
value chain incomplete and unable to work. As the era of big data evolves , data 
scientists and social scientists should cooperate to help data holders (e.g., e-business 
companies that have big transaction dataset, larger banks, insurance companies, and 
credit-card issuers) to extract value from their dataset, to innovate new business models 
and to make adequate decisions. 
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Bayona, C., Garcıá-Marco, T., & Huerta, E. 2001. Firms’ motivations for cooperative 
R&amp;D: an empirical analysis of Spanish firms. Research Policy, 30(8): 1289-
1307. 
Chassagnon, V. 2014. Toward a Social Ontology of the Firm: Reconstitution, Organizing 
Entity, Institution, Social Emergence and Power. Journal of Business Ethics, 
124(2): 197-208. 
Chiles, T. H., Meyer, A. D., & Hench, T. J. 2004. Organizational emergence: The origin 
and transformation of Branson, Missouri's musical theaters. Organization Science, 
15(5): 499-519. 
Choi, T. Y., Dooley, K. J., & Rungtusanatham, M. 2001. Supply networks and complex 
adaptive systems: control versus emergence. Journal of operations management, 
19(3): 351-366. 
Davenport, T. H., & Patil, D. 2012. Data Scientist. Harvard Business Review, 90: 70-76. 
Edge. 2012. Reinventing society in the wake of big data: A conversation with Alex 
Pentland. Accessed in 2014. http://edge.org/conversation/reinventing-society-in-
the-wake-of-big-data 
Fuller, T., & Moran, P. 2001. Small enterprises as complex adaptive systems: a 
methodological question? Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, 13(1): 
47-63. 
Garcia, R. 2005. Uses of agent-based modeling in innovation/new product development 
research. Journal of Product Innovation Management , 22(5): 380-398. 
Hekkert, M. P., Suurs, R. A., Negro, S. O., Kuhlmann, S., & Smits, R. 2007. Functions of 
innovation systems: A new approach for analysing technological change. 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change , 74(4): 413-432. 
Hingley, P., & Nicolas, M. 2006. Forecasting innovations: Methods for predicting numbers 
of patent filings: Springer. 
Hung, S. C., & Tu, M. F. 2011. Technological change as chaotic process. R & D 
Management, 41(4): 378-392. 
Landau, D., & Drori, I. 2008. Narratives as sensemaking accounts: the case of an R&D 
laboratory. Journal of Organizational Change Management, 21(6): 701-720. 
Levy, D. 1994. Chaos theory and strategy: theory, application, and managerial implications. 
Strategic Management Journal, 15(S2): 167-178. 
Malan, L. C., & Kriger, M. P. 1998. Making sense of managerial wisdom. Journal of 
Management Inquiry, 7(3): 242-251. 
Mayer-Schönberger, V., & Cukier, K. 2013. Big data: A revolution that will transform how 
we live, work, and think: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 
McAfee, A., Brynjolfsson, E., Davenport, T. H., Patil, D., & Barton, D. 2012. Big Data. 
Harvard Business Review, 90(10): 61-67. 
Poole, M. S., Van de Ven, A. H., Dooley, K., & Holmes, M. E. 2000. Organizational 
Change and Innovation Processes: Theory and Methods for Research: Oxford 
University Press. 
Siau, K., Long, Y. N., & Ling, M. 2010. Toward a Unified Model of Information Systems 
Development Success. Journal of Database Management, 21(1): 80-101. 
Snowden, D. J., & Boone, M. E. 2007. A leader's framework for decision making. Harvard 
Business Review, 85(11): 68. 
 
153 
Stevenson, H., & Harmeling, S. 1990. Entrepreneurial management's need for a more 
“chaotic” theory. Journal of Business Venturing , 5(1): 1-14. 
Suurs, R. A. A. 2009. Motors of Sustainable Innovation--Towards a theory on the dynamics 
of technological innovation systems. Utrecht University. 
Utterback, J. M. 1994. Mastering the dynamics of innovation: How companies can seize 
opportunities in the face of technological change. Boston, Mass.: Harvard 
Business School Press. 
Van de Ven, A. H., Angle, H. L., & Poole, M. S. 2000. Research on the management of 
innovation: The Minnesota studies: Oxford University Press New York. 
Want, T. 2013. Big Data Needs Thick Data. Accessed in 2014. 
http://ethnographymatters.net/blog/2013/05/13/big-data-needs-thick-data/ 







Appendix A  
 
Supplementary information on Chapter 2  
 
Summary 
This appendix illustrates how we analyse an innovation process, namely identifying 
patterns from the large amounts of process data, using the Nylon innovation. Nylon is 
one type of synthetic plastic material composed of polyamides of high molecular 
weight, manufactured as a fibre. It was first produced in 1935 by DuPont, which 
created a revolution in the fibre industry. The products made of nylon range from civil 
applications (e.g., stocking, toothbrush, ropes) to military usages (e.g., parachutes, flak 
vests, and airplane tires). An interesting feature of Nylon case is the innovation of a 
technology gave rise to a new industrial sector. Besides, the many decades of 
development of Nylon are disturbed by strong events such as the Second World War or 
the world-wide oil crisis which clearly mark nonlinear dynamics of innovation. 
This appendix consists of five parts: (1) the chronological list of events in Nylon 
innovation; (2) coding scheme; (3) coding Nylon innovation events into pre-defined 
categories (here we use Hekkert et al. (2007)’s seven system functions as a framework); 
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AA.1  Chronological list of events in Nylon innovation  
Time By whom Events
1
 References 
1926/12/18 Stine, the 






Took the first step to nylon 
invention; submit a short 
memorandum entitles “Pure 







1927 Stine Stine received budget to start 
a fundamental research unit 





1928 Stine Hired Carothers  (Hounshell & 
Smith, 1988a) 
1934/3/23 Carothers Suggested to his assistant, 
that he attempt to prepare a 




1934/5/24 One assistants 
of Carothers 
On the suggestion of 
Carothers, assistants drew a 
sample of synthetic fibre 
which overcoming the 





                                                                 
1 The events data are completely literal texts from the internet. We do not want to change the original 
texts when we analyse.  
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attempts. This fibre was 
Nylon. 
1935/2/28  A “cousin” of this fibre, 
known technically as nylon 




Summer, 1936 Du Pont’s 
Rayon 
Department 
Business model assessment: 
Nylon was evaluated as a 
high quality yarn superior to 
natural silk, and expected to 




Summer, 1936 Research 
Manager 
On the basis of these 
optimistic forecasts, the 
research manager decided to 
expand the company’s nylon-
manufacturing capacity from 
two to one hundred pounds in 
order to improve the process 




February,1937 Du Pont’s 
development 
team 
Du Pont’s development team 
had made significant strides 
toward its goal of producing a 
standard and uniform 
product, but no yard had been 











First knitting test in Union 




April, 1937  Further testing was done at 
the Van Raalte mill in 
Boonton, NJ, and the first 




July, 1937  By July 1937 Van Raalte had 
knitted enough material to 
give Du Pont some definite 
feedback: the yarn performed 
quite well; the outstanding 
defect was the tendency of 
the stockings to wrinkle 




A few months later it was 
discovered that these 
wrinkles could be eliminated 






 Thanksgiving and perhaps 
Christmas came early for 






Raalte mills had started 
turning out "full-fashioned 
hosiery excellent in 
appearance and free from 
defects". 
Smith, 1988b) 
 The reaction of women to 
nylon: durable but easily 





of the Rayon 
Department 
Once skeptic, now found 
good future of the product. 
(Betz; Hounshell 
& Smith, 1988a; 
Hounshell & 
Smith, 1988b) 
1936, 1938 Two trial 
facilities: 
Semi-works 
(1936) and the 
pilot plant 
(1938) 
Prototype machinery test (McVie, 2006) 
1937  The nylon polymer produced 
at the semi-works during 
equipment testing was not 
suitable for making yarn for 
hosiery. 
(McVie, 2006) 
1937  Nonetheless DuPont found a 
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made at the semi-works--the 
amazing new Dr. West's 




1937  Nylon did not reveal the 
chemical nature of the new 
bristles. It simply referred to 







Authorized a pilot plant of 
toughly one-tenth of expected 
production 
(CHA) 
1938  Du Pont 
plastics 
department 
Began marketing nylon 
bristles under the trademark 
Exton. This offered an 
attractive entering wedge in 
the marketplace for nylon. 
Imperfect polymer produced 
in the pilot plant could be 
sold for toothbrush fibres. 
(Klooster, 2009) 




1939 Carothers Unveiled nylon to three 










1940  A second plant for nylon 
production was started in 
Martinsville, Virginia in 
1940. 
(Doyle & Stern, 
2006) 
1940  Nylon was an instant market 
and financial success when it 
became available in May of 
1940. Production of $9 
million sold out with a 33% 
profit.  
(Doyle & Stern, 
2006) 
1941  $7 million profits on sales of 
$25 million. 
(Doyle & Stern, 
2006) 
1941  Began pioneering research 
for the development of 
products of Orlon, Cardura 
and Dacron. 
(CHA; Hounshell 
& Smith, 1988a) 
1941-1942  All nylon was requisitioned 
by government and used for 
making parachutes, ropes, 
cords, instead of nylon 
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1948  New plants in Chattanooga 
for Nylon. Increase 
investment in additional plant 
capacity, justified by new 
uses of Nylon. 
(CHA; Doyle & 
Stern, 2006) 
1951  Sensing that the demand for 
Nylon could be 
overwhelming, and perhaps 
volatile, DuPont licensed 
Nylon to Chemstrand by 
building them a 50 million 
pound per year plant for $110 
million. 
(Doyle & Stern, 
2006) 
1960-1980  Worldwide nylon market 
enjoyed a 10.5% 
compounded annual growth. 
Textile consumption grew at 
about 7.5% per annum, while 
carpet and industrial 
consumption grew at over 
12%. 
(CHA; Doyle & 
Stern, 2006; 
Nohria, 1996) 
1973  The oil shortages of 1973 and 
1979 hit nylon hard. Nylon 
made no profit in 1975. 
(Anonymous; 
CHA; Doyle & 
Stern, 2006) 
  In 1975, some nylon areas 
were directed to be cash 
generators and Fibre’s 




research was cut accordingly. 
1981 Du Pont After the second oil shortage, 
DuPont acquired Conoco (as 
Continental Oil) for $7.6 
billion.  
(CHA) 
1980s Du Pont During the 1980s, the amount 
of capital made available for 
upgrading DuPont's nylon 
plants was around 30% less 
than comparable companies 
such as 3M, Monsanto, 
Procotor and Kodak.  
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AA.2  Coding scheme 
System functions  Event category 
F1: Entrepreneurial 
activities 
 New company entry, start-ups 
 Company quits 




 Technical trial 
 Experiment 
 Technical invention 
 Other R&D related events 
F3: Knowledge diffusion  Joint forces with other companies or institutions 
 Meetings 
 Workshops 
 Personal or informal relationships 
F4: Guidance of the 
search 
 Business assessment 
 Strategic decisions or strategic target 
 Technical or economic performance result 
 Entrepreneur’s envision 
 Media report/announcement 
 Government policy and legislation 
 Debate 
F5: Market formation  Market stimulation program me (e.g., tax exemption 
measures, subsidy measures) 
 Niche market 
F6: Resource 
mobilization 
 Subsidy by government 
 Investments by venture capital 
 Expansion of manufacturing capacity 
 Hiring new people 
F7: Support from 
advocacy coalitions 
 Direct political lobbies 
 Indirect imposing pressure on government to issue a 




AA.3  Coding Nylon innovation events into pre-defined categories 
Events
2
 Year F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 
Submitted a short memorandum entitles 
“Pure Science Work” to DuPont’s 
executive committee. 
1926 1       
Received budget to start a fundamental 
research unit within Du Pont. 
1927      1  
Hired Wallace Hume Carothers, who later 
invented Nylon.  
1928      1  
Attempted to prepare synthetic fibre 1934  1 1 1    
Invented Nylon, the first synthetic fibre 1934  1  1    
Nylon 6.6 became a market success. 1935    1 1   
Business model assessment: Nylon was 
evaluated as a high quality yarn superior 
to natural silk, and expected to bring huge 
market value to DuPont. 
1936    1    
                                                                 
2 The “Events” are the same events in AA.1. For references, please refer to AA.1. 
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Started process innovation in order to 
improve manufacture efficiency. 
1936  1 1 1    
Manufacture process achieved a standard 
and uniform production. 
1937    1    
Started application testing 1937  1 1     
Success in knitting Nylon into full-
fashioned stockings free from defects 
1937  1  1    
Built up two trial facilities 1937    1  1  
Nylon polymer which was not suitable for 
making yarn was used to make 
toothbrushes, and turned out a big market 
success. 
1937 1 1  1 1   
Unveiled nylon to three thousand 
women’s club members 
1938   1 1    
Full-scale commercial production 1939    1  1  
A second plant for nylon production was 
started in Martinsville, Virginia in 1940. 
1940      1  
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Nylon was an instant market and financial 
success when it became available in May 
of 1940. Production of $9 million sold out 
with a 33% profit.  
1940    1    
1941, $7 million profits on sales of $25 
million. 
1941    1    
1941, Began pioneering research for the 
development of products of Orlon, 
Cardura and Dacron. 
1941 1 1  1    
All nylon DuPont was requisitioned by 
government and used for making 
parachutes, ropes, cords, instead of nylon 
stockings. Production was pushed. 
1941    1    
New plants in Chattnooga for Nylon. 
Increase investment in additional plant 
capacity, justified by new uses of Nylon. 
1948 1   1  1  
Sensing that the demand for nylon could 
be overwhelming, and perhaps volatile, 
DuPont licensed nylon to Chemstrand by 
building them a 50 million pound per year 
plant for $110 million. 
1951   1   1  
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Worldwide nylon market enjoyed a 10.5% 
compounded annual growth. Textile 
consumption grew at about 7.5% per 
annum, while carpet and industrial 
consumption grew at over 12%. 
1960-
1980 
   1    
The oil shortages of 1973 and 1979 hit 
nylon hard. Nylon made no profit in 1975. 
1973, 
1979 
   -1  -1  
Nylon made no profit in 1975. 1975    -1    
In 1975, some nylon areas were directed 
to be cash generators and Fibre’s research 
was cut accordingly. 
1975    -1  -1  
After the second oil shortage, DuPont 
acquired Conoco (as Continental Oil) for 
$7.6 billion. This was done to insure a 
source of petroleum based feedstock. 
1981    1  1  
During the 1980s, the amount of capital 
made available for upgrading DuPont's 
nylon plants was around 30% less than 
comparable companies such as 3M, 
Monsanto, Procotor and Kodak.  





AA.4  Analysing the interaction patterns between events 
Nylon invention (1926-1934) 
This period is characterized by a strategic shift of DuPont that leads to the invention of 
Nylon. In a situation where less resources were available for basic research in DuPont, 
on December 18, 1926, Charles Stine, the director of DuPont submitted a proposal to 
DuPont’s executive committee entitled “Pure Science Work” (Hounshell & Smith, 
1988a) [F1]. In this proposal, he convinced the executive committee to shift the 
strategy from applied research to fundamental research (Hounshell & Smith, 1988a) 
[F7]. Since April 1927, the DuPont executive committee decided to allocate $20,000 
per month to fundamental research [F6] (Ament, 2005). Using part of this 1927 budget, 
Stine established a new laboratory for fundamental research [F1] (Ament, 2005; 
Hounshell & Smith, 1988a). 
For DuPont, the technological development leading to the invention of Nylon begins in 
1928 when Stine hired Dr. Wallace Hume Carothers from Harvard University [F6], 
who only agreed to work for DuPont on the promise of a fundamental research project 
in the pursuit of pure science (CHA). After studying large amounts of polymers cases 
[F2], in 1929, Carothers published a landmark paper proposing that “polymers were 
aggregates of small entities rather than true molecules” (Hounshell & Smith, 1988a) 
[F3]. This paper received favourable comments from numerous sources and increasing 
recognition in the scientif ic world (Hounshell & Smith, 1988a) [F4].  By 1929, 
Carothers had eight men working for him [F6] (Hounshell & Smith, 1988a). 
Carothers’s group began to try an unusual compound 
3
(DVA) as an attempt to create a 
synthesized fibre [F2] but failed. In 1930, a new assistant director of the Chemical 
Department, Elmer K. Bolton, was assigned in Carothers’s project (Hounshell & 
Smith, 1988a) [F6]. He asked Carothers to continue exploring the chemistry of DVA 
[F4]. In April 1930, Carothers’s research group succeeded in producing neoprene 
synthetic rubber and the first laboratory-synthesized fibre (Hounshell & Smith, 1988a) 
[F2, F4]. The invention of neoprene, as a promising synthetic fibre, encouraged the 
fundamental research toward more clearly defined goals (Hounshell & Smith, 1988a) 
[F4]. But in June 1930, Elmer Bolton replaced Stine as the chemical director , and Stine 
was promoted to the corporate executive committee (Hounshell & Smith, 1988a; 
                                                                 
3
 This unusual compound is a short polymer consisting of three acetylene molecules, divinylacetylene 
(DVA) (Hounshell, 1988), which later became the first laboratory -synthesized fibre. 
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Hounshell & Smith, 1988b). This brought a fundamental change in the research 
philosophy and style (Hounshell & Smith, 1988a). Different from Stine, Bolton 
emphasized practical applications. Therefore, he put the development of a new 
synthetic fibre at the top of his research priorities and pushed Carothers to renew 
efforts on synthetic fibres (Hounshell & Smith, 1988a) [F4]. Bolton was enthusiastic 
about this synthetic fibres and insisted on putting at least one man on this problem 
[F6]. In 1934, after some experimental difficulties and depressions, Carothers 
suggested his assistants to prepare a fibre from an aminononanoic ester [F2, F3, F4]. 
Under this suggestion and supervision, on May 24, 1934, one of the assistants drew a 
sample of synthetic fibre, which was Nylon [F2]. 
Interaction pattern analysis 
In this period, the system functions of the Nylon innovation system were beginning to 
take shape. A careful examination of the relationships between the events in this period 
finds the following “lead-to” chains : “Carothers’s research group test synthetic 
rubbers” (F2, F3) lead to “success in producing the first laboratory-synthesized fibre”; 
the success leads to “high expectancy of scientif ic experiments” [F4]; the high 
expectancy leads to “the new chemical director, named Elmer Bolton, continued 
emphasizing and supporting application research of synthesized fibre” [F6], which 
further leads to “Carothers’s research group continued scientif ic experiments” [F2]. 
This chain of “lead-to” events constructs a self-reinforced reaction loop, initiating from 
knowledge development [F2], going through knowledge diffusion [F3], guidance of the 
search [F4], resource mobilization [F6], and finally going back to the initial knowledge 
development function [F2]. As such, they form a cycle, as illustrated in Figure AA.1. 
Because these activities contribute mainly to technological discovery and development, 




Figure AA.1 Technological cycle in Nylon innovation 
Technological improvement (1935-1937) 
This period focuses on technological improvement and application or exploitation of 
Nylon. After the invention of Nylon, the research team tried 81 possible variants of 
nylon [F1]. During these trials, a “cousin” of Nylon (technically called nylon 6.6) was 
first prepared on February 28, 1935 and became DuPont’s most famous product (CHA) 
[F2, F4]. By the summer 1936, DuPont had enough production of Nylon and was ready 
to develop Nylon production on a larger scale (Hounshell & Smith, 1988a)[F6]. 
DuPont’s Rayon Department did a business evaluation of Nylon [F2] and reported that 
the new fibre was “a high quality yarn superior to natural silk” with a huge market 
potential at two dollars a pound, roughly the price of silk (Hounshell & Smith, 
1988a)[F4]. Encouraged by this high expectation, the research manager decided [F4] to 
expand the company’s Nylon-manufacturing capacity to improve the process and 
prepare enough material for extensive testing [F6] (Hounshell & Smith, 1988a). In 
February 1937, DuPont’s development team was successful in producing a standard 
and uniform product [F2], but still with knitting problems (Hounshell & Smith, 1988a) 
[F4]. Intensive testing was carried out in pilot plants
4
 [F2] until April 1937 when the 
first experimental stockings were made (Hounshell & Smith, 1988a)[F2, F4] 
(F2F4F6F2). By July 1937, there was enough material available for further step 
                                                                 
4
 According to Hounshell (1988), the first test was in February 1937 in Union 
Manufacturing Company in Frederick; and the further testing was done at the Van 
Raalte mill in Boonton, NJ, and the first experimental stockings were made in April.  
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testing (Hounshell & Smith, 1988a)[F6] and to give DuPont some definite feedback on 
their investment in the new material. Nylon represented a well performing yarn but 
suffered from wrinkle problems during dyeing and other finishing operations [F4]. 
Focusing on solving these defects, the development team planned trial 
experimentations [F2] and succeeded in eliminating the wrinkles by steam treating the 
stocking before dyeing [F4]. Before Christmas in 1937, DuPont had developed “full-
fashioned hosiery” with excellent appearance and free from defects [F2, F4].  
Interaction pattern analysis 
The dominant driver in this period is still the technological cycle, which was  reflected 
in the “lead to” chain of events: F2F4F6F2. The dynamics of this sequence of 
events involves positive scientific results [F2] feeding back on guidance of the search 
[F4], which lead to continuous resource investments [F6] to technological development 
[F2]. Obviously, this cycle mainly involves the following system functions: knowledge 
development [F2], guidance of the search [F4], and resource mobilization [F6]. A 
contrast with the previous technological cycle, it is interesting to notice that  the 
knowledge diffusion function [F3] disappeared from the main activities, as shown in 
Figure AA.2. That’s because DuPont wanted to enter the market first and therefore 
kept the material a secret for competitors. Just as Everett Vernon Lewis, a Rayon 
Department research chemist, later recalled that: the security precautions during his 
task of taking a few carefully measured skeins of yarn for a knitting test to the Union 
Manufacturing Company in Frederick, Maryland, were more stringent than those he 
encountered later in the Manhattan Project (Hounshell & Smith, 1988a). What is 
needed to be stressed is that the market formation function remains weak. Most 
attention was devoted to technological development and R&D [F2] yet no customers 




Figure AA.2 The second technological cycle in Nylon innovation 
Market entry (1936-1940) 
This period is characterized by the first market introduction of Nylon products. The 
initial market entry of Nylon can almost be considered an accident. During the testing 
of prototype machinery in semi-works in 1936 [F2], the nylon polymer produced was 
found not suitable for making yarn for hosiery [F4]. Nonetheless, DuPont found it 
useful as a material to make bristles [F2, F4].  In 1937, DuPont Plastics Department 
began marketing nylon bristles, under the brand name Exton in Dr. West’s 
toothbrushes and it was a big market success [F4]. This created an attractive niche 
market for nylon [F5], where imperfect nylon polymer could be used to make 
toothbrush fibres. In 1938 January, DuPont’s executive committee authorized a pilot 
plant to expand the production. But still DuPont didn’t reveal what material was of 
these bristles [-F3]. 
On October 2, 1938, Charles Stine announced the invention of Nylon [F3]. And in the 
next year, he exposed Nylon to three thousand women’s club members [F1, F5, F7]. 
After publication of Nylon, it became an instant market and financial success in 1940 
[F4, F6]. Because the market success of Nylon, DuPont’s Pioneering Research began 
developing other products made of Nylon [F1, F2]. At the same time, DuPont invested 
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Interaction pattern analysis 
The event sequences reveal two cycles in this period: (1) an entrepreneurial cycle and 
(2) a market cycle. The dominant cycles in this period have shifted from technical to 
entrepreneurial and market cycles. The dynamics within this period presents a self-
reinforcing role of entrepreneurial activities, identif ied in the “lead-to” chain: 
F1F5F4F6F1, as shown in Figure AA.3. This event sequence was initiated by 
entrepreneurial activities, and went through market lobby/creation, resource 
mobilization and led to further more entrepreneurial activities, which shows a self-
reinforcement cycle. We call it entrepreneurial cycle. As it shows, the most developed 
system functions in this period are entrepreneurial activities [F1], market formation 
[F5], guidance of the search [F4], resource mobilization [F6] and occasionally 
knowledge diffusion [F3] and support from advocacy coalitions [F7]. Therefore, the 
seven functions were all involved.  
 
Figure AA.3 Entrepreneurial cycle in Nylon innovation 
The first market introduction of nylon, namely using Nylon to make toothbrushes [F1], 
was a great success. The good market performance provided a guaranteed demand for 
Nylon [F5, F4] and resulted in DuPont’s further investments in Nylon application [F6], 
such as developing new products, investing in new pilot plants [F1]. Similarly, the 
activity that Charles Stine told three thousand women’s club about the invention of 
Nylon is classified as lobbying for potential customers [F5, F7]. It established an 
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important niche market for Nylon, which is considered to be an essential step for 
Nylon’s commercialization. This publication of Nylon brought such great market 
success that it stimulates DuPont’s further investments in Nylon development and 
diverse products made of Nylon. At the same time, good market performance 
encouraged DuPont to explore new businesses and new markets of Nylon, which 
further led to a better market performance (F5F4F1F5)., This sequence of event 




Figure AA.4 Market-driven cycle in Nylon innovation 
It is interesting to note that (1) in this period all of the seven system functions have 
entered the Nylon innovation system; and (2) the cycles which dominate the 
development are signif icantly different from the previous ones. In this period, system 
functions F1, F5 and F6 play a central role to the Nylon development.  
Market mature (1941-1970) 
This period is characterized by a fast market growth. Nylon’s expansion in the market 
place was stopped by the Second World War between 1941 till 1945. During the 
Second World War, all Nylon products were requisitioned by government [F4]. In fact, 
in order to escape the monopoly of Japan in the silk market, the US government was 
eager to develop a substitute for silk [F4, F6]. Pushed and facilitated by US 
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government, DuPont increased its Nylon production threefold [F6] and extended the 
application of nylon from civil into military uses, such as flak vests, parachutes, cords, 
instead of stockings [F1, F2, F5]. After the war, nylon uses expanded quickly, 
involving textiles, carpets, and industrial [F1, F5]. The huge demand and market of 
nylon guided DuPont’s investment in additional plant capacity in Chattanooga, 
Tennessee (1948) and in Camden, South Carolina (1950) [F4, F6]. The worldwide 
nylon market enjoyed a fast growth with production going up to 1 billion pounds 
annually. The radical shift to continuous processing of nylon was delivering quality 
and profitability beyond all expectations. And it continues to do so for longer than 
could have been predicted.  
Interaction pattern analysis 
In this period the Second World War plays a critical role and serves as a catalyst. The 
war created new military demands of nylon [F5], stimulated DuPont to increase 
investment in Nylon production [F4, F6] as well as in technical research in terms of 
new products [F2]. After the war, the accumulated market demand [F5] triggers more 
resource allocation into nylon development [F6] in the purpose of nylon application 
exploitations and production expansion [F2]. A large diversity of nylon products, 
resulting from technical development, leads to much more market demand after the war 
[F5]. A self-reinforcing loop is identified, which starts from market stimulation [F5], 
leading to high expectations [F4] and increasing resource allocation [F6], followed by 
enhanced knowledge development [F2] and improved technological performance, 
thereby increasing market demand further [F5]. Given the centrality of market 
formation in this cycle, it makes sense to call it market-driven cycle, as illustrated in 
Figure AA.5. In this period, it is found that system functions F2, F4 and F6 play a 
central role again via the system function F5. Comparing with the first market-driven 
cycle shown in Figure AA.4, the second market-driven cycle in Figure AA.5 is 
triggered by environmental discontinuity, namely the Second World War, while the 




Figure AA.5 The second market-driven cycle in Nylon innovation 
Decline (1971-1990) 
The 1970s witness a hard time for Nylon after a long period of growth. The trigger of 
this crisis was an oil shortage in 1973 and 1979. The production of Nylon requires 
petroleum based material as input. In 1975, Nylon made no profit for the first time 
since it was commercialized [-F4]. In the same year, DuPont decided to reduce 
resources allocated to Nylon research and increased the budget for developing new 
materials that can substitute Nylon [-F6]. After the second oil shortage, in 1981 DuPont 
acquired Conoco (as Continental Oil) for $7.6 billion in order to insure a source of 
petroleum based feedstock for Nylon [F7, F6]. However, the huge investment 
contributed to a financial crisis for DuPont [-F6]. During the 1980s, DuPont reduced 
Nylon plants budgets to alleviate capital starvation [-F6, -F4]. The amount of capital 
allocated to upgrading Nylon plants was around 30% less than comparable companies 
such as 3M, Monsanto, and Kodak (Cook-Hauptman, 2013)[-F6].  
Interaction pattern analysis 
The cycle in this period is identified in the event sequence F6F4F6. Given the 
essential role of resource mobilization in this event sequence, we call it the resource 
cycle, as shown in Figure AA.6. This period is characterized by DuPont’s continuous 
strategy adjustment in face of a resource crisis. The trigger event is the world-wide oil 
shortage which led to insufficient supplies to make Nylon and ultimately also made 
Nylons profits disappear [-F6]. As a remedy, DuPont invested in new substitutes of 
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nylon, acquiring upper supply chain companies, decreasing nylon plant investments 
[F6], and so on. All these operations are through resource re-allocations. The two 
worldwide oil shortages influenced the Nylon innovation through changing the 
resource availability, namely through the system function F6. 
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Appendix B  
 
Supplementary information on Chapter 3  
 
Summary 
This appendix illustrates how we analyse the Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitor 
(SSRI) innovation process. Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRI) is a class of 
antidepressant drugs which are primarily used to treat depression. The development of 
SSRI is acknowledged as a breakthrough in psychotropic medications, because before 
the invention of SSRI all psychotropic medications were based on chance observation. 
SSRI were the first psychotropic medications that were purposefully designed. The 
complexity of the SSRI innovation is matched by tightly governmental regulations as 
well as unexpected contextual events. Dynamics were primarily driven by multiple 
waves of innovation activities by diverse pharmaceutical companies.  
This appendix consists of five parts: (1) technological background of SSRI; (2) 
chronological list of events in SSRI innovation; (3) coding SSRI innovation events into 
pre-defined categories (here we use Hekkert et al. (2007)’s seven system functions as a 
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AB.1  Technological background of SSRI 
The SSRIs are the first rationally designed psychotropic drugs which are used to treat 
depression, anxiety disorders and other personality disorders (eMedExpert, 2011).  
Before SSRIs, all psychotropic medications (e.g., MAO-Is and Tricyclics) were 
discovered by chance observation (Preskorn). The rationality of the SSRIs lies in their 
selective effect on a specific neural site of action while avoiding effects on others 
instead of chance observations (eMedExpert, 2011; Wrobel, 2007). The discovery and 
development of the SSRIs opened up a new generation of antidepressants and rational 
drug designs (Carlsson, 1999). 
The term SSRIs refer to a class of antidepressants instead of a single medicine. The 
first invented SSRI antidepressant was zimelidine by Astra, a Swiss pharmaceutical 
company (Carlsson, 1999), followed by Prozac (Fluoxetine) by Eli Lilly and Company, 
Zoloft (Sertraline) by Pfizer Inc, Paxil (Paroxetine) by GlaxoSmithKline, Celexa 
(Citalopram) and Lexapro (Escitalopram) by Forest Pharmaceuticals, Inc, respectively. 
The following five SSRIs were almost developed at the same time by different 
pharmaceutical companies.  
All SSRIs work through the same mechanism. Research suggests that the special 
chemicals for brain communications, which are called neurotransmitters, play a 
signif icant role in affecting mood and behaviour. Low levels of neurotransmitters are 
proved to lead to depression, and on the other hand high levels of neurotransmitters are 
found to help improve mood. Serotonin and norepinephrine are two commonly known 
neurotransmitters. The SSRIs work through blocking the reuptake of serotonin, thereby 
increasing the level of serotonin and improving depressed people’s mood. And the 
SSRIs distinguish themselves by “selective”, which means they most significantly 









Table AB.1 Commonly prescribed SSRIs (Source: eMedExpert.com) 
Scientific name Zimelidine Fluoxetine Sertraline Paroxetine Citalopram Escitalopram 
Trademarked 
name 
Zelmid Prozac Zoloft Paxil Celexa Lexapro 
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AB.2  Chronological list of events in SSRI innovation 
Time By whom Events1 References 
1953 John Gaddum and one 
of the founders of 
psycho-pharmacology 
in Britain 
They speculated to a small but influential 
group of researchers, “It is possible that 
the 5-HT [serotonin] in our brains plays 
an essential part in keeping us sane.” 
(Shorter, 1997) 
1950s A team in the United 
States and another 
team in Edinburgh, 
Scotland, led by Sir 
John H. Gaddum 
A potential role of serotonin in brain 
function and consciousness was 
discovered 
(Cozzi, 2013) 
1953 John Gaddum Through experimenting on himself, 
Gaddum discovered the existence of 
serotonin in certain parts of the brain and 
proposed its potential effect on mental 
performances 
(Amin, Crawford, 
& Gaddum, 1954; 
Cozzi, 2013) 
1954 Woolley and Shaw Woolley and Shaw in New York 
proposed that the mental disorders may 
be caused by an the action of serotonin in 
the brain and the suppression of its action 
may result in a mental disorder 
(Cozzi, 2013; 
Woolley & Shaw, 
1954) 
1957 Researchers in Bernard 
Brodie’s Laboratory of 
Chemical Pathology in 
the National Institutes 
of Health in Bethesda 
The working mechanism of the role of 
serotonin was further proposed by 
Researchers in Bernard Brodie’s 
Laboratory of Chemical Pathology in the 
National Institutes of Health in Bethesda 
who discovered that amines in an 
antipsychotic drug may lead to 
behavioural changes through unlocking 
the body’s reuptake of serotonin 
(Shorter, 1997) 
Mid  By the mid-1960s, the MAOIs were (Healy, 2004) 
                                                                 
1
 The events data are completely literal texts from the internet. We do not want to change the original 
texts when we analyse. 
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1960s rapidly disappearing from clinical 
practice because of worries about a 
dangerous interaction between them and 
cheese. Their demise left the TCAs on the 
market as the gold standard 
antidepressants. 
1963 Alec Coppen, a 
biochemist-psychiatrist 
of the Medical 
Research Council and 
staff member at St. 
Ebba’s Hospital 
Discovered that serotonin-equivalents 
were able to relieve depression. 
(Shorter, 1997) 
1967 Paul Kielholz The origin of the SSRIs lies in 1967. 
Following early studies with imipramine, 
Paul Kielholz became the Professor of 
Psychiatry in Basel. Given the presence 
in Basel of the major Swiss chemical 
companies, Kielholz was well placed to 





Carlsson and his 
colleagues 
Following Kielholz’s lead, Carlsson, 
working with Hanns Corrodi and Peder 
Berndtsson at Astra’s plant in Hässle in 
Sweden, took the anti-histamine 
chlorpheniramine and manipulating the 
molecule, came up with compound H102-
09, later called zimeldine and finally 
given the brand name Zelmid. 
(Healy, 2004) 
1968 Carlsson, Fuxe and 
Ungerstedt 
Reported that the reuptake of serotonin 
(or 5-HT) was also inhibited by a tricyclic 
antidepressant named imipramine 
(Carlsson, 1999; 
Carlsson, Fuxe, & 
Ungerstedt, 1968) 
1968 Clarsson Went to Geigy to report their findings 
regards to the reuptake inhibition of 
serotonin by tricyclic antidepressants in 
order to persuade them to do the clinical 
(Carlsson, 1999) 
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trials of a potent inhibitor agent 
1968 Geigy The agent selected by Geigy proved to 
possess some problem. 
(Healy, 2004) 
1968 Clarsson and his 
colleagues 
Clarsson and his colleagues started to 
develop non-tricyclic agents which were 
able to selectively inhibit 5-HT 




Arvid Carlsson Arvid Carlsson reinforced the news that 




 New alternative antidepressants drugs 
with minor side effects and low toxicity 




 There was a backlash against over-
prescription of anti-anxiety drugs because 




Carlsson together with 
Hanns Corrodi in Astra 
Developed the first SSRIs called 
zimeldine and known as the brand name 
Zelmid 
(Healy, 2004) 
1970 Barr Labs Barr Labs was founded in Pomona, N.Y., 




Eli Lilly SSRIs research also became fashion in 
Eli Lilly Company. 
(Shorter, 1997) 
1971 Ray Fuller Persuade Lilly to start develop an 





Ray Fully and David 
Wong 
Organized a serotonin depression team in 
Lilly. 
(Shorter, 1997) 
1971 Carlsson Applied for a patent on Zelmid in 




selective serotonin uptake inhibitor 
1971 Lilly Fluoxetine (LY110141) - the compound 
that became Prozac - was developed 
(The-Observer, 
2007) 
1971 Astra A phase I clinical development of 
zimelidine was carried out at Hassle 
(Carlsson, 1999) 
1972 Lilly The lab experiments with fluoxetine were 
carried out by David Wong. 
(Carlsson, 1999) 
1972 Wong Hoping to find a derivative inhibiting 
only serotonin reuptake, Wong proposed 
to re-test the series for the in-vitro 
reuptake of serotonin, norepinephrine and 
dopamine. 
(Wikipedia)  
1972 Jong-Sir Horng Showed the compound later named 
fluoxetine to be the most potent and 
selective inhibitor of serotonin reuptake 
of the series 
(Wikipedia) 
1973 DuPhar Laboratories in 
Weesp 
Developed fluvoxamine (Healy, 2004) 
1973 Lilly Applied for a patent for fluoxetine (Carlsson, 1999) 
1974 Lilly Prozac was patented (Healy, 2004) 
1975 DuPhar Laboratories in 
Weesp 
Applied for a patent on fluvoxamine (Healy, 2004) 
1976 Lilly Clinical trial of fluoxetine was carried out 
in healthy volunteers 
(Carlsson, 1999) 
1976 Astra Testing of zimelidine in patients who 
were suffering from depression 
(Carlsson, 1999) 
1977 Pharmacologist Le Fur 
and Uzan at Pharmuka 
Discovered Indalpine (Healy, 2004) 
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1978 Lilly Clinical trials of fluoxetine were being 




US government At the end of the 1970s, due to several 
factors (the financial burden of the 
Vietnam war, escalation of healthcare 
costs and other issues), the Nixon 
administration was not very keen on 
approving new drugs. This intention was 
manifested by changing the head of the 
FDA and introduction of harder and more 
costly drug approval procedures 
(Shorter, 1997) 
1980 Lilly  Decided to cooperate with John Feighner, 
a famous biological psychiatrist 
(Shorter, 1997) 
1980 Astra At a symposium of depression treatment 
zimelidine was commented as effective as 
existing antidepressants in treating 
depressions, but with less side-effects 
(Carlsson, 1999) 
1980 Astra Zelmid trials published (Healy, 2004) 
1982 Astra Zimelidine was approved as 
antidepressant agent in Sweden and 
several other countries 
(Carlsson, 1999) 
1982 Astra Zimelidine was trade marked as Zelmid 
by Astra in Europe 
(Carlsson, 1999) 
1982 Astra Submitted its application to FAD (Carlsson, 1999) 
1982 Astra Some patients with zimelidine treatment 
were found to subject to GuillainBarre 
syndrome 
(Carlsson, 1999) 
1983 Lilly 1983 clinical trials in clinic found 





1983 Astra Withdraw all zimelidine drugs from 
market in all countries 
(Carlsson, 1999) 
1983 Astra Derivative of Zelmid, called alaproclat,  
was also found to cause serious side 
effect (aplastic anaemia) and was 
withdrawn from the market 
(Healy, 1997) 
1984 US government The landmark Hatch-Waxman Act of 
1984 was aimed almost entirely at 
making low-priced generics available 
more quickly 
(McLean, 2001) 
1985 Lilly The weight loss effect of fluoxetine, was 
published in Lilly’s annual report, 
thereby leading to stock rising of Lilly  
(Shorter, 1997) 
1985 Lilly Prozac trials published (Healy, 2004) 
1986 Lilly Fluoxetine made its appearance on the 
Belgian market 
(Wikipedia) 
1987 Lilly Fluoxetine was approved for use by the 
FDA in the United States. 
(FDA) 
1987 Lilly Fluoxetine was handed to Interbrand, the 
world’s leading branding company for an 
identity, and the name Prozac was chosen 
(The-Observer, 
2007) 
1987 Lilly Market introduction of Prozac (Wong, Perry, & 
Bymaster, 2005) 
1987 Lilly Lilly carried out large scale promotion 
campaigns for Prozac 
(The-Observer, 
2007) 
1988 Lilly Prozac was brought onto the market (Healy, 1997, 
2004; The-
Observer, 2007) 
1990 Researchers at McLean Published an article suggesting that (Shorter, 1997) 
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Hospital Prozac was effective for a range of 
disorders such as panic and drop attacks 
1990 Lilly Prozac became the number one drug 




Astra Astra contemplated withdrawing from the 
research-based pharmaceutical market, in 
favour of a focus on over-the counter 
medicines. 
(Healy, 2004) 
1990s  Prozac, Zoloft and Paxil became 
household names 
(Healy, 2004) 
1990s  The acronym SSRI came into general use (Shorter, 1997) 
1992 Royal College of 
Psychiatrists 
Launched its Defeat Depression 
campaign in the 1992, it surveyed the 
population using professional polling 
organizations and found that most people 
thought the antidepressants were likely to 
be addictive. 
(Pill, Prior, & 
Wood, 2001) 
1993 Fuller, Bryan Molloy 
and David Wong in 
Lilly 
Fuller was posthumously awarded the 
Pharmaceutical Discoverer's Award. 
Bryan Molloy and David Wong were also 
awarded. 
(Bellis) 
1994 Lilly Prozac had become the number two best-
selling drug in the world. 
(Shorter, 1997) 
1995 Barr Labs Filed its application to market a 20-
milligram capsule of fluoxetine, charging 
that two Lilly patents - one set to expire 
in 2001 and the other in 2003 - weren't 
valid 
(McLean, 2001) 
1997 David Healy Wrote The Anti-Depressant Era  (1997) 
and Let Them Eat Prozac (2004), in 
which he alleged that the use of Prozac 





patients especially  
1997 FDA Approved direct marketing to consumers (Lawlor, 2012) 
End of 
1990s 
 The threshold of what people were 
defined as illness was reduced. 
(Shorter, 1997) 
2000 Lilly A three-judge appeals court panel 
annulled the Lilly’s 2001 patent  
(McLean, 2001) 
2001 Barr Labs The first generic fluoxetine was released 
in August 2001 in America by Barr 
Laboratories 
(Druss, Marcus, 
Olfson, & Pincus, 
2004) 
2001  There was a long-running campaign 
waged by Scientologist against Lilly’s 
Prozac 
(McLean, 2001) 
2001 Lilly All the security checks at Eli Lilly's main 
headquarters are partly the result of a 
long-running campaign waged by 
Scientologists. 
(McLean, 2001) 
2001 Lilly Eli Lilly lost $35m of its market value in 
one day - and 90 per cent of its Prozac 
prescriptions in a single year. 
(The-Observer, 
2007) 
2001  In the wake of the traumatic events of 
September 11, pharmaceutical companies 
drastically increased their expenditures 
for television advertising of 
antidepressants and prescription sleep 
aids. 
(Rosack, 2002) 
2001 GlaxoSmithKline Spent a whopping $16.5 million on 
television ads promoting the drug during 
the month of October of last year, nearly 
twice as much as it did during the same 
month in 2000.   
(Rosack, 2002) 
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2001 Pfizer spent $5.6 million promoting the benefits 
of Zoloft (sertraline) in treating 
posttraumatic stress disorder during 
October 2001 
(Rosack, 2002) 
2001  Total sales of the three brand-name 
SSRIs amounted to $499.6 million during 
the month of October 2001—an increase 
of 19 percent over a year earlier 
(Rosack, 2002) 
2002  Generic fluoxetine represented 69.6 
percent of all fluoxetine prescriptions. 
There was a corresponding decline in 
prescriptions for brand-name fluoxetine 
(Prozac). 
(Druss et al., 
2004) 
2005 Tom Cruise Tom Cruise fired for suggesting using 
vitamins instead of Prozac….. In May 
2005, Tom Cruise was promoting War of 
the Worlds and Shields was promoting 
Down Came the Rain. Scientologists are 




2009 Irving Kirsch Wrote book “The Emperor’s New Drugs: 
Exploding the Antidepressant Myth” to 




2010 Gary Greenberg Wrote book “Manufacturing Depression: 
The Secret History of a Modern Disease” 








AB.3  Coding SSRI innovation events into pre-defined categories2 
Events3 Year F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 
They speculated to a small but influential group 
of researchers, “It is possible that the 5-HT 
[serotonin] in our brains plays an essential part 
in keeping us sane.” 
1953    1    
A potential role of serotonin in brain function 
and consciousness was discovered 
1950s  1  1    
Through experimenting on himself, Gaddum 
discovered the existence of serotonin in certain 
parts of the brain and proposed its potential 
effect on mental performances 
1953  1  1    
Woolley and Shaw in New York proposed that 
the mental disorders may be caused by an the 
action of serotonin in the brain and the 
suppression of its action may result in a mental 
disorder 
1954  1  1    
The working mechanism of the role of 
serotonin was further proposed by researchers 
in Bernard Brodie’s Laboratory of Chemical 
Pathology in the National Institutes of Health 
in Bethesda who discovered that amines in an 
antipsychotic drug may lead to behavioural 
changes through unlocking the body’s reuptake 
of serotonin 
1957  1  1    
By the mid-1960s, the MAOIs were rapidly 
disappearing from clinical practice because of 
worries about a dangerous interaction between 
them and cheese. Their demise left the TCAs 
on the market as the gold standard 
Mid 
1960s 
   1    
                                                                 
2
 The coding scheme can be found in AA.2. 
3
 The “Events” are the same events in AB.2. For references, please refer to AB.2. 
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antidepressants. 
Discovered that serotonin-equivalents were 
able to relieve depression. 
1963  1  1    
The origin of the SSRIs lies in 1967. Following 
early studies with imipramine, Paul Kielholz 
became the Professor of Psychiatry in Basel. 
Given the presence in Basel of the major Swiss 
chemical companies, Kielholz was well placed 
to become a leading figure in the world of 
psychopharmacology. 
1967  1  1  1  
Following Kielholz’s lead, Carlsson, working 
with Hanns Corrodi and Peder Berndtsson at 
Astra’s plant in Hässle in Sweden, took the 
anti-histamine chlorpheniramine and 
manipulating the molecule, came up with 
compound H102-09, later called zimeldine and 
finally given the brand name Zelmid. 
Late 
1960s 
 1  1    
Reported that the reuptake of serotonin (or 5-
HT) was also inhibited by a tricyclic 
antidepressant named imipramine 
1968  1  1    
went to Geigy to report their findings regards 
to the reuptake inhibition of serotonin by 
tricyclic antidepressants in order to persuade 
them to do the clinical trials of a potent 
inhibitor agent 
1968 1 1     1 
The agent selected by Geigy proved to possess 
some problem. 
1968    1  1  
Clarsson and his colleagues started to develop 
non-tricyclic agents which were able to 
selectively inhibit 5-HT (serotonin) reuptake 
inhibitor 
1968  1      
Arvid Carlsson reinforced the news that Late  1  1    
 
195  
serotonin seemed to control mood 1960s 
New alternative antidepressants drugs with 




   1 1   
There was a backlash against over-prescription 




   1    
Developed the first SSRIs called zimeldine and 
known as the brand name Zelmid 
Late 
1960s 
 1  1    
Barr Labs was founded in Pomona, N.Y., as a 
maker of generic antibiotics. 
1970 1       




1   1  1  
Persuade Lilly to start develop an 
antidepressant using serotonin in particular 
1971 1      1 
Organized a serotonin depression team in Lilly. Early 
1970s 
1     1  
Applied for a patent on Zelmid in Sweden, 
Belgium and Great Britain as a selective 
serotonin uptake inhibitor 
1971    1  1  
Fluoxetine (LY110141) - the compound that 
became Prozac - was developed 
1971 1       
A phase I clinical development of zimelidine 
was carried out at Hassle 
1971  1    1  
The lab experiments with fluoxetine were 
carried out by David Wong. 
1972  1      
Hoping to find a derivative inhibiting only 
serotonin reuptake, Wong proposed to re-test 
the series for the in-vitro reuptake of serotonin, 
1972  1  1    
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norepinephrine and dopamine. 
Showed the compound later named fluoxetine 
to be the most potent and selective inhibitor of 
serotonin reuptake of the series 
1972  1  1    
Developed fluvoxamine 1973  1      
Applied for a patent for fluoxetine 1973    1  1  
Prozac was patented 1974      1  
Applied for a patent on fluvoxamine 1975  1    1  
Clinical trial of fluoxetine was carried out in 
healthy volunteers 
1976  1    1  
Testing of zimelidine in patients who were 
suffering from depression 
1976  1    1  
Discovered Indalpine 1977  1      
Clinical trials of fluoxetine were being carried 
out in Indianapolis and Chicago 
1978  1    1  
At the end of the 1970s, due to several factors 
(the financial burden of the Vietnam war, 
escalation of healthcare costs and other issues), 
the Nixon administration was not very keen on 
approving new drugs. This intention was 
manifested by changing the head of the FDA 
and introduction of harder and more costly 
drug approval procedures 
Late 
1970s 
   1    
Decided to cooperate with John Feighner, a 
famous biological psychiatrist 
1980  1  1  1  
At a symposium of depression treatment 
zimelidine was commented as effective as 
existing antidepressants in treating depressions, 
1980    1    
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but with less side-effects 
Zelmid trials published 1980   1     
Zimelidine was approved as antidepressant 
agent in Sweden and several other countries 
1982    1    
Zimelidine was trade marked as Zelmid by 
Astra in Europe 
1982     1   
Submitted its application to FAD 1982    1  1  
Some patients with zimelidine treatment were 
found to subject to erious risk called 
GuillainBarre syndrome 
1982    -1    
1983 clinical trials in clinic found fluoxetine 
was as effective as tricyclic agent 
1983    1    
Withdraw all zimelidine drugs from market in 
all countries 
1983     -1   
Derivative of Zelmid, called alaproclat,  was 
also found to cause serious side effect (aplastic 
anaemia) and was withdrawn from the market 
1983    -1    
The landmark Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 was 
aimed almost entirely at making low-priced 
generics available more quickly  
1984    1    
The weight loss effect of fluoxetine, was 
published in Lilly’s annual report, thereby 
leading to stock rising of Lilly  
1985     1   
Prozac trials published 1985   1     
Fluoxetine made its appearance on the Belgian 
market 
1986     1   
Fluoxetine was approved for use by the FDA in 
the United States. 
1987    1    
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Fluoxetine was handed to Interbrand, the 
world’s leading branding company for an 
identity, and the name Prozac was chosen 
1987     1 1  
Market introduction of Prozac 1987     1   
Lilly carried out large scale promotion 
campaigns for Prozac 
1987     1 1  
Prozac was brought onto the market 1988     1   
Published an article suggesting that Prozac was 
effective for a range of disorders such as panic 
and drop attacks 
1990    1    
Prozac became the number one drug prescribed 
by psychiatrists. 
1990    1    
Astra contemplated withdrawing from the 
research-based pharmaceutical market, in 




-1    -1   
Prozac, Zoloft and Paxil became household 
names 
1990s    1    
The acronym SSRI came into general use 1990s    1    
Launched its Defeat Depression campaign in 
the 1992, it surveyed the population using 
professional polling organizations and found 
that most people thought the antidepressants 
were likely to be addictive. 
1992    -1    
Fuller was posthumously awarded the 
Pharmaceutical Discoverer's Award. Bryan 
Molloy and David Wong were also awarded. 
1993    1    
Prozac had become the number two best-selling 
drug in the world, following, …, an ulcer drug 




Filed its application to market a 20-milligram 
capsule of fluoxetine, charging that two Lilly 
patents--one set to expire in 2001 and the other 
in 2003--weren't valid 
1995 1   1   1 
Wrote The Anti-Depressant Era  (1997) and 
Let Them Eat Prozac (2004), in which he 
alleged that the use of Prozac increases the risk 
of suicide in younger patients especially  
1997    -1    
Approved direct marketing to consumers 1997    1 1   
The threshold of what people were defined as 
illness was reduced. 
End of 
1990s 
   1 1   
A three-judge appeals court panel annulled the 
Lilly’s 2001 patent 
2000    1  -1  
The first generic fluoxetine was released in 
August 2001 in America by Barr Laboratories 
2001 1   1 1   
There was a long-running campaign waged by 
Scientologist against Lilly’s Prozac 
2001    -1    
This paranoia is partly the result of a long-
running campaign waged by Scientologists. 
2001    1  1  
Eli Lilly lost $35m of its market value in one 
day - and 90 per cent of its Prozac prescriptions 
in a single year. 
2001    -1 -1   
In the wake of the traumatic events of 
September 11, pharmaceutical companies 
drastically increased their expenditures for 
television advertising of antidepressants and 
prescription sleep aids. 
2001    1 1 1  
Spent a whopping $16.5 million on television 
ads promoting the drug during the month of 
2001     1 1  
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October of last year, nearly twice as much as it 
did during the same month in 2000.   
Spent $5.6 million promoting the benefits of 
Zoloft (sertraline) in treating posttraumatic 
stress disorder during October 2001 
2001     1 1  
Total sales of the three brand-name SSRIs 
amounted to $499.6 million during the month 
of October 2001—an increase of 19 percent 
over a year earlier 
2001    1    
Generic fluoxetine represented 69.6 percent of 
all fluoxetine prescriptions. There was a 
corresponding decline in prescriptions for 
brand-name fluoxetine (Prozac). 
2002    1    
Tom Cruise fired for suggesting using vitamins 
instead of Prozac….. In May 2005, Tom Cruise 
was promoting War of the Worlds and Shields 
was promoting Down Came the Rain. 
Scientologists are vehemently opposed to all 
forms of psychiatry. 
2005    -1    
Wrote book “The Emperor’s New Drugs: 
Exploding the Antidepressant Myth” to 
question the effectiveness of antidepressants. 
2009    -1    
Wrote book “Manufacturing Depression: The 
Secret History of a Modern Disease” to 
question the effectiveness of antidepressants. 





AB.4  Analysing the interaction patterns between events 
The time period during which the development of SSRI is analysed starts in the early 
1950s and ends in the early 2000s. The section is structured in a story-telling way 
consisting of four periods: (1) the scientific discovery ranging from the early 1950s till 
the late 1960s; (2) the product development phase ranging from late 1960s till late 
1980s, which was characterized by pharmaceutical companies’ starting developing 
SSRIs; (3) Prozac’s marketing phase in 1990s, which was characterized by a fast 
growth of Prozac; and (4) Prozac’s maturity phase in 2001 due to the expiration of 
Prozac’s patent. It needs to say that the term “period” is not referred to a predefined 
and predictable sequential process but a representation of continuity in activities. Just 
as Langley (1999) pointed out that this is only a way of structuring the events rather 
than any particular theoretical significance.  
The analysis of the SSRIs innovation process is based on historical events. The 
database came from various sources, such as journal papers, scientific books, 
interviews with professionals in relative field, as well as rich information on the 
internet.  In particular, the earlier development phase of the SSRI (1950s-1960s) was 
based on the accounts from Shorter (1997) and Stanford et al. (1999); the later phase of 
SSRI development was referred to Healy (2004), the influence of institutional changes 
was referred to Lawlor (2012).These professional publications about the discovery and 
development of the SSRIs provided us with valuable information about the 
evolutionary history of the SSRIs medicines. A contribution of our study is a 
representation of the SSRIs innovation history using the system function framework 
and analys ing in term of cycles. The storyline of how SSRI evolved over time has been 
given in Chapter 3. Below we focus on analysing the cycles underlying each 
developmental phase of SSRI.  
The scientific discovery phase (1950s  - 1960s) 
Cycle analysis 
This period is characterized by scientific discoveries which paved way for the further 
research of the SSRIs. They provided a knowledge base for SSRI research through 
identifying the function mechanism of serotonin in brains and opened up a new 
direction of antidepressant research through blocking the reuptake of serotonin in 
brains. The most developed functions in this period are knowledge development [F2], 
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knowledge diffusion [F3], guidance of the search [F4], resource mobilization [F6], and 
accidently the support from advocacy coalitions [F7]. Other functions, such as 
entrepreneurial activities [F1], market formation [F5], etc. haven’t entered the system. 
It needs to point out that here the “support from advocacy coalitions” mainly focusses 
on forming scientific alliance in new generation of antidepressants – the SSRIs.  
A cycle is observed to dominate the development of the SSRIs research in this period, 
which can be identif ied through the event sequence F2F3F4F6F2, as shown 
in Figure AB.1. Given the signif icance of knowledge development, it is reasonable to 
call it a technological cycle. This cycle is characterized by continuous scientific 
discoveries [F2], starting from the discovery of the role of serotonin in brains, to the 
existence of serotonin in tricyclic antidepressants, then to the working mechanism of 
blocking reuptake of serotonin to treat depression, and to the beginning of research on 
non-tricyclic agents for inhibiting serotonin reuptake, which was later called selective 
serotonin reuptake inhibitor. The dynamics involve an event sequence consisting of 
positive experimental outcomes spreading out [F3], creating positive expectations [F4], 
leading to more research projects [F6] which directly contribute to the knowledge 
development of the SSRI (selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors) field [F2].  
 




Product development phase (late 1960s  - late 1980s) 
Cycle analysis 
This period was characterized by the involvement of pharmaceutical companies in 
SSRI commercialization. Science advance achieved in the previous phase as well as 
great market demand helped facilitating the emergence of SSRI research. Previous 
antidepressants were found to have side effects and the market needs new alternative 
antidepressants with same effect but less side effects. All of these factors together 
attract researchers into SSRI development.   
One entrepreneurial cycle is identif ied in this period, indicated in event sequence: F1 
F5F4F6F1. Since the entrepreneurial cycle happens mainly within established 
pharmaceutical companies, we call it ‘corporate entrepreneurial cycle’. It is a direct 
result from the positive outcome of knowledge development. Positive research 
outcomes provide high expectancies and promises for pharmaceutical companies, 
which push them embark on entrepreneurial activities in terms of new business 
development [F1]. In order to promote the new drugs, both Astra and Eli Lilly had 
increased their expenditure on marketing [F6, F5]. The feedbacks from the market 
(either positively or negatively) affect the next step resource allocation strategies [F4], 
which would in turn increase or constrain the range of  pharmaceutical companies’ 
business activities [F1] (F1F5F4F6F1). The visual presentation of this cycle 
is shown in Figure AB.2. 
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Figure AB.2 The corporate entrepreneurial cycle in SSRI development  
What need to be noticed is that the entrepreneurial cycle in Zelmid’s  later phase 
presented a vicious circle, triggered by a negative feedback [-F4] that some patients 
with zimelidine treatment  were found to exhibit GuillainBarre syndrome [-F5]. This 
event forced Astra to withdraw all zelmid drugs from its market [-F5] and stopped its 
original plan into American market [-F1] (-F5-F4-F1).  The vicious circle led to 
quit of Astra from the Zelmid antidepressant market. Prozac quickly superseded 
Zelmid and became dominant in the market. 
Prozac’s marketing phase (1990s) 
Cycle analysis: 
This period is characterized by the establishment of a stable market environment as a 
result of previous entrepreneurial activities. The most developed system functions are 
entrepreneurial activities [F1], knowledge development [F2], knowledge diffusion 
[F3], guidance of the search [F4], market formation [F5] and resource mobilization 
[F6]. It is obvious that all the system functions have been developed except the support 
from advocacy coalitions [F7]. Prozac became the dominant SSRI drugs that were 
prescribed by psychiatrists. The rapid diffusion of SSRI was driven by a Rogers  (2010) 
adoption cycle: the effective of SSRI in treating depression was broadcasted by mass 
media [F3], leading to more people know and start to use Prozac drugs [F5] 
(F5F3F4F5). In light of the pivot position of market formation in this event 




Figure AB.3 The adoption cycle in SSRI development 
Two external events were found to play an important role in Prozac’s take-off: (1) at 
the end of 1970s, the Nixon administration changed the head of FAD and required 
harder and more costly drug approval procedures. “Around 1990, it was estimated that 
new FDA regulations and other hurdles to drug development meant that the cost of 
bringing a drug to market had rocketed to $300 million” (Healy, 2004). The effect was 
that it became harder for a new drug to enter the market.  As a result, for a long time, 
there was no new drug brought out onto the market, and Prozac was exactly one of the 
drugs to enter the market after many years (Pla & Ortt, 2008). The market thirst for 
new medications was dramatically fulf illed by Prozac, leading to Prozac’s fast 
diffusion. (2) The second critical external event was the reduced threshold to diagnose 
people as illness in the end of 1990s. As a result, previous non-illness who suffered 
from pressure and life problems was also defined with illness. This had created a 
stunning increase of market demand for antidepressant drugs, including Prozac.  
It is needed to point out that during the new antidepressant development process both 
Astra and Lilly pharmaceutical company chose to keep the clinical and lab 
experimental trials secret. It is obvious that both were using a patent protection strategy 
to protect their innovation benefits. 
Prozac maturity phase (2001 - ) 
Cycle analysis 
Two cycles became dominant in this period: (1) entrepreneurial cycle indicated from 
event sequence F1 F5F4F1 and (2) market-driven cycle, which is indicated from 
event sequence: F5 F6 F5. The most developed system functions in this period are 
market formation [F5], resource mobilization [F6], entrepreneurial activities [F1] and 
the guidance of the search [F4].  
The entrepreneurial cycle, shown in Figure AB.4, is initiated by the entrepreneurial 
activities of generic pharmaceutical companies, represented by Barr’s launching of the 
first generic fluoxetine [F1]. The quick market diffusion of Barr’s generic fluoxetine 
[F5] sent a promising signal to other companies [F4], which previously were not in 
generic fluoxetine market, to enter this market [F1] (F1 F5F4F1).  
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Figure AB.4 The entrepreneurial cycle in SSRI development 
The market-driven cycle is triggered by the September 11 traumatic event, after which 
increasing people were suffered from depression [F5]. The increased market demand 
attracted existing pharmaceutical companies to enhance marketing their own anti-
depressant drugs [F6], which in turn reinforce the formation of market demand [F5] 
(F5F6F5).  The visual presentation of the market-driven cycle can be referred to 
Figure AB.5. 
 
Figure AB.5 The market-driven cycle in SSRI development 
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Three external events have disturbed the development of SSRIs TIS in this period. (1) 
The 1984 Hatch Waxman act decreased the entry obstacles for generic companies to 
enter SSRIs market, which re-shaped the matured market environment and competition 
order, providing stimulus for entrepreneurial activities from generic companies. (2) The 
September 11 event created a bigger market for antidepressants drugs. (3) The long-
running campaign waged by Scientologist against Lilly’s Prozac induced higher 
production cost for Prozac. 
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Appendix C  
 
Supplementary information on Chapter 4  
 
Summary 
This appendix illustrates how we analyse the Teflon innovation process. Teflon, 
technically called polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE), is the plastic with slippery, inert, 
non-corrosive and heat-resistant characteristics, and is commonly used for non-stick 
coating for pans and other cookware. Teflon was discovered by accident, instead of 
purposefully planned results, which provides a good representation of the emergent 
process. In 1930 when DuPont and General Motors decided to cooperate in developing 
new refrigerant, nobody would have known a by-product material with slippery, non-
stick and heat-resistant characteristics would be discovered. Even, nobody would have 
said, “Let’s coat our cooking pans with this material and make a non-sticky cookware 
industry”. Yet, this is what Teflon technology exactly grew into: commonly used for 
non-stick coating for cookware and contributing to one of the world’s most slippery 
materials. Therefore, the Teflon case provides an excellent setting for examining the 
emergence of a technological innovation. Besides, the long history of Teflon provides a 
time range that enables the examination of how the process evolved over time. The 
historical data can be obtained from the internet. 
This appendix consists of four parts: (1) the chronological list of events in Teflon 
innovation; (2) coding Teflon innovation events into pre-defined categories (here we 
use Hekkert et al. (2007)’s seven system functions as a framework); (3) analysing the 
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AC.1 Chronological list of events in Teflon innovation 
Time By whom Events1 References 




Brought samples of two compounds to the Jackson 
Laboratory at Du Ponts Chambers Works in 
Deepwater, New Jersey. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
1930 GM, Du Pont, 
Kinetic Chemicals. 
GM and Du Pont formed a joint venture called 
Kinetic Chemicals. GM  wants to make use of Du 




Mid-1930s Kinetic Chemicals Isolated and tested a lot of CFCs and put the most 
promising ones (Freon 114) into mass production. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
 Kinetic Chemicals Kinetic had agreed to reserve its entire output of 
Freon 114 for Frigidaire. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
Late 1930s Du Pont Du Pont was looking for an equally effective 





1936 Plunkett Plunkett was hired and assigned to this project. (MIT, 2000) 
1936 Plunkett Plunkett worked on a new CFC that he hoped would 
be a good refrigerant. He synthesized it by reacting 
TFE with hydrochloric acid.  
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
1936 Plunkett and his 
assistant, Jack 
Rebok 
Prepared 100 pounds of TFE and stored it in 
pressure cylinders. To prevent an explosion or 




1938 Plunkett He discovered PTFE accidently. And he found very 
interesting characteristics of this substance. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
                                                                 
1
 The events data are completely literal texts from the internet. We do not want to change the original 
texts when we analyse. 
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1939 Plunkett He applied for a patent, which he assigned to 
















 Gen. Leslie Groves, 
director of the 
Manhattan project 
Chose Du Pont to design the separation plant. To 
make it work, the designers needed equipment that 
would stand up to the highly corrosive starting 
material, uranium hexafluoride gas. PTFE was just 
what they needed.   
(Funderburg, 
2000) 




  For security reasons PTFE was referred to by a code 
name, K416.  
(McKeen, 
2006) 
1941  The patent was granted. (Funderburg, 
2000) 
 Du Pont’s organic 
chemical’s 
department 
For about three years, Du Pont’s organic chemicals 
department experimented with ways to produce IFE, 
which is also known as TFE monomer, the raw 
material for PTFE. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
 Du Pont Plunkett and Rebok had produced small batches for 
laboratory use, but if PTFE was ever going to find a 
practical use and be produced commercially, the 
company would have to find a way to turn out TFE 
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 Organic group and 
Du Pont’s central 
R&D department 
When the organic group came up with a promising 
method, Du Pont’s central R&D department began 
looking into possible polymerization processes. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
 Chemist Rober M. 
Joyce 
 Found a feasible but costly procedure for 
spontaneous polymerization of TFE  
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
 Du Pont’s 
applications group 
Began identifying the properties of PTFE that would 
be useful in industry. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
1944  The Arlington production unit was wrecked by an 
explosion one night in 1944. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
 Army, FBI, Du 
Pont chemists 
they found that the explosion had been caused by 
uncontrolled, spontaneous polymerization 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
 Manhattan project Consumed about two-thirds of Arlington’s PTFE 
output, and the remainder was used for other 
military applications. Such as nose cones of 




  When the Army needed tape two-thousandths of an 
inch thick to wrap copper wires in the radar systems 
of night bombers, it was painstakingly shaved off a 
solid block of PTFE at a cost of $100 per pound. 
The high cost was justified because PTFE did a job 
nothing else could do. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
1945 Du Pont Go ahead with commercializing PTFE, since its 




1945 Du Pont Registered the trademark Teflon, TFE. The new 
substance was an ideal fit for Du Pont’s traditional 
marketing strategy, which was to shun the 
manufacture of commodity plastics and specialize in 





 DuPont Other materials with some of Teflon’s properties 
were available, but none were as comprehensively 
resistant to corrosion, and none of the lubricants or 
low-friction materials then in use was anywhere near 
as durable or maintenance-free. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
1946 DuPont The Teflon® trademark was coined by DuPont and 
registered in 1945; the first products were sold 




 Du Pont Faced significant obstacles before it could produce 
large amounts of Teflon uniformly and 
economically. The properties of the product varied 
significantly from batch to batch. And nearly every 
step of the manufacturing process raised problems 
that no chemical manufacturer had faced before. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
 Du Pont After the synthesis was completed, fabricating 
Teflon into useful articles raised another set of 
difficulties. Its melting point was so high that it 
could not be moulded or extruded by conventional 
methods. Another problem was how you make the 




 DuPont Du Pont chemists also developed fluorocarbon 
resins that would stick to both Teflon and metal 
surfaces. And of course, sheets of Teflon could be 
attached to other items with screws, bolts, clamps, 
and other mechanical fasteners. 
(Paucka, 
2006) 
By 1948 DuPont By 1948 Du Pont had made enough progress to 
prepare for full-scale production. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
1950 DuPont First commercial Teflon plant, designed to produce 




1950 Du Pont Du Pont stepped up its efforts to market Teflon for (Funderburg, 
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industrial applications. 2000) 
1950 Du Pont To help users understand the polymer’s unusual 
properties and tricky fabrication requirements, Du 
Pont sent out a team of scientists to advise 
customers on integrating Teflon into their 
production processes. Members of the research, 




1951 DuPont Teflon was also being used in commercial food 




1951 DuPont  Teflon-lined bread pans and muffin tins became 
standard equipment in many bakeries. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
1951 DuPont Du Pont saw the potential for expansion in this field 
but decided to proceed slowly. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
1953 DuPont Du Pont television commercial advertisement. (Funderburg, 
2000) 
As late as 
1960s 
Du Pont Du Pont sold less than 10 million pounds of Teflon 
per year, with receipts of a piddling $28 million, 
because some toxic fumes will be given off by 
overheated Teflon pans. Expanding consumer uses 
would be the key to boosting sales, but Du Pont had 
to convince itself that Teflon was harmless before 
selling it to the housewives of America 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
1954 Marc Gregoire Heard about Teflon from a colleague, who had 
devised a way to affix a thin layer of it to aluminium 









1954 His wife, Colette Had an idea, why not coat her cooking pans? 




enough to be granted a patent in 1954. 2000) 
1955 Gregoires couple They set up a business in their home.  (Funderburg, 
2000) 
1956 Gregoires couple Encourages by this reception, the couple formed the 
Tefal corporation in May 1956 and opened a factory. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
1956 DuPont DuPont recognizes the potential of Teflon® for 
cookware as well, and begins the process of gaining 
approval from the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) for its use in consumer 





1956 Du Pont Tested frying pans and other cooking surfaces under 
conditions even more rigorous than those used in 
France. Du Pont’s researchers concluded that 
utensils coated with Teflon were unquestionably 
safe for both domestic and commercial cooking. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
1956 France’s Conseil 
Superieur de 
I’Hygiene publique 
Officially cleared Teflon for use on frying pans. (Funderburg, 
2000) 
1956 The Laboratoire 
Municipale de Paris 
and the École 
Supérieur de 
Physique et Chimie 
Also declared that Teflon-coated cookware 
presented no health hazard. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
1958 The French 
ministry of 
agriculture 
Approved the use of Teflon in food processing. (Funderburg, 
2000) 
1958 Gregoires Sold one million items from their factory. (Funderburg, 
2000) 
1958 Bill Gore Decided to commit himself to his own innovations 
and left DuPont. On January 1958, he and his wife 
Gore founded a small PTFE company out of the 
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Associates. 
1958 Gore In the company’s early years, Gore discovered how 
to apply PTFE tape to insulate wire and cable. These 
products were in high demand by the mainframe 
manufacturers of a fledgling computer industry. 
(Gore & 
Associates) 
1957 Thomas G. Hardie Trip to France, met Marc Gregoire at a party. The 
Frenchman enthusiastically told Hardie about his 
business and the factory he was building in a Paris 
suburb. Hardie was intrigued by Gregoire’s tale of 
the fast-selling cookware. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
 Thomas G. Hardie He decided that the popular French pans would sell 
in the US too. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
 Thomas G. Hardie Went back to Paris to meet with Gregoire, who was 
reluctant to do business with an American because 
he didn’t trust Yankees. But Hardie was very 




 Thomas G. Hardie With visions of quick success, he went back to US 
with the rights to manufacture non-stick cookware 
using Tefal’s process. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
1958-1959 Thomas G. Hardie Called on many American cookware manufacturers, 
trying to persuade them to make Teflon-coated pans. 
He had no success because the idea of non-stick 
pans was simply too new. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
 Thomas G. Hardie He asked the French factory to ship him 3,000 Tefal 
pans, which he warehoused in a barn on his sheep 
farm in Mary land. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
 Thomas G. Hardie He sent free sample pans, along with promotional 
literature, to housewares buyers at 200 department 
stores. Not one of them placed an order. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
 Thomas G. Hardie , Hardie met with an executive at Du Pont in 




Du Pont executive executive that cookware could be a valuable new 
market. 
2000) 




 Thomas G. Hardie Agreed to market his imported French pans under 
the name T-fal. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
 Du Pont A salesman was assigned to accompany Hardie on a 
visit to Macy’s in New York City  
(Funderburg, 
2000) 




1960 Gregoires The sales approached the three million mark. (Funderburg, 
2000) 
1960 Du Pont Gave the FDA four volumes of data, collected over 




1960 FDA FDA decided that the resins did not present any 
problems under the food additives amendment. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
1960 Du Pont Despite the favourable FDA decision, Du Pont 
continued to move slowly, since marketing Teflon-
coated cookware was not a high priority. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
1960 Macy’s Herald 
Square store 
A severe snowstorm, the T-fal “Satisfy” skillets 
went on sale for $6.94. The pans quickly sold out. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
1960 Hardie, Horchow Made his second sale when he telephoned Roger 




 Horchow Agreed to test a sample skillet even though his store 
didn’t have a housewares department. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
 Horchow, Helen 
Corbit, a cookbook 
Gave the skillet to Helen Corbitt, a cookbook editor (Funderburg, 
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editor. who ran a popular cooking school in Dallas. 2000) 
 Corbitt He loved it, prompting Neiman Marcus to place a 
large order and run a half-page newspaper 




 Hardie The news spread to other department, buyers 
jumped on the non-stick bandwagon, and Hardie 
was swamped with orders. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
 Hardie The inventory in Hardie’s barn was quickly 
exhausted. He phoned France daily to ask for more 
pans, but the French plant couldn’t work fast enough 
to supply both sides of the Atlantic. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
 Hardie Flew to France to press his case with Gregoire. He 
even lent Tefal $50,000 to expand its facilities, but it 
still could not meet the American demand. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
1960 DuPont FEP (the family of Teflon® fluoropolymers ) was 
introduced 
(Anonymous) 
1961 A magazine In New York, a magazine publishes a photo of a 
“rich and famous” lady buying a Tefal frying pan at 
Macy’s. American orders soar to 7,500 pans a week. 
(Tafal, 2011) 
Mid 1961 Hardie To cope with the avalanche of orders, which reached 
a million pans per month in mid-1961, Hardie built 






Several major American cookware companies 
decided to start making Teflon pans. The market 





Because they had no experience with Teflon 
coatings, much of it was inferior to the French 






1961  Just as quickly as the U.S. demand for non-stick 
pans had soared, it plummeted and warehouses were 
filled with unsold stock. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 




1961 Du Pont’s 
managers 
Despite the problems with early Teflon cookware, 
DuPont's managers still believed that it had 




1961 Du Pont, 
consumers, 
professionals in the 
cookware business 
Six thousand consumers, along with professionals in 
the cookware business, were asked what was wrong 
with Teflon products.  
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
1961 Du Pont Du Pont knew that cookware could be more than 
just a way to sell lots of Teflon. It could also be an 
invaluable marketing tool, a vehicle to familiarize 
vast numbers of consumers with Teflon and its 
properties. Conversely, low-quality merchandise 
could only harm the product’s reputation. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
1968 Du Pont As a result the company established coating 
standards for manufacturers and initiated a 
certification program, complete with an official seal 
of approval for Teflon kitchenware. To verify 
compliance with its standards, Du Pont performed 
more than 500 tests per month on cookware at its 
Marshall Laboratories in Philadelphia. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
mid-1960s Du Pont, customers The Du Pont certification program was so successful 
that a marketing survey in the mid-1960s found that 
81 percent of homemakers who had purchased non-
stick pans were pleased with them. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
1968 Du Pont By 1968 Du Pont had developed Teflon II, which 
not only prevented food from sticking to the pans 
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1968 French Tefal is France’s No. 1 manufacturer of cookware 
with sales of FF59 MILLION. It is acquired by the 
French domestic appliances company, SEB. 
(Tefal) 
1960-70s  As Teflon became better known to consumers, 
rumours began to circulate that it was unsafe 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
1960-70s Du Pont Whenever one of these false reports came to Du 
Pont’s attention, the company demanded a published 
retraction. It also published a booklet called The 
Anatomy of a Rumour that summarized the results 
of research carried out at Du Pont and elsewhere. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
1970 National magazines Many national magazines printed articles about the 
new products. Most discussed the safety issue, and 
several mentioned the rumours, but none gave any 
credence to the gossip. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
1970 Du Pont DuPont introduces two new melt processable 
fluoropolymers. 
(Teng, 2012) 
1970 Du Pont Tefzel, ETFE (DuPont) 
1972 Du Pont PFA (DuPont) 
1973 Consumer Reports Still receive mails on old bugaboo about non-stick, 
prompting the editors to publish yet another article 
emphasizing that they knew of no consumer 
illnesses resulting from non-stick cookware in 
ordinary home use. 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
1976 Du Pont  DuPont sought fluorocarbon polymers that would 
provide even greater non-stick performance and 
scratch resistance, achieving success in 1976 with 
the introduction of Silverstone®, a three-coat system 




1978 Du Pont Patent new fluoropolymer technology for very high-





1979 Du Pont DuPont also develops two- and three-coat reinforced 
non-stick coating systems that provide improved 
scratch and abrasion resistance on cookware 
(Whitford, 
2010) 
1984 Du Pont “Another improvement in non-stick coatings 




1985 Du Pont “Du Pont registered another variant of Teflon in 
1985, Teflon AF, which is soluble in special 
solvents.” 
(Made How) 
1985 Plunkett Dr. Plunkett was inducted into the Plastics Hall of 
Fame in 1973, and in 1985, the National Inventors 
Hall of Fame.” 
(Funderburg, 
2000) 
1986 Du Pont Silverstone Supra was introduced to the cookware 
market in 1986 
(Coy, 1986) 
1988 Du Pont DuPont has presented the Plunkett Award each year 
since 1988 to innovative customers and partners 




1989 W. L. Gore & 
Associates 
“GORE-TEX® is a registered trademark and the 
best-known product of W. L. Gore & Associates, 
Inc. The trademarked product was introduced in 
1989.” 
(Wikepedia) 
1990 U.S. National 
Medal of 
Technology 
DuPont receives the U.S. National Medal of 
Technology from President George H.W. Bush in 
1990 for the company’s role in the development and 
commercialization of high-performance, man-made 
polymers, including fluoropolymers.” 
(Wikepedia) 
2004 DuPont DuPont settled for $300 million in a 2004 lawsuit 
filed by residents near its manufacturing plant in 
Ohio and West Virginia based on groundwater 
pollution from this chemical.  
(Anonymous; 
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Found in 2005 that perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), 
a chemical compound used to make Teflon, is a 
"likely carcinogen 







AC.2 Coding Teflon innovation events into pre-defined categories2 
Events3 Year F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 
Brought samples of two compounds to the Jackson 




  1     
GM and Du Pont formed a joint venture called Kinetic 
Chemicals. GM wants to make use of Du Pont’s 
expertise in manufacturing and research and 
development. 
1930 1  1    1 
Isolated and tested a lot of CFCs and put the most 
promising ones (Freon 114) into mass production. 
Mid-
1930s 
 1      
Kinetic had agreed to reserve its entire output of Freon 
114 for Frigidaire. 
    1  1  
Du Pont was looking for an equally effective refrigerant 
that it could sell to other manufacturers. 
Late 
1930s 
 1      
Plunkett was hired and assigned to this project. 1936      1  
Plunkett worked on a new CFC that he hoped would be a 
good refrigerant. He synthesised it by reacting TFE with 
hydrochloric acid.  
1936  1      
Prepared 100 pounds of TFE and stored it in pressure 
cylinders. To prevent an explosion or rupture of the 
cylinder, they kept the canisters in dry ice. 
1936  1      
Plunkett discovered PTFE accidently. And he found very 
interesting characteristics of this substance 
1938  1  1    
He applied for a patent, which he assigned to Kinetic 
Chemicals on PTFE. 
1939  1    1  
WWII gave a large boost to the development of PTFE. 1940    1    
Faced a problem of separating the isotope U-235 from U-
238. 
1940    1    
                                                                 
2
 The coding scheme can be found in AA.2. 
3
 The “Events” are the same events in AC.1. For references, please refer to AC.1. 
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Chose Du Pont to design the separation plant. To make it 
work, the designers needed equipment that would stand 
up to the highly corrosive starting material, uranium 
hexafluoride gas. PTFE was just what they needed.   
1940 1   1    
Du Pont agreed to reserve its entire output for 
government use. 
    1  1  
For security reasons PTFE was referred to by a code 
name, K416.  
   -1     
The patent was granted. 1941    1  1  
For about three years, Du Pont’s organic chemicals 
department experimented with ways to produce IFE, 
which is also known as TFE monomer, the raw material 
for PTFE. 
  1      
Plunkett and Rebok had produced small batches for 
laboratory use, but if PTFE was ever going to find a 
practical use and be produced commercially, the 
company would have to find a way to turn out TFE 
monomer in industrial quantities. 
  1      
When the organic group came up with a promising 
method, Du Pont’s central R&D department began 
looking into possible polymerization processes. 
  1 1     
Chemist Rober M. Joyce found a feasible but costly 
procedure for spontaneous polymerization of TFE 
  1      
Began identifying the properties of PTFE that would be 
useful in industry. 
  1  1    
The Arlington production unit was wrecked by an 
explosion one night in 1944. 
1944      -1  
they found that the explosion had been caused by 
uncontrolled, spontaneous polymerization 
  1  1    
Consumed about two-thirds of Arlington’s PTFE output, 
and the remainder was used for other military 
applications. Such as nose cones of proximity bombs, 
airplane engines and in explosive manufacturing. 
    1    
When the Army needed tape two-thousandths of an inch 
thick to wrap copper wires in the radar systems of night 
    1 1   
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bombers, it was painstakingly shaved off a solid block of 
PTFE at a cost of $100 per pound. The high cost was 
justified because PTFE did a job nothing else could do. 
Go ahead with commercializing PTFE, since its manifold 
military uses had shown its great industrial potential. 
1945    1 1   
Registered the trademark Teflon, TFE.  1945     1   
The Teflon® trademark was coined by DuPont and 
registered in 1945; the first products were sold 
commercially under the trademark beginning in 1946 
1946     1 1  
Faced significant obstacles before it could produce large 
amounts of Teflon uniformly and economically.  
  1      
After the synthesis was completed, fabricating Teflon 
into useful articles raised another set of difficulties.  
  1      
Du Pont chemists also developed fluorocarbon resins that 
would stick to both Teflon and metal surfaces. And of 
course, sheets of Teflon could be attached to other items 
with screws, bolts, clamps, and other mechanical 
fasteners. 
  1      
By 1948 Du Pont had made enough progress to prepare 
for full-scale production. 
By 
1948 
    1   
First commercial Teflon plant, designed to produce a 
million pounds a year, went on line at the Washington 
Works. 
1950     1   
Du Pont stepped up its efforts to market Teflon for 
industrial applications. 
1950     1 1  
To help users understand the polymer’s unusual 
properties and tricky fabrication requirements, Du Pont 
sent out a team of scientists to advise customers on 
integrating Teflon into their production processes. 
Members of the research, manufacturing, and sales staff 
met regularly to compare notes. 
1950   1  1   
Teflon was also being used in commercial food 
processing, like bread manufacturing, in candy factories. 
1951  1   1   
 Teflon-lined bread pans and muffin tins became standard 1951    1 1   
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equipment in many bakeries. 
Du Pont saw the potential for expansion in this field but 
decided to proceed slowly. 
1951    1    
Du Pont television commercial advertisement. 1953     1   
Du Pont sold less than 10 million pounds of Teflon per 
year, with receipts of a piddling $28 million, because 
some toxic fumes will be given off by overheated Teflon 
pans. Expanding consumer uses would be the key to 
boosting sales, but Du Pont had to convince itself that 





   1 1   
Heard about Teflon from a colleague, who had devised a 
way to affix a thin layer of it to aluminium for industrial 
applications. 
1954   1     
Decided to coat his fishing gear with Teflon to prevent 
tangles. 
1954 1 1      
Had an idea, why not coat her cooking pans? Gregoire 
agreed to try it, and he was successful enough to be 
granted a patent in 1954. 
1954 1       
They set up a business in their home.  1955 1    1   
Encourages by this reception, the couple formed the 
Tefal corporation in May 1956 and opened a factory. 
1956 1       
DuPont recognizes the potential of Teflon® for cookware 
as well, and begins the process of gaining approval from 
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for its use 
in consumer cooking and food processing. 
1956   1 1    
Tested frying pans and other cooking surfaces under 
conditions even more rigorous than those used in France. 
Du Pont’s researchers concluded that utensils coated with 
Teflon were unquestionably safe for both domestic and 
commercial cooking. 
1956  1      
Officially cleared Teflon for use on frying pans. 1956    1    
Also declared that Teflon-coated cookware presented no 
health hazard. 
1956    1    
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Approved the use of Teflon in food processing. 1958    1    
Sold one million items from their factory. 1958     1   
Decided to commit himself to his own innovations and 
left DuPont. On January 1958, he and his wife Gore 
founded a small PTFE company out of the basement of 
his home, called W.L.GORE & Associates. 
1958 1       
In the company’s early years, Gore discovered how to 
apply PTFE tape to insulate wire and cable.  
1958  1      
Trip to France, met Marc Gregoire at a party on the Left 
Bank. The Frenchman enthusiastically told Hardie about 
his business and the factory he was building in a Paris 
suburb. Hardie was intrigued by Gregoire’s tale of the 
fast-selling cookware. 
1957 1  1     
He decided that the popular French pans would sell in the 
US too. 
 1       
Went back to Paris to meet with Gregoire, who was 
reluctant to do business with an American because he 
didn’t trust Yankees. But Hardie was very persuasive and 
eventually won Gregoire’s confidence. 
   1    1 
With visions of quick success, he went back to US with 
the rights to manufacture non-stick cookware using 
Tefal’s process. 
   1     
Called on many American cookware manufacturers, 
trying to persuade them to make Teflon-coated pans. He 
had no success because the idea of non-stick pans was 
simply too new. 
1958-
1959 
      1 
He cabled the French factory to ship him 3,000 Tefal 
pans, which he warehoused in a barn on his sheep farm in 
Mary land. 
   1     
He sent free sample pans, along with promotional 
literature, to housewares buyers at 200 department stores. 
Not one of them placed an order. 
    -1 1   
Hardie met with an executive at Du Pont in Wilmington, 
Delaware. He was able to convince the executive that 
cookware could be a valuable new market. 
 1  1    1 
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Refused the name Tefal, because it was too close to 
Teflon. 
    1    
Agreed to market his imported French pans under the 
name T-fal. 
   1 1   1 
A salesman was assigned to accompany Hardie on a visit 
to Macy’s in New York City  
   1    1 
A buyer named George Edelstein placed a small order. 
Hardie was so excited that he sent a victory cable to the 
French factory. 
    1 1   
The sales approached the three million mark. 1960    1    
Gave the FDA four volumes of data, collected over nine 
years, on the effects of Teflon resins in food handling. 
1960  1    1  
FDA decided that the resins did not present any problems 
under the food additives amendment. 
1960    1    
Despite the favourable FDA decision, Du Pont continued 
to move slowly, since marketing Teflon-coated cookware 
was not a high priority. 
1960    1    
A severe snowstorm, the T-fal “Satisfy” skillets went on 
sale for $6.94. The pans quickly sold out. 
1960    1 1   
Made his second sale when he telephoned Roger 
Horchow, a buyer for the Dallas department store 
Neiman Marcus. 
1960   1  1  1 
Agreed to test a sample skillet even though his store 
didn’t have a housewares department. 
     1   
Gave the skillet to Helen Corbitt, a cookbook editor who 
ran a popular cooking school in Dallas. 
   1     
He loved it, prompting Neiman Marcus to place a large 
order and run a half-page newspaper advertisement. The 
store sold 2,000 skillets in a week. 
    1 1   
The news spread to other department, buyers jumped on 
the non-stick bandwagon, and Hardie was swamped with 
orders. 
   1 1    
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The inventory in Hardie’s barn was quickly exhausted. 
He phoned France daily to ask for more pans, but the 
French plant couldn’t work fast enough to supply both 
sides of the Atlantic. 
    -1    
Flew to France to press his case with Gregoire. He even 
lent Tefal $50,000 to expand its facilities, but it still 
could not meet the American demand. 
    -1  1  
FEP (the family of Teflon® fluoropolymers ) was 
introduced 
1960  1      
In New York, a magazine publishes a photo of a “rich 
and famous” lady buying a Tefal frying pan at Macy’s. 
American orders soar to 7,500 pans a week. 
1961   1 1 1   
To cope with the avalanche of orders, which reached a 
million pans per month in mid-1961, Hardie built his 
own factory in Timonium, Maryland. 
Mid 
1961 
1       
Several major American cookware companies decided to 
start making Teflon pans. The market was saturated with 
non-stick cookware. 
1961 1       
Because they had no experience with Teflon coatings, 
much of it was inferior to the French product, and non-
stick pans soon acquired a bad name. 
1961  -1      
Just as quickly as the U.S. demand for non-stick pans had 
soared, it plummeted and warehouses were filled with 
unsold stock. 
1961    -1    
Sold his factory and focused on his family’s business. 1961 -1       
Despite the problems with early Teflon cookware, 
DuPont's managers still believed that it had enormous 
potential. So the company commissioned some research. 
1961    1    
Six thousand consumers, along with professionals in the 
cookware business, were asked what was wrong with 
Teflon products.  
1961     1   
Du Pont knew that cookware could be more than just a 
way to sell lots of Teflon. It could also be an invaluable 
marketing tool, a vehicle to familiarize vast numbers of 
consumers with Teflon and its properties. Conversely, 
low-quality merchandise could only harm the product’s 
1961    1    
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reputation. 
As a result the company established coating standards for 
manufacturers and initiated a certification program, 
complete with an official seal of approval for Teflon 
kitchenware. To verify compliance with its standards, Du 
Pont performed more than 500 tests per month on 
cookware at its Marshall Laboratories in Philadelphia. 
1968  1  1    
The Du Pont certification program was so successful that 
a marketing survey in the mid-1960s found that 81 
percent of homemakers who had purchased non-stick 
pans were pleased with them. 
mid-
1960s 
   1    
By 1968 Du Pont had developed Teflon II, which not 
only prevented food from sticking to the pans but was 
also (supposedly) scratch-resistant. 
1968  1      
Tefal is France’s No. 1 manufacturer of cookware with 
sales of FF59 MILLION. It is acquired by the French 
domestic appliances company, SEB. 
1968    1    
As Teflon became better known to consumers, rumours 
began to circulate that it was unsafe 
1960-
70s 
   -1    
Whenever one of these false reports came to Du Pont’s 
attention, the company demanded a published retraction. 
It also published a booklet called The Anatomy of a 
Rumour that summarized the results of research carried 
out at Du Pont and elsewhere. 
1960-
70s 
    1 1  
Many national magazines printed articles about the new 
products. Most discussed the safety issue, and several 
mentioned the rumours, but none gave any credence to 
the gossip. 
1970    -1    
DuPont introduces two new melt processable 
fluoropolymers. 
1970  1      
Tefzel, ETFE 1970  1      
PFA 1972  1      
Still receive mails on old bugaboo about non-stick, 
prompting the editors to publish yet another article 
emphasizing that they knew of no consumer illnesses 
resulting from non-stick cookware in ordinary home use. 
1973    -1    
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DuPont sought fluorocarbon polymers that would 
provide even greater non-stick performance and scratch 
resistance, achieving success in 1976 with the 
introduction of Silverstone®, a three-coat system that set 
a new standard for durability and performance. 
1976  1      
Patent new fluoropolymer technology for very high-
speed data communications cables 
1978  1      
DuPont also develops two- and three-coat reinforced 
non-stick coating systems that provide improved scratch 
and abrasion resistance on cookware 
1979  1      
“Another improvement in non-stick coatings occurred in 
1984 with the development of Silverstone® SUPRA” 
1984  1      
“Du Pont registered another variant of Teflon in 1985, 
Teflon AF, which is soluble in special solvents.” 
1985  1      
Dr. Plunkett was inducted into the Plastics Hall of Fame 
in 1973, and in 1985, the National Inventors Hall of 
Fame.” 
1985    1    
Silverstone Supra was introduced to the cookware market 
in 1986 
1986 1 1   1   
DuPont has presented the Plunkett Award each year since 
1988 to innovative customers and partners who develop 
unique, sustainable applications for fluoroplymers 
1988    1  1  
“GORE-TEX® is a registered trademark and the best-
known product of W. L. Gore & Associates, Inc. The 
trademarked product was introduced in 1989.” 
1989 1   1    
DuPont receives the U.S. National Medal of Technology 
from President George H.W. Bush in 1990 for the 
company’s role in the development and 
commercialization of high-performance, man-made 
polymers, including fluoropolymers.” 
1990    1  1  
DuPont settled for $300 million in a 2004 lawsuit filed 
by residents near its manufacturing plant in Ohio and 
West Virginia based on groundwater pollution from this 
chemical.  
2004    -1  1  
perfluorooctanoic acid is a likely carcinogen 2005    -1    
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AC.3 Analysing the interaction patterns between events 
The time period during which the development of Teflon is analysed starts in the late 
1930s and ends by 1990. The history of Teflon technology development can be divided 
into five discrete periods: (1) invention (1930s-1938); (2) military application (1939-
1944); (3) industrial application (1944-1953); (4) household application (1954-1968) 
and (5) market maturity (1969-1980s). Figure AC.1 visualizes the timeline of Teflon 
innovation process, where the pentagon refers to milestone events in Teflon innovation, 
and the whole process was divided into five phases as illustrated at the top of the 
figure. The red pentagon represents critical crisis which postponed or deviated Teflon 
innovation from the main trajectory, while the green one indicates the events which 
help push Teflon innovation into the next developmental phase. 
 
Figure AC.1. Timeline of Teflon innovation process 
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Phase I: Invention (1930 - 1938) 
The reciprocal conditioning between scientific research and positive research outcomes 
helped drive the emergence of a scientific group focusing on the exploration of the 
chemical properties of the new material. This feedback loop involves continuous 
research activities [F2] leading to positive experimental results, which provide high 
expectancy for the new technology [F4], leading to continuous resource allocation [F6] 
to further knowledge development [F2]. The re-enforcing cycle that starts from 
knowledge development [F2], going through guidance of the search [F4], resource 
mobilization [F6], and finally goes back to enhance further knowledge development 
[F2] indicates a positive feedback loop which amplif ies the accident discovery of 
Teflon, as shown in Figure AC.2. 
In this period, the majority of activities were focusing on scientific research and 
development of the newly discovered material. The knowledge development function 
then dominated the system. Given the significance of knowledge development 
function, it is reasonable to call the cycle a technological cycle.  
 
Figure AC.2. Technological cycle in phase I 
Phase II: Military application in war time (1939 - 1944) 
The main source of dynamics in this period is the Second World War. The feedback 
loop involves “mutual causation” (Chiles, Meyer, & Hench, 2004, p.509)between 
system functions of market formation [F5], entrepreneurial activities [F1], resource 
allocation [F6], knowledge development [F2], and guidance of the search [F4] 
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(F5F1F6F2F4 F5, as shown in Figure AC.3). The World War II served as 
the first niche market for PTFE in terms of military application as anti-corrosive 
material in Manhattan project [F5]. The government supported programmes were 
established with DuPont [F1]. The financial resources were granted by the government 
in the form of project findings [F6]. Using these findings, technological development 
activities were carried out to fulfil the requirements of military use [F2]. Successful 
fulfilment of these programmes created positive expectations and promises [F4] and 
led to the expansion of PTFE into other military uses [F5]. This self-reinforcing cycle 
brought wide range of technological developments and applications in the military 
market, which matches complexity theory arguments that “positive feedback processes 
drive system toward increasing diversity” (cf., Chiles et al., 2004, p 510).  
Given the signif icant role of market formation function in initiating and stimulating the 
re-enforcing cycle, it is reasonable to call it a market-driven cycle. The activities in this 
period are attracted around market formation in military field.  
 
Figure AC.3. Market-driven cycle in Phase II 
Phase C: Industrial application after war (1944 - 1953) 
The positive feedback loop involves mutual causations between entrepreneurial 
activities and market formation; and between entrepreneurial activities and 
technological development. Considering Teflon’s satisfactory performance in the 
military market, DuPont decided to continue with the industrial market [F1]. Following 
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this decision, technological improvement and adjustment to catering industrial 
requirements were carried out [F2]. At the same time, marketing activities w ere 
enhanced by DuPont to persuade industrial customers to accept the new material [F5]. 
All of these led to market growth [F4], which in turn reinforced the entrepreneurial 
activities [F1] in terms of new market applications. Therefore, the feedback loops  are 
two parallel ones: F1F2F4F1 and F1F5F4F1, as shown in Figure AC.4. 
It is interesting to note that the activities were no longer supported by government 
programmes, but by DuPont itself. 
The dominant behaviour regime in this period is characterized by active initiations by 
firms from the supply-side of the innovation system, in contrast with the foregoing 
market-driven cycle. The underlying cycle is formed by the entrepreneurial decisions 
of DuPont. Therefore, we call it entrepreneurial regime; and the cycle as 
entrepreneurial cycle. 
 
Figure AC.4. Entrepreneurial cycle in phase III 
Phase IV: Household application (1954 - 1968) 
There are two positive feedback loops: the re-enforcing relationship between the 
entrepreneurial activities and market formation and between entrepreneurial activities 
and resource allocation played an important role in the emergence of Teflon’s 
cookware market. The main enactors in this period were individual entrepreneurs, e.g., 
Gregoire who established the first Teflon pan Company, and Hardie who introduced 
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Teflon-coated pans from Europe in the U.S. market. The pivot is looking for 
cooperation and required resources [F6] through continuous lobbying (to government 
or to potential business partners) [F7] (F1F7F6F1). On the other side, with 
resources, entrepreneurs are able to market and diffuse the Teflon pan [F5], thereby 
providing pos itive expectations [F4] and attracting companies, many of which were 
previously outsiders to the Teflon-coated pan business. By entering this market, these 
companies boosted entrepreneurial activities [F1] (F1F5F4F1). These feedback 
loops are shown in Figure AC.5. These self-reinforcing cycles drive a quick expansion 
of Teflon in the cooking pan market.  
Given the centrality of the entrepreneurial activities in the cyclical pattern, it is 
reasonable to name the cycle in this period the “entrepreneurial cycle”. The difference 
between this entrepreneurial cycle and the one in the previous phase is that small 
entrepreneurial companies became the dominant actors in the later period, instead of 
the big company DuPont. Due to different actors, the system functions within the 
feedback loops also differ. Entrepreneurial cycles by DuPont were supported by a 
mechanism of top-down resource allocation. But entrepreneurial cycles were initiated 
by small firms that have to follow a resource searching event sequence constructed by 
support from advocacy coalitions and resource mobilization. Besides, there are 
different forms of reinforced entrepreneurial activities. DuPont’s entrepreneurial cycle 
boosted DuPont’s new business expansion. But the small firms’ entrepreneurial cycle 
attracted new entries of firms that were previously outsider in this market. 
 
Figure AC.5. Positive feedback loops in phase IV 
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Phase IV: Market maturity (1954 - 1968) 
There is one positive feedback loop in this phase: market responses [F5] leading to 
high expectations [F4], which directly fed back on continuous financial support [F6] 
for developing new generations of Teflon [F2]. This further improved performance and 
increased market demand [F5]. This positive feedback loop is visualized in Figure 
AC.6. This self-reinforcing cycle drives the emergence of an established institutional 
structure. 
Notably, positive feedback loops do not always lead to positive results. When Teflon 
was plagued by a safety rumor, the system function F4 became a negative signal which 
led to a negative outcome of system function F6 in terms of decreasing market demand 
(-F4-F6). The set of activities carried out by DuPont, such as public retraction, 
publishing research results, aimed at re-gaining a positive guidance function [F4], 
which would reverse the effect of the loop. 
 
Figure AC.6. Positive feedback loop in phase V 
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The innovation process remains a fascinating topic to study. Moreover, it is highly 
relevant to study this process because: (1) managerially, innovation processes are 
critical in determining a country’s economic growth, a firm’s success and people’s 
living standard; and (2) theoretically, innovation processes are inherently dynamic 
phenomena that require dynamic theories for their understanding.  
However, a good understanding of the dynamics of innovation processes, explaining 
how and why innovations evolve over time, is still missing. Technological innovation 
is a multi-level phenomenon, but existing theories focus either on the micro-level 
operational details or on the macro-level aggregate trends. These theories miss a 
systematic view on innovation processes, which leads to an inadequate understanding 
of technological innovation dynamics.  
The limited understanding of the dynamics of innovation processes makes decision 
making on innovation difficult. Decision makers, such as innovation policy makers and 
innovation managers, do not have an advanced and realistic process theory to guide 
them through the innovation processes.  
Modelling the dynamics of innovation processes in order to obtain an advanced process 
theory is difficult because the empirical basis for innovation process theories requires 
large amounts of data. The collection of this data is a difficult and labour-intensive 
undertaking. 
But now, with the development of the internet and computer technology, the large 
amounts of data can be captured and recorded much more easily and cheaply. This 
means we can re-consider the actual innovation processes. The availability of large 
amounts of data enables us to get down to the details underlying the innovation 
processes and to investigate patterns required to provide adequate decision support.  
With this background, the research explores the following Problem Statement: 
To what extent can the new available big amounts of data be used to improve 
decision making on innovations? 
From the above Problem Statement, we derived four research questions. 
Research Question 1: Is it possible to develop a data-driven modelling method for 
studying innovation processes? 
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Research Question 2: Is it possible to form an advanced model that is able to combine 
the seemingly contradictory models, namely the linear innovation model and the 
cyclical innovation model?  
Research Question 3: What does emergence mean? And what is the underlying 
mechanism that drives the emergence of technological innovations? 
Research Question 4: Is it possible to simulate the emergent process of innovation so 
as to provide decision support for innovation managers and policy makers? 
In order to address the above research questions, we draw on a theoretical framework 
of innovation system functions and focus on the interaction patterns between these 
functions. Functions refer to activities that are involved in an innovation process, rather 
than actors. Hence, focussing on functions provides a dynamic approach to modelling. 
We show how these functions can be used to track what actually happens over time in 
innovation processes.  
Next to the theoretical foundation, we use three in-depth case studies. Their 
identification is: (1) the Nylon case, (2) the SSRI case, and (3) the Teflon case. All of 
these three cases are well-documented. The historical data is obtained from the internet, 
relevant books and scientific publications. 
Below we give a brief summary of each chapter. 
Chapter 1 gives a brief introduction to the motivation of this research. It describes the 
importance of innovation and the difficulty of decision making on innovations. The 
recent availability of large amounts of data is emphasised, which may lead to more 
effective decision making on innovations. 
Chapter 2 answers RQ1. This chapter provides a new data-driven modelling method 
for innovation process studies. The method aims at taking advantage of the fast 
development of Internet and digital data sources to develop a more advanced process 
theory. We overcome the trade-off in the mainstream approaches which provide either 
(1) rich descriptions of individual cases or (2) generalised but shallow models. The 
trade-off is overcome by combining qualitative, quantitative, and simulation analysis.  
Chapter 3 answers RQ2. This chapter applies the data-driven modelling method 
developed in chapter 2 to investigate the overall structure of innovation processes. It 
proposes an integrated innovation model which was formed on the basis of 
understanding the more fine-grained patterns underlying innovations. In particular, our 
model integrates the seemingly contradictory models, namely the linear innovation 
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model and the cyclical innovation model. By means of modelling activities and 
identifying interaction patterns of the activities, this chapter is able to show consistency 
of the different perspectives.  
Chapter 4 answers RQ3. This chapter investigates the emergent properties of 
innovation systems and provides managerial advices on how to enable the emergence 
of technological innovations. An explicit definition of emergence is given. A 
theoretical explanation of the underlying mechanism of emergence is provided. 
Moreover, guidance about what R&D and innovation managers can do to enable 
emergence is offered. 
Chapter 5 answers RQ4. This chapter provides a simulation model of the emergence 
of technological innovations. The emergence is simulated as a collective order arising 
from action-reaction chains of heterogeneous activities. The simulation model is 
calibrated and verified using an empirical innovation case, namely the Nylon 
innovation. Seven what-if scenarios are designed to test the effect of different 
interventions on the innovation path. 
Chapter 6 concludes by summarising the answers to research questions 1 to 4 and 
providing an answer to the problem statement. Moreover, it reflects on the main 
contributions and limitations of the research, as well as presents recommendations for 
future research. 
There are three main contributions. (1) The study contributes to data science by 
providing a new approach to analyse qualitative data. (2) It contributes to innovation 
process theory (2a) by providing an advanced innovation model that combines 
seemingly contradictory innovation models and (2b) by theoretically investigating the 
emergence of technological innovations. (3) It contributes to decision making on 
innovations by providing a more comprehensive understanding of how and why 
innovation evolves over time, as well as a simulation model for decision support.  
In the end of the thesis, a vision on the future is given. We suggest more cooperation 









Innovatie is een fascinerende proces om te bestuderen. Daarnaast is het zeer relevant 
om dit proces nader te onderzoeken, vooral bestuurlijk gezien en ook theoretisch 
gezien. (1) Bestuurlijk: innovatieprocessen zijn cruciaal bij het bepalen van de 
economische groei van een land, het succes van een onderneming en de 
levensstandaard van de mensen. (2) Theoretisch: innovatieprocessen zijn inherent 
dynamische fenomenen die dynamische theorieën nodig hebben om begrepen te 
worden.  
Edoch, een goed begrip van de dynamiek van innovatieprocessen, waarbij uitgelegd 
wordt hoe en waarom innovaties evolueren in de tijd, bestaat nog altijd niet. 
Technologische innovatie is een multi-niveau fenomeen. De bestaande theorieën 
richten zich of wel op het micro-niveau van de operationele gegevens of op het macro-
niveau van geaggregeerde trends. Deze theorieën missen evenwel een systematische 
visie op innovatieprocessen, en dat leidt weer tot een onvoldoende begrip van de 
dynamiek van technologische innovatie. 
Het beperkte inzicht in de dynamiek van innovatieprocessen maakt de besluitvorming 
over innovatie moeilijk. Besluitvormers, zoals innovatie-beleidsmakers en innovatie-
managers, beschikken niet over een geavanceerde en realistische procestheorie om hen 
de weg te wijzen door de wirwar van innovatieprocessen. 
Het modelleren van de dynamiek van innovatieprocessen om tot een geavanceerde 
procestheorie te komen is moeilijk, vooral omdat de empirische basis voor 
innovatieprocessen theorieën vereist over grote hoeveelheden gegevens. Het 
verzamelen van deze gegevens is een moeilijke en arbeidsintensieve onderneming. 
Maar tegenwoordig, met de huidige ontwikkeling van Internet en geavanceerde 
computertechnologie, kunnen de grote hoeveelheden gegevens veel gemakkelijker en 
goedkoper worden vastgelegd en opgenomen. Dit betekent dat we de werkelijke 
innovatieprocessen opnieuw dienen te onderzoeken. De beschikbaarheid van grote 
hoeveelheden gegevens stelt ons in staat zicht te krijgen op de details van de 
onderliggende innovatieprocessen en om patronen die nodig zijn voor adequate 
ondersteuning van de besluitvorming te onderzoeken. 




PS: In hoeverre kunnen de nieuwe beschikbare grote hoeveelheden gegevens worden 
gebruikt om de besluitvorming over innovaties te verbeteren? 
Vanuit de bovenstaande probleemstelling, hebben we vier onderzoeksvragen (OVen) 
afgeleid. Onderzoeksvraag 1: Is het mogelijk om een data-gestuurde 
modelleringsmethode voor het bestuderen van innovatieprocessen te ontwikkelen? 
Onderzoeksvraag 2: Is het mogelijk om een geavanceerd model dat in staat is om twee 
schijnbaar tegenstrijdige modellen, namelijk het lineaire innovatiemodel en het 
cyclische innovatiemodel? 
Onderzoeksvraag 3: Wat betekent emergentie? En wat is het onderliggende 
mechanisme dat de emergentie vanuit  technologische innovaties voortbrengt? 
Onderzoeksvraag 4: Is het mogelijk om het emergente proces van innovatie te 
simuleren om zo de besluitvorming door innovatie-managers en beleidsmakers te 
ondersteunen? 
Om de bovenstaande onderzoeksvragen te adresseren, maken we gebruik van een 
theoretisch kader van innovatieve systeemfuncties. We richten ons vervolgens op de 
interactiepatronen tussen deze functies. Functies verwijzen naar activiteiten die 
betrokken zijn bij een innovatieproces, en niet naar de acteurs. Op deze wijze leiden de 
functies tot een dynamische benadering van het modelleren. We laten vervolgens zien 
hoe deze functies kunnen worden gebruikt om bij te houden wat er na verloop van tijd 
werkelijk gebeurt in innovatieprocessen. 
Naast de theoretische basis gebruiken we drie uitvoerig gedocumenteerde case studies. 
Hun identificatie is: (1) de Nylon casus, (2) de SSRI casus, en (3) de Teflon casus. De 
historische gegevens zijn afkomstig van het internet, relevante boeken en 
wetenschappelijke publicaties. 
Hieronder geven we een korte samenvatting van elk hoofdstuk. 
Hoofdstuk 1 geeft een bescheiden inleiding op de motivatie van dit onderzoek. Het 
beschrijft het belang van innovatie en de moeilijkheid van de besluitvorming tijdens 
innovaties. De recente beschikbaarheid van grote hoeveelheden data wordt benadrukt; 
dit kan immers leiden tot effectievere besluitvorming bij innovaties. 
Hoofdstuk 2 geeft antwoord op OV1. Dit hoofdstuk beschrijft een nieuwe data-
gestuurde modelleringsmethode voor innovatieproces-studies. De methode beoogt te 
profiteren van de snelle ontwikkeling van Internet en de digitale gegevensbronnen om 
uiteindelijk een geavanceerde procestheorie te ontwikkelen. We krijgen grip op de 
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uitwisseling van de mainstream benaderingen die ofwel (1) rijke beschrijvingen van 
individuele gevallen bevatten of (2) gegeneraliseerde maar ondiepe modellen 
aanbieden. De uitwisseling van onsamenhangende details wordt overwonnen door het 
combineren van kwalitatieve, kwantitatieve en simulatie-analyse. 
Hoofdstuk 3 geeft antwoord op OV2. Dit hoofdstuk past de data-gestuurde 
modelleringsmethode die ontwikkeld is in hoofdstuk 2 toe op de algemene structuur 
van innovatieprocessen. Er wordt een geïntegreerd innovatie-model geformuleerd dat is 
ontworpen op basis van het begrijpen van de meer fijnkorrelige patronen die ten 
grondslag liggen aan innovaties. In het bijzonder kunnen we stellen dat ons model de 
schijnbaar tegenstrijdige modellen, namelijk het lineaire innovatiemodel en het 
cyclische innovatiemodel, adequaat integreert. Door middel van het modelleren van 
activiteiten en het identificeren van interactiepatronen van de activiteiten, is dit 
hoofdstuk in staat om de consistentie van de verschillende perspectieven te laten zien. 
Hoofdstuk 4 geeft antwoord op OV3. Dit hoofdstuk onderzoekt de emergente 
eigenschappen van innovatiesystemen en geeft bestuurlijke adviezen over hoe de 
emergentie van technologische innovaties mogelijk gemaakt kan worden. Eerst wordt 
een expliciete definitie van emergentie gegeven. Vervolgens wordt een theoretische 
verklaring van het onderliggende mechanisme van emergentie geformuleerd. Daarna 
wordt uiteengezet wat R&D en innovatie-managers kunnen doen om emergentie te 
gebruiken. 
Hoofdstuk 5 geeft antwoord op OV4. Dit hoofdstuk beschrijft een simulatiemodel 
van het emergente gedrag van technologische innovaties. De emergentie wordt 
gesimuleerd als een collectieve geordende verzameling die het gevolg is van actie-
reactie ketens van heterogene activiteiten. Het simulatiemodel is gekalibreerd en 
geverifieerd met behulp van een casus over empirische innovatie, namelijk de Nylon-
innovatie. Zeven what-if scenario's zijn ontworpen om het effect van verschillende 
interventies op het innovatietraject te testen. 
Hoofdstuk 6 eindigt met een samenvatting van de antwoorden op de onderzoeksvragen 
1 tot 4 en het geven van een antwoord op de probleemstelling. Er vindt reflectie plaats 
over de belangrijkste bijdragen en beperkingen van het onderzoek. Voorts worden er 
aanbevelingen gedaan voor toekomstig onderzoek. 
De studie kent drie belangrijke bijdragen. (1) De studie draagt bij aan Data Science 
door een nieuwe benadering van kwalitatieve gegevens te analyseren. (2) Het draagt bij 
aan de theorievorming over het innovatieproces door middel van een geavanceerd 
innovatiemodel dat schijnbaar tegenstrijdige innovatie-modellen combineert alsmede 
door middel van theoretisch onderzoek naar de emergentie van technologische 
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innovaties. (3) Het draagt bij aan de besluitvorming over innovaties door het 
verstrekken van een meer omvattend begrip over hoe en waarom innovatie evolueert in 
de tijd, als ook door de beschrijving van een simulatiemodel voor de ondersteuning van 
de besluitvorming. Tenslotte geeft de thesis een visie op de toekomst. We stellen voor 
om de samenwerking tussen data science en social science te intensiveren. 
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